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ABSTRACT 
 
Social entrepreneurship and international business theory have not been 
properly introduced. Many authors conducted micro-studies within their field of 
interest but limited information has been published on the opportunity 
selection models and entry mode strategies that social entrepreneurs use to 
venture into foreign countries.  
 
The primary purpose of this study was then to introduce these distinct 
industries to one-another, transferring international business’s best practices 
into the social entrepreneurship arena.  
 
A foundational research framework was selected, using Coetzee’s (2006a) 
“16 Vectors of Global Venture Creation” model as baseline. The deliverables 
of the research project, along with other interesting correlations made, can be 
attributed to the tapestry of lessons learnt from: 
 A comprehensive literature study,  
 The desktop analysis of 25 case studies as well as 
 In-depth interviews with 3 renowned social entrepreneurs. 
 
The outcome of the study is a Global Social Investment Model that will 
empower social entrepreneurs and investors with a means to structure their 
project proposals prior to entering a new country and to highlight problem 
areas within their existing proposals. 
  
The research project is by no means the miracle cure for world hunger, but it 
is definitely a paradigm shift that would enable social entrepreneurs to 
leverage the multitude of teachings contained in the vast selection of 
international business theories. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 SETTING  
THE LANDSCAPE 
On June 26, 2006, the international business world was shocked by the 
sudden announcement by one of its iconic leaders. The renowned US 
investor, Warren Buffet, announced that he would start giving the majority of 
his Berkshire Hathaway fortune away to philanthropic causes. This major 
contribution was part of a bigger phenomenon that was hitting the US. 
 
One of the most successful business men of his time, Bill Gates, announced 
in 2006 that he would be retiring as the head of Microsoft over a five year 
period. He was redirecting his efforts to join his wife, Melinda, in their struggle 
against poverty. He was ready to move beyond Maslow’s stage of self 
actualisation and come to a point where he can leave a legacy for generations 
to come. His commitment was authenticated by the $35 billion investment 
from his personal wealth into their foundation. He motivated his retirement 
from Microsoft by saying that their foundation was in need of the business 
skills so desperately needed to bring forth the desired changes.  
 
With Bill Gates at the helm of Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Buffet was 
convinced that his $30 billion gift would not go to waste. Suddenly, a single 
foundation had a capital budget bigger than the GDP of a small country and 
they were definitely a force to be reckoned with.  
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Bill, Melinda and Warren were not the only celebrities using their influence as 
activists against poverty. People like Oprah Winfrey, Madonna, U2’s lead 
singer Bono, Angelina Jolie, are all personally and financially involved the 
fight against poverty. Even the infamous US president, Bill Clinton, is now 
investing all his time and energy to combat poverty through the Bill Clinton 
Foundation. 
 
There has been an increased commitment from the G8 countries, UN, World 
Bank, political leaders, NGO’s, churches, etc. towards philanthropic activities. 
Even 32-36% of the Millennium Generation is labelled as “Bootstrappers” – 
people who are willing to trade the professional industry for a less glamorous 
setting where they actually make a difference.  
 
With all this eagerness to help, one must ask the question: What will they do 
differently from the previous generations to ensure success? What should be 
done differently if we want to shine a light into the “darkness” of Africa? Most 
of these people come from fist-world countries and the burning passion to 
make a difference might blind them from the realities at hand such as the: 
 Ever-growing economical distance between first-word and developing 
countries, 
 Difficulties of cultural and physical distance, 
 Reality of war, corrupt officials, death, 
 Magnitude and emotional burden of the problem… 
 
With all this money, energy, commitment and passion breeding around the 
world, one has to stand back and define success. There is too much at stake 
to sanction failure. One has to look at the past, learn from our father’s 
mistakes and build on their victories. Like the old saying goes: “Only an idiot 
will do the same thing twice, expecting different results.” 
 
In business, we have many ways to craft a strategy that will minimise risk and 
ensure maximum returns. Surely the same philosophy applies to social 
projects? There must be a way to guarantee success, identify risks, avoid 
pitfalls and maximise returns on social projects? 
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1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Is it possible to predict the health and improve the effectiveness of 
international (and domestic) social investment programs? 
 
The main focus of the research study will be to design a model that would 
assist international (and local) Social Entrepreneurs and other philanthropic 
foundations in opportunity and entry mode selection, using international 
business theory as basis for the study. The model will also assist as an 
international “best practice” guide for social interventions in the field 
 
The content of the model will be based on: 
 International business knowledge and best practices,  
 Social investment research findings, 
 Lessons learnt from other field and case studies 
 Interviews with successful social entrepreneurs and 
 Personal experience. 
 
Definition of Success: To empower social entrepreneurs with a tool that 
would allow them to invest their time, money and efforts effectively in those 
projects that will ensure measurable, long term sustainable success or the 
upfront structuring of the efforts that will increase the probability of success. 
 
Sub-Problems: 
 Is it applicable to re-interpret Coetzee’s “16 vectors of global venture 
creation”  (2006a) to suit the social entrepreneurship arena? 
 Craft a generic template using existing literature, case studies and 
interviews with specialists in the field. 
 Determine whether a generic template would be effective and identify any 
additional vectors to be addressed. 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
The research question can now be framed as follows: 
To what extent can the Vectors Model tailored to improve the effectiveness 
of international social investment programs? 
 
The specific research objectives are: 
1. To understand the theories underpinning the Vectors Model through a 
comprehensive literature review. 
2. By way of a desk-top analysis to re-interpret Coetzee’s (2006a) 16 vectors 
for the purpose of international social investment programs, and to craft a 
generic questionnaire for the existing 16 vectors. 
3. By way of case analysis and structured interviews to verify and enrich the 
above desktop analysis. 
4. Correlate and interpolate the social data with the foundational international 
business models. 
5. To tailor the Social Investment towards a practical management tool for 
social entrepreneurs to structure projects up-front for sustainable success. 
 
1.3 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
This study primarily focused to serve the needs of major international 
investments into Africa. The literature study was based on the main stream 
international findings but the case studies were predominantly based on work 
done in Bangladesh, India and Africa within the arenas of micro-finance and 
poverty related diseases like HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculoses.  
 
The Micro-finance and HIV/AIDS arenas have been chosen due to: 
 The number of successful social entrepreneurs operating in these areas, 
 Major strategic focus of  Millennium Development Goals and Gates 
foundation 
 Amounts of data availability. 
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The interviews were limited to: 
 International Social Investment Organisations operating in South Africa,  
 Social entrepreneurs and social workers operating in Southern Africa, 
especially South Africa. 
 
1.4 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
 The re-interpretation of Coetzee’s 16 vectors of global venture creation 
(2006a)  will result in an effective social project health monitoring tool. 
 The generic template will be effective in most of the social investment 
programs but not all the vectors will always be applicable.  
 The template will be applicable to other developing countries but the actual 
implementation details will differ between the various projects. 
  
1.5 DEFINITIONS 
 Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with 
perfect equality (where everyone has the same income) and 1 
corresponds with perfect inequality (where one person has all the income, 
and everyone else has zero income). 
 
1.6 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
The world is in dire straits. The rich are getting richer and the poor are left 
behind. The mere fact that people have good intentions does not guarantee 
that the social program will succeed. Many social investment programs are 
driven by people who reacted to the need, and they aren’t necessarily 
equipped to manage projects of this nature.  
 
Africa is a classic example where numerous efforts showed little returns. It is 
not just the financial losses that occur during the failure of these projects, but 
more important – dreams and expectations of a better life are shattered. This 
often leaves deeper scars than poverty itself. 
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This study will equip social entrepreneurs and companies with the easy to use 
toolbox that will help them to realise the nature of their undertaking and to 
craft their strategy to ensure long-term sustainable success.  
 
It is also a user friendly and understandable tool to be used by investors. They 
can use it to determine the heath of a particular proposal and it will give them 
greater comfort knowing that the money will be invested in sustainable 
projects with measurable outcomes. 
 
1.7 TARGETED AUDIENCE  
This research report is primarily aimed at: 
 Major foundations like the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation, Bill Clinton 
Foundation and the Nelson Mandela Children Fund, etc. 
 Other high profile social entrepreneurs and investors like Mark 
Shuttleworth, Oprah Winfrey, Bono, Graham Power, etc. 
 Actively involved global organisations like the United Nations, World Bank, 
World Health, etc. 
 Political officials, social service, non-governmental organisational and 
religious leaders operating in philanthropic activities. 
 Lecturers of Unisa’s School of Business Leadership as partial fulfilments of 
the MBL study. 
 
1.8 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
The research report is structured in three sections. The first section (chapters 
1 – 3) sets the tone for the study, using academic as well as statistical data to 
paint the picture. The second portion (chapters 4 and 5) contains the research 
methodology and findings, where the last section (chapter 6 and 7) contains 
the final product, along with the relevant conclusions and recommendations. 
Table 1.1 contains a brief synopsis and outline of the research report. 
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Table 1.1: Outline of the research report. 
Chapter Contents 
Chapter 1: 
Setting the Landscape 
This chapter starts off by painting a picture of the birth of the 
research problem and then provides the reader with a clear 
understanding of the importance, scope, objectives, 
definitions and framework of the research report. 
Chapter 2: 
The Growing Need for 
Social Entrepreneurs 
In this chapter we start to introduce the reader to the concept 
of social entrepreneurship by giving more details on their 
typical characteristics. The researcher then takes the reader 
on a journey through the problems faced and current 
solutions on offer. The chapter reveals the urgency for social 
entrepreneurs, especially within Southern Africa. 
Chapter 3: 
Literature Review 
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the research 
problem. It is based on the assumption that there is a 
correlation between social entrepreneurship and international 
business and that the same techniques would be applicable 
to both environments. The chapter contains information drawn 
from various international business models, as summarised 
by Coetzee’s (2006a) Global Creation Model.  
Chapter 4: 
Research Methodology 
Here the reader will be shown how the international business 
theory is tailored for the social entrepreneurial environment. 
The research methodology is broken down into seven distinct 
phases, each with their own deliverables. The researcher 
provides the necessary detail to convince the reader of the 
validity of the processes, techniques and measurement 
instruments used to produce well-founded results. 
Chapter 5: 
Research Results 
This chapter contains the analysis of the case study and 
interview data, coded down to each vector within the Global 
Creation Model.  
Chapter 6: 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
This chapter contains the correlation of the research data with 
the original business theory as well as the formulation and 
description of the Global/Local Social Investment Model. It 
also concludes the research work done, the outcome of the 
results achieved as well as recommendations for future 
studies and applications of the social investment model. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 THE GROWING NEED FOR  
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 
 
Social Entrepreneur (n):  
1. “A person who uses creative business practice to start a social services 
organisation.” 1 
2. “Society’s change agent; pioneer of innovation that benefits humanity”2 
 
According to Ashoka (2007), social entrepreneurs are nothing different from 
business entrepreneurs. Where business entrepreneurs create and transform 
whole industries, social entrepreneurs: 
 Act as the change agents for society,  
 Improve systems,  
 Invent and disseminate new approaches and  
 Advance sustainable solutions that create social value. 
 
They go further by saying that the only difference for social entrepreneurs is 
that they primarily seek to generate "social value" rather than profits. They are 
also different from the majority of non-profit organisations, whose focus is to 
solve immediate and small-scale problems, by intentionally aiming for long-
term and sustainable change. 
                                            
1
 Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English, 2007 
2
 Skoll Foundation Website, 2007 
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According to Oregon Public Broadcasting (2005), there has been a 
phenomenal growth in the arena of social development since the early 80’s. 
The growth is mainly contributed to the same lesson learnt throughout the 
railroad, stock market, manufacturing and digital revolutions…  
 
“Nothing is as powerful as a revolutionary idea as when it is led by a first- 
class entrepreneur”  
 
Classical examples of leading and historical social entrepreneurs include:3  
 Florence Nightingale (UK): The mother and founder of modern nursing 
through her efforts to improve hospital conditions and establishment of the 
first school for nurses. 
 Jane Addams (USA): She founded the Hull-House in 1889, a social 
settlement aimed to improve the living conditions in a poor immigrant 
neighbourhood in Chicago. Ultimately her efforts resulted in protective 
legislation for women and children. 
 Jean Monnet (France): Was responsible for the reconstruction of the 
French economy following World War II, the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), who pioneered the notion 
of the European Union. 
 Maria Montessori (Italy): The first female physician in Italy; renowned for 
her revolutionary education method that allows each child to realise his or 
her full potential by fostering social skills, emotional growth and physical 
coordination, in addition to cognitive preparation. 
 Vinoba Bhave (India): He is renowned for the redistribution of more than 
7,000,000 acres of land to aid India's poorest.  
 
                                            
3
 Examples listed in Ashoka, 2005; Skoll, 2007 and Oregon Public Broadcasting, 2005 
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Modern Social Entrepreneurs Include: 
 Muhammad Yunus (Bangladesh): Winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace 
Prize for his revolutionary work to uplift the poorest in Bangladesh, and 58 
other countries around the world. His model revolutionised economics 
through founding the Grameen Bank, or "village bank," in 1976 whereby 
he used social micro-finance programs to uplift the poorest of poor. 
 Lady Diana (Princess of Wales) and Mother Theresa: Both these fine 
woman were renowned for great hearts, public affection for the poor, level 
of influence across the world and noble efforts towards the needy. 
 Bill Clinton: Bill founded the Bill Clinton Foundation after his term as US 
president expired. He is now using his charisma, influence and 
relationships built during his presidential years to combat poverty and 
HIV/AIDS in developing countries. 
 Various Celebrities: Hollywood legends like Bono (U2), Oprah Winfrey, 
Angelina Jolie, Madonna, Will Smith, etc. are all openly proclaiming their 
stance against poverty. Not only are they deemed as activists by society, 
but they are also actively involved through personal effort and financial 
assistance to combat the terror of the 21st century. 
 
As the efforts of these historical figures illustrate, the term "social 
entrepreneur" is a new definition for an ever-present phenomenon rooted in 
the DNA of mankind. 
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2.1 THE DNA OF A SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR 
"Social entrepreneurs are not content just to give a fish or teach how to fish. 
They will not rest until they have revolutionised the fishing industry." 
Bill Drayton, CEO, chair and founder of Ashoka4 
 
According to the Skoll Foundation (2007), successful social entrepreneurs 
are: 
 Ambitious: They have to tackle major issues (poverty, diseases, 
education, etc.) which might seem impossible to the average person.  
 Mission Driven: The satisfaction from responding to the need usually 
outweighs the rewards within the industry. Some of the aspects of social 
projects contain wealth creation, but it is always a means to an end. The 
mission and objective is always to promote organised social change. 
 Strategic: It is very easy to get lost in the jungle of desperateness out 
there. Like business entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs see and act upon 
strategies which others might miss. Like the best business entrepreneurs, 
social entrepreneurs are intensely focused and relentless in their pursuit of 
the crafted social vision.  
 Creatively Resourceful: Because social entrepreneurs operate within a 
social context rather than the business world, they have limited access to 
capital and traditional market support systems. As a result, social 
entrepreneurs must be exceptionally skilled at assembling and mobilising 
human, financial and political resources.  
 Results Oriented: Ultimately, successful social entrepreneurs are driven 
to show short-tem and long-term measurable return on investment to their 
investors. These results include the transformation of historical barriers, 
paving new ways for the disadvantaged, unlocking the potential within the 
afflicted society to bring forth change, etc. 
 
                                            
4
 Ashoka, a leading global non-profit organisation devoted to developing the profession of social entrepreneurship. 
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Dees stated in 1998 that social entrepreneurs play the role of change agents 
in their industry by (Dees, 1998): 
 Adopting a mission to create and sustain social value (not just private 
value). 
 Recognising and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to serve that 
mission 
 Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, and learning. 
 Acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand, and 
 Exhibiting heightened accountability to the constituencies served and for 
the outcomes created. 
 
There is a distinct trend throughout literature that successful social 
entrepreneurs share a committed passion towards pioneering ways that will 
reshape a society and eventually benefit humanity. As the Skoll Foundation 
(2007) puts it… 
 
“Social entrepreneurs are solution-minded pragmatists who are not afraid to 
tackle some of the world’s biggest problems.” 
 
2.1.1 Ashoka’s Selection Criteria for Successful Social 
Entrepreneurs 
One of Ashoka’s key success factors is their recruitment strategy. They 
realised that great problems are solved by great people who are anchored in 
the following five criteria (Ashoka, 2007):   
(a) The Knockout Test: A New Idea 
Dreams are passions born from within the heart and not bestowed upon the 
shoulders of a giant. The primary requirement for Ashoka is that the candidate 
must be overly excited and contaminated by their new idea on how to solve a 
particular social problem. The idea must be radical and good enough to effect 
permanent change in a particular environment. The idea is also benchmarked 
against historical success as well as current work done by existing members.  
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(b) Creativity 
Ashoka believes that successful social entrepreneurs must be creative both 
as goal-setting visionaries and as problem solvers, capable of engineering 
their visions into reality. They also believe that creativity does not appear 
overnight, and the candidate would have to give detailed examples of how 
(s)he turned previous visions into reality. The new idea mentioned in the 
previous paragraph is also used as an indicator towards the candidate’s ability 
to craft new strategies for age old problems. 
(c) Entrepreneurial Quality 
This criterion is the cornerstone of their success to date. They are interested 
in leaders who see opportunities for change and innovation and devote 
themselves entirely to making that change happen. These men and woman 
must be entirely committed to their dreams, and must be willing to invest at 
least ten to fifteen years in launching their ideas into reality.  
(d) Social Impact of the Idea 
Ashoka believes that the dream must be bigger than the person itself. With 
this criterion, the focus is not on the dreamer but rather the probable impact 
that the dream will eventually have on the macro-environment. In other words, 
they will not support the launch of a new school or clinic unless it forms part of 
a broader strategy to reform the education or health system at the national 
and international levels. 
(e) Ethical Fibre 
Social entrepreneurs have to be trusted with a society’s future, people’s lives 
and even budgets that are worth more than the GDP of the society they are 
impacting. If the entrepreneur is not trustworthy, the likelihood of success is 
significantly reduced. People’s expectations and dreams are demolished and 
Ashoka will do anything to minimise that risk of setting someone up for failure.  
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Candidates are questioned, traced, investigated and referenced during the 
evaluation process. At times they even resort to their instincts and gut feelings 
when the rational analysis seems conflicting. No candidate will become a 
member when the slightest hint of doubt exists in the committee’s minds. 
2.1.2 Conclusion on Social Entrepreneurs 
Now that we know what a social entrepreneur is made of, one has to dig a bit 
deeper in order to understand the hearts of these astounding men and woman 
who are willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good of others. One has 
to take a deep look into the eyes of their “clients”. One must listen to the 
children’s hopeless crying and smell the rotten stench of death around them. 
One must look through the clouds of darkness and realise that their hope lies 
in the in the light that we bear and the willingness entrenched in our hearts… 
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2.2 THEIR DILEMMA 
2.2.1 Poverty 
“Poverty is pain; it feels like a disease. It attacks a person not only materially 
but also morally. It eats away one’s dignity and drives one into total despair” 
- A poor woman, Moldova5 - 
 
“If we knew that there would be an end to this crisis, we would endure it 
somehow. Be it for one year, or even for ten years. But now all we can do is 
sit and wait for the end to come.” 
 - A woman from Entropole, Bulgaria5 - 
 
Extreme poverty is defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1 per 
person per day and moderate poverty as less than $2 per person per day5.  
 
According to the statistics released:  
 In 2001, it has been estimated that 1 billion people had consumption levels 
below $1 a day, and 2.7 billion lived on less than $2 a day6.  
 30% of all deaths are poverty related. That entails to 18 million people a 
year or 50,000 per day7. 
 In 2005, about 10.1 million children died before they reached their fifth 
birthday. Almost all of these deaths occurred in developing countries, 75% 
of them in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the two regions that also 
suffer from the highest rates of hunger and malnutrition8. 
 800 million people go to bed hungry every day7. 
 About a billion people have no access to safe drinking water9. 
 Nearly a billion people entered the 21st century unable to read a book or 
sign their names and more than 100 million children do not go to school9. 
                                            
5 World Bank Group, 2007 
6
 UN Development Goals Report, 2006 
7
 Poverty, Wikipedia 2007 
8
 World Food Programme, 2007 
9
 Department for International Development, 2007 
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Since 1990, the world has seen great results in the combat against poverty, 
but the progress has not been equally spread across the globe.  The major 
trends in poverty reduction have been dominated by rapid growth in China, 
East Asia and Pacific region. Poverty also declined moderately in South Asia 
over the past 20 years. All these efforts resulted in 45 million people freed 
from the claws of poverty (UN Development Goals Report, 2006) 
 
Figure 2.1: World income map, highlighting areas where people live on less than $2 a 
day 
 
Source: Poverty – Wikipedia (2007)  
 
Where other regions have seen little or no change, in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
picture turned daunting over the past two decades (World Development 
Indicators, 2004):  
 GDP per capita shrank 14%,  
 Poverty rose from 41% in 1981 to 46% in 2001, and  
 An additional 150 million people were living in extreme poverty. 
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To make matters worse, the gap between the rich and poor are ever 
increasing. Even within African countries, one can see a major difference in 
income levels, making the problem even more excruciating. Table 2.1 
illustrates the growing epidemic of income inequality across the globe, 
especially Africa (9 out of the 20 countries on the list). 
Table 2.1: Top twenty countries in the world with the greatest income inequality  
 Countries with greatest inequality Gini Index Lowest 20% 
Highest 
20% 
1 Sierra Leone 62.9 1.1% 63.4% 
2 Central African Republic 61.3 2 65 
3 Swaziland 60.9 2.7 64.4 
4 Brazil 60.7 2.2 64.1 
5 Nicaragua 60.3 2.3 63.6 
6 South Africa 59.3 2.9 64.8 
7 Paraguay 57.7 1.9 60.7 
8 Colombia 57.1 3 60.9 
9 Chile 56.7 3.3 61 
10 Honduras 56.3 2.2 59.4 
11 Guinea-Bissau 56.2 2.1 58.9 
12 Lesotho 56 2.8 60.1 
13 Guatemala 55.8 3.8 60.6 
14 Burkina Faso 55.1 4.6 60.4 
15 Mexico 53.1 3.5 57.4 
16 Zambia 52.6 3.3 56.6 
17 Hong Kong, China 52.2 4.4 57.1 
18 El Salvador 52.2 3.3 56.4 
19 Papua New Guinea 50.9 4.5 56.5 
20 Nigeria 50.6 4.4 55.7 
Source: Infoplease (2007) 
To put table 2.1 in context, one must zoom into a specific example: The top 
20% earners in South Africa earn 64.8% of the GNI compared to the 2.9% of 
the lowest income group. Comparing these results for South Africa, one 
realise that the richest people in the country earn 22.3 times more money than 
the poor in the same country! These differences are clearly creating 
boundaries between members of the population, putting more pressure on 
governments to alleviate the face of poverty.  
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2.2.2 HIV and AIDS10 
Every month more people die of HIV/AIDS related diseases in the world than 
the sum of deaths (229,866) incurred during the historical 2004 Asian 
Tsunami.11 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/Aids (UNAIDS) released the following statistics (table 2.2) 
in their “2006 Report on the global AIDS Epidemic, December 2006 Update” 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2006) 
 
Table 2.2: UNAIDS/WHO global HIV/AIDS statistics for 2006.  
Number of people living with HIV in 2006 
Total 39.5 million (34.1–47.1 million) 
Adults 37.2 million (32.1–44.5 million) 
Women 17.7 million (15.1–20.9 million) 
Children under 15 years 2.3 million (1.7–3.5 million) 
People newly infected with HIV in 2006 
Total 4.3 million (3.6–6.6 million) 
Adults 3.8 million (3.2–5.7 million) 
Children under 15 years 530 000 (410 000–660 000) 
People newly infected with HIV in 2006 
Total 2.9 million (2.5–3.5 million) 
Adults 2.6 million (2.2–3.0 million) 
Children under 15 years 380 000 (290 000–500 000) 
Source: UNAIDS/WHO (2006) 
                                            
10
 The statistics, facts and figures quoted in this section are directly taken from (UNAIDS/WHO, 2006) and 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2006 update). 
11Averaged assumption, based on the figures released in (UNAIDS /WHO, 2006 update) and (UN Tsunami, 2005)  
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To be honest, 39.5 mill people infected with HIV does not seem so 
overwhelming when glancing at the above mentioned figures. The statisticians 
will tell you that only 0.59% of the 6.6 billion people across the world (US 
Census, 2007) are infected with HIV and the value is small and insignificant.  
 
It is only when one starts to look into the demographics of this “little” monster 
that one can fully grasp the magnitude of devastation being caused. 
(a) A Closer Look … 
Figure 2.2: HIV Global demographics and estimations for 2006 
 
 Source: UNAIDS /WHO (2006) 
 
Figure 2.2 clearly shows that the epidemic is definitely not spread equally 
across the world and that Sub-Sahara Africa, especially Southern Africa is 
severely under attack. With this in mind, the next step would be to shift our 
focus into the affected areas within Sub-Sahara Africa. 
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Figure 2.3: HIV demographics and estimations within Sub-Sahara Africa, 2006 
 
 Source: UNAIDS /WHO (2006) 
The following facts from the UNAIDS/WHO survey definitely starts to put 
Africa’s dilemma into perspective. In 2005… 
 More than 10% of the world’s population lived in Sub-Sahara Africa, but 
almost 64%, or 24.5 million (21.6 - 27.4 mil) of the global HIV population 
were also identified within this region.  
 Two million (1.5 - 3.0 mil) of these people are children younger than 15 
years of age. Again, almost 90% of children living with HIV are situated in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
 An estimated 2.7 mil (2.3 - 3.1 mil) people in the region became newly 
infected, while 2.0 mil (1.7 - 2.3 mil) adults and children died of AIDS.  
 At the time of the study, there were some 12.0 mil (10.6 - 13.6 mil) 
orphans living in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 75% of all women (15 years and older) living with HIV are in sub-Saharan 
Africa. They comprise an estimated or 59%, or 13.2 mil (11.4 - 15.1 mil), of 
adults living with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 33% of the global AIDS related deaths, 930 000 (790 000–1.1 mil) were 
recorded in Southern Africa. 
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The 2006 UNAIDS/WHO report concludes that Southern Africa still remains 
the global epicentre of the AIDS epidemic.  
 Almost one in three people infected with HIV globally live in this sub-
region.  
 About 43%, or 860 000 (560 000 - 1.4 mil) of all children (under 15 years) 
living with HIV are in Southern Africa, 
  Approximately 52% or 6.8 mil (5.9 - 7.7 mil) of all women (15 years and 
older) infected with HIV live in this region. 
 
To make matters worse, according to the UNAIDS/WHO 2006 report, South 
Africa’s AIDS epidemic is one of the worst in the world and is not yet showing 
any signs of decline. At 2005, South Africa’s statistics seemed very 
discouraging: 
 An estimated 5.5 mil (4.9 - 6.1 mil) people were living with HIV.  
 An estimated 18.8% (16.8% - 20.7%) of the adult population (15 - 49 
years) were infected. 
 Almost one in three pregnant women attending public antenatal clinics 
were living with HIV in 2004 and  
 Trends over time show a gradual increase in HIV prevalence.  
 
Suddenly, the major global problems are to be found on our doorstep; far 
more severe than the “romantic” documentaries portrayed on your favourite 
news network … 
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2.3 WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
“It’s not ok to have a child dying for the lack of a 20c immunisation.  
It’s not ok to have a child dying for the lack of food in its belly in the 21st 
century.  
That’s not ok anymore…” 
- Bono, World Famous Pop Singer and Poverty Activist - 
 
2.3.1 Millennium Development Goals12 
In September 2000, 189 countries signed the Millennium Declaration, which 
led to the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs 
are a set of eight goals for which 18 numerical targets have been set and over 
40 quantifiable indicators have been identified.  
 
The goals are: 
 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
 Achieve universal primary education. 
 Promote gender equality and empower women. 
 Reduce child mortality. 
 Improve maternal health. 
 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. 
 Ensure environmental sustainability. 
 Develop a global partnership for development. 
 
While each goal is important in its own right, they should be viewed together 
as they are mutually reinforcing. This is seen a giant leap for mankind but 
many still doubt whether these goals would be achieved. Achieving them will 
require building capacity for effective, democratic, and accountable 
governance, protection of human rights, and respect for the rule of law.  
 
                                            
12
 Taken from the UN website, Millennium Development Goals and Background 
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2.3.2 AIDS Treatment 
Figure 2.4: HIV prevalence rates across the globe compared to that of Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Source: UNAIDS/WHO (2006).  
 
Globally, it seems as if the disease has stabilised at almost 1%, in terms of 
the percentage of the global population infected with HIV. This is only 
comforting until one realises that the global population is growing daily and 
that the disease is still in fact spreading among adults at a rapid rate.  
CHAPTER 2 THE GROWING NEED FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 24 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage figures are showing a decline, and the 
spread rate took a turn for the better in 2000.  
 
According to the UNAIDS/WHO 2006 report, Southern Africa remains in an 
uncontrolled state. The good news is that access to antiretroviral therapy in 
Southern Africa has increased more than eight-fold since the end of 2003, 
with about 810 000 people on treatment in December 2005. About one in six 
(17%) of the 4.7 million people in need of antiretroviral therapy in this region 
now receive it. The flip side is that coverage is reaching or exceeding 50% in 
only three countries (Botswana, Namibia and Uganda) but remaining below 
20% in most others. South Africa accounts for one quarter of all people 
receiving antiretroviral therapy in sub-Saharan Africa, and still doesn’t 
manage to get the spreading under control. 
 
Chapter 8 of the UNAIDS/WHO 2006 report noted various social economic 
problems being faced by families affected by HIV/AIDS. Infected parents 
reach a stage where they are unable to continue their daily work and 
eventually the family looses a major source of income. Many a time the 
children loose both parents and they are stranded, forced to leave school in 
order to provide food for their families. The report note the possibility of 
governments and social organisations to provide subsidised antiretroviral 
medication to prolong the symptoms while using micro-finance options to help 
a family becoming self-sustaining again after the loss of a loved one. 
 
This solution hits the heart of poverty – combating deadly diseases while 
preparing the family to become self-sufficient through micro-loans, education 
and any other creative means possible. 
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2.3.3 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation provides aid to all states in the US and 
towards more than 100 countries across the globe. The organisational 
structure consists of a centrally operated head office, overseeing three major 
divisions (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2007): 
 Global Development Program 
 Global Health Program 
 United States Program 
 
According to their website (gatesfoundation.org, 2007),  
 The Global Development Program will focus their support efforts to 
improve crop production and access to markets for smaller farmers 
because the poor mainly rely on agriculture for food and income. Financial 
services for the poor, like loans, insurance and savings will help people 
fend off financial setbacks and build up their assets. Information is a 
source of power against poverty, and thus the reason for their involvement 
in public access to computing in libraries world wide. 
 The Global Health Program focus their resources in providing access to 
drugs, vaccines and other tools needed to fight diseases in developing 
countries as well as research towards developing effective, affordable and 
practical health solutions. 
 The mission of the United States Program is to reduce inequities and 
improve access to opportunities by increasing the amount of students who 
graduate from high school, improve the quality of life for at-risk citizens of 
Washington state & Greater Portland and expand the access to 
information through technology in public libraries who serve low-income 
and disadvantaged communities. 
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Figure 2.5: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s organisational structure. 
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As a future social entrepreneur, their strategy seems sound and solid. The 
questions are rather whether: 
 A “charity” organisation can operate on the same rules as a multi-billion 
dollar company? 
 Bill Gates will be able to translate his experience and orchestrate a 
successful cross-over from business to social entrepreneur? 
 
Time will tell whether Bill Gates managed to cross-over, but for the time being, 
we will start to translate existing international business theory into tools 
applicable for the evaluation of social investment programs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Coetzee (2006a) developed unpublished works, named the “16 Vectors of 
Global Venture Creation”, that primarily focuses on opportunity and entry 
mode selection of international business activities. He constructed the sixteen 
vector model, creatively combing all mainstream models within the current 
international business literature to form a simple and effective toolbox for 
companies who are seeking ways to evaluate their prospective offshore 
opportunities.  
 
For the Opportunity Selection section, he used: 
 Ghemawat’s (2001) CAGE model  
 Dagnino’s (2003) Capability & Opportunity Space Model  
 Coetzee’s (2006b) Global Opportunity Selection 3D Model  
 
And for the Entry Mode Selection section, he applied knowledge from 
 Shi, Sui & Ho’s (2001) Conceptual Framework of Entry Mode Choice  
 Wild, Wild & Han’s (2006) Evolution of the Entry Mode Decisions  
 Pan & Tse’s (2000) Hierarchical Model of Entry Modes  
 
The 16-vector model was selected as the baseline for the research design 
because it can easily be tailored to suit a specific industry, company and even 
a single transaction, depending on the particular requirement. 
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3.1 GHEMAWAT’S CAGE MODEL 
Ghemawat (2001) argued that the distance between two countries will 
manifest itself in the four basic dimensions of Cultural -, Administrative -, 
Geographical - and Economic Distance13. Although the world is ‘shrinking’ by 
the day due to exponential technological developments, one can never 
eliminate the total cost of distance. 
3.1.1 Cultural Distance (V1) 
The old saying: “As far as the east is from the west” really gets a new 
meaning when a citizen from the west travels to the east (and visa versa). The 
actual physical distance is nothing compared to the cultural distance between 
two individuals of these origins. Culture is a complex paradigm of interlinked 
variables such as values, norms, social structure, religion, language, 
education, etc, all working together to create a distance barrier between two 
countries. 
 
National cultural distance can therefore be defined as the “extent to which the 
shared norms and values in one country differ from those in another”  
- Chen & Hu, 2002; Hofstede, 2001; Kogut & Singh, 1988 - 
 
A number of cultural frameworks exist to evaluate the dimensions of national 
culture, but Hofstede’s (1980) and Swhwartz’s (1992) dimensions of national 
culture are acknowledged as the main pillars on which current literature is 
based (Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006). 
 
Hoffstede’s framework consists of four dimensions assigned to each country, 
varied between 0 and 100. Hoffstede’s four dimensions are described in Table 
3.1, while Schwartz’s dimensions are described in table 3.2 on the following 
page. 
 
 
 
                                            
13
 Refer to Appendix 1 for application details on Ghemawat’s CAGE model. 
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Table 3.1: Hofstede’s four dimensions of cultural distance.  
Dimension Description 
Power The extent to which people believe and accept that power and status are distributed unequally. 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
The extent to which people are threatened by 
uncertain, unknown or unstructured situations. 
Individualism / 
Collectivism 
Refers to the degree to which a society emphasises 
the role of the individual as opposed to the group.   
Masculinity / 
Femininity 
This dimension refers to the extent to which a society 
emphasises traditional masculine values 
(competitiveness, assertiveness, achievement, 
ambition) as apposed to feminine ones (nurturing, 
helping others, quality of life, relationships) 
Adapted from: Hofstede (1980) 
 
Table 3.2: Schwartz’s four dimensions of cultural distance. 
Dimension Description 
Conservatism 
This represents a culture’s emphasis on maintaining 
the status quo, propriety and restraining actions that 
may disrupt the traditional order of the group. 
Intellectual & 
Affective Autonomy 
It refers to the extent to which people are free to 
independently pursue their own ideas, intellectual 
directions and their emotional desires. 
Hierarchy / 
Egalitarian 
Commitment 
Hierarchy refers to the extent to which it is legitimate to 
distribute power, roles and resources as apposed to 
the extent to which people are inclined to voluntary put 
aside selfish interests to promote the welfare of others. 
Mastery / Harmony 
Mastery expresses the importance of getting ahead by 
being self-assertive as opposed to fitting harmoniously 
into the environment. 
 Adapted from: Schwartz (1999) 
Cultural distance is an extremely complex, but very important parameter in 
international business and can’t be investigated in isolation. Effects of tangible 
attributes like language is easily comprehended, but subtle variables like 
social norms complicate life even more when they impact other vectors in the 
model. 
With this in mind, one should always remember that the vectors are 
interconnected and a variance in one can ripple right through the system. 
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3.1.2 Administrative or Political Distance (V2) 
According to Ghemawat (2001, p142) “Historical and political associations 
between two countries greatly affect trade between them.” He goes even 
further by giving the example that colony-coloniser links between two 
countries can boost trade by 900%. He also states that other factors such as 
preferential trading arrangements, common currency and political union can 
also increase trade by up to 300%. 
 
Ghemawat continues by stating that political distance is created (and 
increased) by the governments of home or target countries via tariffs, trade 
quotas, restrictions on foreign direct investment, local supplier preference 
through subsidies, favouritism in regulation procurement, etc. These barriers 
are usually created to protect and stimulate the companies within the local 
industry if it: 
 Is a large employer. 
 Is seen as a national champion. 
 Is vital to national security. 
 Produces staples foods or products. 
 Produces “entertainment” goods or service. 
 Exploits national resources. 
 Involves high sunk-cost commitments. 
 
He ends off by saying that a country’s lack of, or weak social infrastructure 
could also increase the trade barrier between countries due to the impact of 
crime, corruption, social conflict, weak legal systems on investor confidence.   
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3.1.3 Geographical Distance (V3) 
It is very important to consider the accessibility and availability of 
communication and infrastructure networks when assessing the geographic 
influences on cross-border activity.”  
- Ghemawat (2001) - 
 
Trade conditions are very susceptible to geographic distance, but according to 
Ghemawat (2001), one should also consider factors such as: 
 Physical size of the home and host countries. 
 Average within country distance towards borders and exporting facilities. 
 Access to waterways and the ocean. 
 Country topology. 
 Access to the country’s communication, transportation and electrical 
supply infrastructure. 
 
He concludes that companies might consider foreign direct investment when 
the distance barrier reaches a certain limit, but this is not always the preferred 
option. According to him, most companies would rather elect to defer the 
trade option instead of submitting themselves to the capital risk. 
3.1.4 Economic Distance (V4) 
“The wealth or income of consumers is the most important economic attribute 
that crates distance between countries.” 
- Ghemawat (2001) - 
 
In Ghemawat’s article (2001), he notes that rich countries trade mostly with 
other rich countries, and that poor countries also trade more with the rich than 
with their counterparts. He also states that companies that rely on economies 
of scale, experience and standardisation should focus more on countries that 
have similar profiles because it is very easy to replicate their existing business 
profile within the host country; maximising their existing competitive 
advantage.  
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It is almost impossible for a person who receives $10,000 per month to relate 
to an individual who is sustaining his/her family on less than $10 a day. In 
order to overcome this enormous distance barrier other alternatives, such as 
mediatory companies, should be utilised when establishing trade between 
these countries. It is therefore imperative to understand the secondary 
implications of the economical distance between countries when evaluating 
factors such as country attractiveness, entry mode selection, risk, experience, 
etc.  
 
3.2 DAGNINO’S CAPABILITY & OPPORTUNITY SPACE 
MODEL 
Figure 3.1:Capability and Opportunity space model. 
Foresight
Capability Space
Opportunity Space
Mindfulness Judgement
Luck
Firm's strategy at time t0...t2... t4...
(Potential Gap Bridging)
Firm's strategy at time t1...t3...t5...
(Realised Gap Bridging)
Feedback Feedforward
 
 Adapted from: Dagnino (2003) 
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In order to fully grasp the value of Dagnino’s Opportunity and Space model 
(2003), one has to familiarise oneself with the definitions of the various 
building blocks: 
 Capability space is “A complex multidimensional evolving space of the 
firm’s strategic capabilities, accessible by the firm at any given point in 
time. 
 Opportunity space is “A complex multidimensional, evolving space in 
which all the productive opportunities within the range of a firm’s 
perception and action at one point in time and in a definite context are 
present.”  
 Foresight refers to the firm’s strategic ability to anticipate the nature and 
the span of the strategy gap and respond to it. 
 Mindfulness is the ability to match the capability and opportunity spaces 
by means of creative and insightful strategic decisions. 
 Entrepreneurial Judgement is defined as the ability to  
 Discover new ways of dealing with known problems,  
 Creating and tackling new problems and  
 Knowledge to be able to perceive new opportunities outside the 
established routines. 
 Luck is a firm’s unexpected and unintentional success in matching the 
strategy gap better than expected (and than other players). 
 
Without diving into the details, the objective of any company should be to use 
their existing resources to exploit the available opportunities. In reality, no 
company has the capabilities and strategies in place to exploit the all the 
available opportunities, since the opportunities available in the market are 
dynamic of nature. Instead, the company must craft their strategy in t0, using a 
combination of foresight, mindfulness, judgement and luck to close the gap in 
order to realise the opportunities in t1. They must then re-evaluate their 
position, change the strategy somewhat during t2, in order to better align their 
resources with the opportunities in t3. This closed loop control will continue to 
evolve and adapt as market conditions and available resources vary. 
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3.2.1 Crafting Your Own Luck (V5) 
The more I practice, the luckier I get. 
- Gary Player, professional golfer - 
 
Luck can be created. One can use foresight, mindfulness and judgement to 
predict future (tn) opportunities and align the current (t1) resources to 
maximise returns at tn.  
 
A typical example used in the international business arena is to place agents 
in target countries, with the main objective of building relations with key 
players in the market. They will announce the company’s presence, 
willingness to do business, and venture new prospects. These agents can 
also provide head quarters with the necessary information gathered during 
informal meetings, which will give them a head start in aligning their resources 
with future opportunities. This pre-empting of opportunities might lead to a first 
mover advantage, leading to a competitive and even distinct advantage in the 
local industry. 
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3.3 COETZEE’S GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY SELECTION 
MATRIX 
In 2006, Coetzee presented an unpublished Global Opportunity Selection 
Matrix (2006b), to assist the international business industry in identifying and 
analysing the quality of their future cross-border prospects. The model 
encompasses existing theory into a practical three dimensional matrix, and is 
illustrated in figure 3.2. 
.  
 Figure 3.2: Coetzee’s global opportunity selection matrix 
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The model consists of three evaluation criteria and can be used to: 
 Improve an international business plan by addressing weaknesses 
identified. 
 Find the optimal application of the three criteria or  
 Compare the attractiveness between two or more prospects during 
executive decision making. 
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3.3.1 Quality of Business Prospects on Offer (V6) 
During this part of the evaluation process, one must consider the opportunities 
and challenges of each prospect, relating to: 
 Geographical distance 
 Market size, volatility, market share, etc. 
 Natural, human, logistics and other resources 
 Opportunities feared and snared upon by competitors. 
  
In essence, one can use any one of the strategic tools available like SWOT, 
PORTER’s Five Forces, GIS Marketing Analysis, Net Present Value 
comparisons and any other tool that might give insight to the quality of the 
business prospects on offer. The only requirement is that the tool selection 
should not be biased towards any offer and the results should be validated. 
 
The value of the vector can also be exploited by means of reverse 
engineering where one define the quality that any prospect must adhere to 
before the company will even consider investment. In this mode of operation, 
one forces everyone in the company (engineers, scientists, marketing 
managers, strategists, etc.) to reach beyond the existing mediocre prospects 
and create new exciting proposals that will maximise return on investment.  
3.3.2 Country Attractiveness (V7) 
During this phase of the evaluation, one typically scrutinises the existing body 
of knowledge available for the particular country. Larger companies tend to 
call upon political scientist to evaluate the countries attractiveness for them. 
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Typical variables used to evaluate a country’s attractiveness include 
(Coetzee, 2006c): 
 Sovereign Risk: A three layer analysis (Country, Province, Local Area) of 
the business risk in terms of Economic, Business and Legal Systems 
provided by the host country. 
 People: One would typically use the human development index14, labour 
productivity/efficiency, cultural distance/compatibility between host and 
home country when evaluating the people within the country’s 
attractiveness. 
 Dynamics of the Country: Rather consider the trend (up/down) of the 
country’s stability during the evaluation, instead of making judgements on 
their current position. 
 Determinants for National Competitive Advantage: Here one evaluates 
a county’s competitive advantage, using Porter’s diamond –Determinants 
of National Competitive Advantage. 
Figure 3.3: Porter’s Diamond – Determinants of National Competitive Advantage 
Factor Conditions
Strategy, Structure &
Rivalry
Demand Conditions Related SupportingIndustries
 
Adapted from: http://www.quickmba.com (2008) 
                                            
14
 Human development index is the sum of (Life expectance, literacy rates, standard of living i.t.o. food, shelter and 
health care) 
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3.3.3  Company’s Ability to Implement or to Deliver (V8) 
What could be worse…Losing a multi-billon dollar contract, or making a loss 
on that same contract due to the company’s inability to deliver quality goods 
on time, within budget? 
 
Fundamentally, it could be detrimental to the company’s image and even 
future when they fail to deliver the promises made to their clients. According 
to Coetzee (2006c), one has to consider the company’s hard and soft 
capabilities during the evaluation process. 
 
Hard capabilities are easy to evaluate and could include finance, technology, 
infrastructure, support and strategic fit in relation to the timing & time span 
and competitive advantage. Soft capabilities on the other hand are more 
complex because it includes issues like risk tolerance, ethics & corporate 
governance acceptance levels, cultural tolerance, willingness change 
business processes, patience, entrepreneurial services available and many 
more. 
 
With respect to the current topic of this thesis, Edith Penrose made very 
interesting comments on the quality of entrepreneurial services of a firm back 
in 1959. In her book she said that the quality of entrepreneurial services of a 
firm is encapsulated in (Penrose, 1959): 
 Entrepreneurial Versatility, which is achieved through imagination, 
creativity and vision and not necessarily through managerial and technical 
versatility. 
 Fund-raising Ingenuity: The ability to convince the market and/or 
investors to invest in your visions. 
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 Entrepreneurial Ambition: Is in actual fact about building wealth and not 
only about making money. The ambition must also exist to influence 
society and preserve nature in the process of making a profit. 
 Entrepreneurial Judgement: This goes far beyond the charisma and 
personal traits of the CEO & board of directors. It is about the process of 
gathering information, dissecting it though consultation and eventually the 
process of decision making. It is about intrinsic values, perceptions, 
stakeholder management, utilising ever-changing windows of opportunity 
and the like. 
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3.4 MODELS ON MARKET ENTRY MODE DECISIONS 
It is common knowledge in the international business arena that the entry 
mode strategy remains a complicated process because it is controlled by a 
multitude of variables like the unique features of investing firms, country 
specific variables, risk, experience, commitment, etc. In this section, the focus 
would be to discuss some of the various models being used in industry, and 
then identifying the various vectors sprouting from each model. Due to the 
nature of the topic, some of the variables are overlapping between models, 
and vector selection is limited to one model only. 
3.4.1 Selecting an Entry Mode 
According to Hill (2005, p496), the primary reason for international expansion 
is to earn greater returns from the company’s core competencies in foreign 
markets, especially where the indigenous competitors lack those skills. He 
goes into extensive detail on the operations of six possible entry modes and 
compared the advantages of each entry mode (Table 3.3, page 42). 
 
He also distinguishes entry mode selection between two primary types of core 
competencies: 
 Technical Know-How: On the one end, high-tech operations are typically 
protected through the usage of wholly owned subsidiaries, or in some 
cases specially structured joint ventures / licensing that would limit the risk 
of exposing the core competence. 
On the other end, when companies are competing in technologies with 
rapid development cycles, they prefer to license their technology to as 
many as possible partners in order to gain international acceptance and 
dominance. 
 Management Know-How: Many service firms’ core competency lies 
within their management structures, control systems and brand name. As 
a result, they tend to make use of franchises, subsidiaries or a 
combination of both within a particular country or region. He also states 
that the subsidiaries are usually in the form of joint ventures, due to their 
international political acceptance. 
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Table 3.3: Advantages and disadvantages of market entry modes  
Entry Mode Advantages Disadvantages 
Exporting 
Ability leverage economies 
of scale and learning curve 
effects on local production 
facilities. 
 High transport costs 
 Trade barriers 
 Problems with local 
marketing agents. 
Turnkey 
Contracts 
Ability to earn returns from 
process technology skills in 
countries where FDI is 
restricted 
 Creating efficient 
competitors. 
 Lack of long-term market 
presence.  
Licensing 
Low development costs and 
risks. 
 Lack of control over 
technology. 
 Inability to leverage 
economies of scale and 
learning curve effects. 
 Inability to engage in global 
strategic co-ordination. 
Franchising 
Low development costs and 
risks. 
 Lack of control over quality. 
 Inability to engage in global 
strategic co-ordination. 
Joint 
Ventures 
 Access to local partner’s 
knowledge. 
 Sharing development 
costs and risks. 
 Politically acceptable. 
 Lack of control over 
technology. 
 Inability to engage in global 
strategic co-ordination. 
 Inability to leverage 
economies of scale and 
learning curve effects. 
Wholly owned 
subsidiaries 
 Protection of technology. 
 Ability to engage in 
global strategic co-
ordination. 
 Ability to leverage 
economies of scale and 
learning curve effects. 
 High costs and risks 
Source: (Hill 2005, p495) 
Hill (2005) also states that companies tend to make use of international 
ventures when the pressures for cost reduction are very high. Companies 
then tend to segregate their supply chain, utilising economies of scale and 
location specific advantages to gain competitive advantage over their rivals.  
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of the entry mode decisions. 
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 Adapted from: Wild, Wild & Han (2006) 
  
Wild, Wild & Han (2006) postulated that entry mode selection is a function of: 
 Risk 
 Control and 
 Experience 
 
As illustrated in figure 3.4, companies might start off, for example, with a 
management contract until they’ve gained enough experience with the foreign 
market conditions to consider joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiary entry 
modes. 
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Figure 3.5: Conceptual framework of entry mode choice 
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 Adapted from: Shi, Sui & Ho (2001) 
 
Si, Su & Ho’s (2001) presented a conceptual model for entry mode choices 
when one has to decide between shared and full ownership. According to 
them, the entry mode choice is a function of: 
 Location-Specific Variables 
 Strategic Variables 
 Transaction-Specific Variables 
 Firm-Specific Variables 
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Figure 3.6: Hierarchical model of entry modes 
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 Adapted from: Pan & Tse (2000) 
 
Pan and Tse (2000) presented their hierarchical model for entry modes in 
2000. Their model, figure 3.6, distinguishes between non-equity and equity 
modes whereby one makes the selection, based on one’s level of 
commitment. In their model, the level of commitment required increases when 
moving from export to wholly owned subsidiary entry modes. 
3.4.2  Vectors Arising from the Various Models 
(a) Strategic Variables (V9) 
According to Shi, Shu & Ho (2001), a firm who is opting for a market seeking 
strategy, implies that they are attempting to lower their production costs 
through supply chain segregation (i.e. by producing in areas where labour and 
land costs are less than in the home country) in order to be more competitive 
in the export market. In most of the applications, a wholly owned subsidiary 
would be the best solution for this strategy. 
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They also noted in their example that many smaller firms push for an export 
orientated strategy. This implies that they are aiming to exploit the market 
potential of host countries while benefiting from economies of scale and 
learning curves within their local facilities. In these cases, joint ventures are 
more appropriate to enter the international arena.  
 
In general, one has to take the long and short-term strategy of the firm into 
account when selecting an entry mode. The end-results could be catastrophic 
if the international venture is not in line with the firm’s strategy (and visa 
versa.)   
(b) Location-Specific Variables (V10) 
According to Shi, Shu & Ho (2001) location specific variables include: 
 Local market potential 
 Local production costs 
 Local government policies 
 Location of investment 
 
Meyer (2001) also shows that the entry mode strategies of multinational 
enterprises into emerging market countries are influenced by the presence of 
effective host country institutions. Thus the more favourable these variables 
are, the less the investment risk and the more likely a firm would consider full 
ownership as entry mode.  
(c) Transaction-Specific Variables (V11) 
Numerous transaction-specific variables can influence the selection of market 
entry mode, but Shi, Shu & Ho (2001) have predominantly used “Perceived 
contractual risks” and “Specificity of assets” as variables in their conceptual 
framework (page 44). 
 
Contractual risks are associated with:  
 Perceived costs of making and enforcing contracts,  
 Risk of knowledge leakage and  
 Risk of product quality deterioration.  
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When these perceived risks are high, investing firms will tend to retain more 
managerial control on overseas ventures to reduce these risks (Shi, Shu & 
Ho, 2001).  
 
Assets specificity refers to the uniqueness of the technology and knowledge 
used by the investing firm. Normally, the more highly specific the asset, the 
more likely investing firms would prefer to keep their proprietary technology 
internal by increasing their control over their subsidiaries (Shi, Shu & Ho, 
2001). 
(d) Firm-Specific Variables (V12) 
Shi, Shu & Ho (2001) used firm specific variables as the forth input to their 
model. These inputs consist of: 
 Firm size 
 International Experience 
 Host Country Experience 
 Relationship with local organisations 
 
With the first glance, it seems as if these issues listed above have been 
covered by other vectors, such as “Company’s ability to implement and deliver 
(V8)” as well as “Experience (V13)”. One should still evaluate other firm-
specific variables that might give an indication whether any restrictions might 
prevent the firm from operating in a particular entry mode. It is therefore an 
excellent practice to evaluate vectors 8, 12 and 13 simultaneously in order to 
encapsulate all the company specific details in a single analysis. 
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(e) Experience (V13) 
Based on the literature, it seems as if experience is the cornerstone of all 
international business activities. In addition, the literature has identified three 
different categories for measuring a firm’s level of experience (Padmanabhan 
& Cho, 2005):  
 General international business experience  
 Host country-specific experience and, 
 Decision-specific experience (experience in the context of a particular 
strategic decision).  
 
Padmanabhan and Cho (1999, pp. 37–38) have suggested that: 
“General international business experience and host country-specific 
experience are more important in the market entry mode decision, where a 
multinational firm faces a decision on whether to undertake foreign 
investments or not, and conditional on the decision to go abroad, selects the 
specific format of the entry mode (licensing, foreign production, etc.).  
 
Once the entry mode decision has been made, general and host country 
specific experience becomes less important, and decision specific experience 
becomes more important.” 
 
Various authors (Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996; Barkema & Vermeulen ,1998; 
Pak & Park, 2004) noted that general international business experience, 
gained through operations in diverse national markets over time, tends to 
enhance the firm’s ability to deal with differences, uncertainties, and potential 
conflicts in diverse foreign markets, with respect to customers, suppliers, 
rivals and partners. These firms are therefore more likely to be able to bear 
the risks and responsibilities associated with full ownership of foreign 
operations and are less likely to form joint venture agreements.  
 
Padmanabhan & Cho (2005) also noted that a higher level of international 
business experience defers potential risks of uncertainty and costs caused by 
high cultural distance barriers. 
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Wild, Wild & Han’s entry mode model (page 43) along with the works of 
Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990), Hennart (1991), and Padmanabhan & Cho 
(1996) on host country experience, state that the probability for a firm to 
choose the full ownership mode increases as the  familiarity with that host 
country increased. According to Barkema & Vermeulen (1998), host country-
specific experience gained by means of operations in a particular host 
country, helps the firm develop effective organisational systems, structures 
and capabilities that would assist them in managing future opportunities and 
threats relating to that host country. 
 
 
The literature on decision-specific experience states that a firm with significant 
experience with a specific entry and ownership mode (whether full or shared) 
would more likely, ceteris paribus, select a similar mode for its current 
ownership mode decision (Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999; Lu, 2002) and the 
probability of occurrence will increase after each successful decision-specific 
experience. Basically, the historic experience enhances the firm’s intrinsic 
value by saving on the financial, managerial and other costs of establishing a 
particular ownership mode in a foreign country, since they only add on to their 
experience of previously implemented structures/systems.  
 
Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) have also shown that decision-specific 
experience dominates the other forms of experience during a foreign entry 
mode selection decision. 
(f) Risk (V14) 
Risk factors could include: 
 Investment Risk: As result of high amounts of capital required for foreign 
direct investment projects.  
 Financial Risk: Exposure to fluctuating exchange and interest rates, as 
well as failure to produce the predicted profit rates. 
 Contractual Risk: Costs relating to contracts, agreements and bridging 
thereof. 
 Country Risk: This includes all vectors mentioned earlier relating to 
country specific barriers like culture, distance, political stability, etc. 
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 Using Wild, Wild & Han’s (2006) “Evolution of the entry mode decision” model 
(page 43), Hill’s (2005) entry mode comparisons (Table 3.3, page 42) and 
even a little bit of common sense, one can clearly see that an export venture 
might be exposed to lesser amounts of business risk than entering a country 
using a joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary entry.  
 
Seen from the other way round, the greater the risk, the more control a 
company would like to retain. This way they are able to minimise the impact of 
the effects of their risk exposure, thus opting for equity modes instead of non-
equity modes as entry mode. 
 (g) Control (V15) 
Again, referring to Hill’s (2005) entry mode comparisons (Table 3.3, page 42), 
one can clearly see how the level of control increases from export right up to 
wholly owned subsidiary entry modes. Control is interdependent on all the 
other vectors – too little control will not ensure that the efforts from the home 
country are synchronised with the host country. On the other hand, too much 
control will slow the expansion process down, which could be detrimental to 
high-tech projects/products with short product life cycles.   
 
According to Padmanabhan & Cho (2005), firms would rather select a high 
control ownership mode, ceteris paribus, in culturally distant host countries 
that would permit the osmotic transferral of local strategies, systems and 
routines in order to limit the transaction costs associated with the cross border 
activities. Under normal conditions, the risks and costs associated with equity 
partners would be greater in culturally distant host countries than in culturally 
close ones. The only way to counter-act the high distance levels is to increase 
control by opting for wholly owned subsidiary instead of joint venture entry 
modes.  
 
Padmanabhan & Cho (2005) also noted that experience and knowledge are 
counter measures to lower the distance barriers between countries, and thus 
deemed to be very effective when low control levels are critical for success. 
Experience and knowledge can be obtained through the gathering of cultural 
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intelligence, sending members from the home country in advance to be 
integrated into the host at a later stage or through the use of local agents 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Gatignon & Anderson, 
1988; Meyer, 2001; Pak & Park, 2004) 
(h) Commitment (V16) 
 Generally, a wholly owned subsidiary requires far more commitment in terms 
of management efforts, human-, financial- and technical resources than that 
of an export strategy. It is also easier to stop exports to a particular country 
than to shut down / sell a wholly owned subsidiary when the venture was 
unsuccessful or at the end of its life cycle.  
 
In today’s networked global community, it is not longer that simple to close 
down a factory, employing more than a thousand workers, without the rest of 
the world knowing about it. These effects ripple from subsidiary level, right up 
to head office, since modern stakeholders demand long term commitment and 
sustainability when a company elected to use ownership entry modes.  
 
It is therefore imperative to consider management and the company’s level of 
commitment prior to finalising the entry mode. It is easier to grow 
systematically from export to contractual agreements, from agreements to 
joint ventures, from joint ventures to wholly owned subsidiaries than to revert 
afterwards to a lower level of commitment. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 52 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The sixteen vectors (table 3.4) identified can be divided into two categories 
namely opportunity selection and entry mode selection, but one should always 
approach all sixteen vectors from a holistic approach, ensuring that the 
business case is not lacking any bit of detail that will steer the proposal off-
course.  
Table 3.4: Summary of Coetzee’s (2006a) “16 Vectors of Global Venture Creation” 
Model 
Opportunity Selection Vectors 
1 Cultural Difference 
2 Administrative or Political Distance 
3 Geographic Distance 
4 Economic Distance 
5 Creating Your Own Luck 
6 Business Prospects on Offer 
7 Country Attractiveness 
8 Company’s Ability to Deliver 
Entry Mode Selection Vectors 
9 Strategic Variables 
10 Location Specific Variables 
11 Transaction Specific Variables 
12 Firm Specific Variables 
13 Experience 
14 Risk 
15 Control 
16 Commitment 
 
The next step would be to analyse the applicability of the 16 vectors and to re-
interpret their definitions to suit the social entrepreneurial environment.  
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CHAPTER 4 
4 RESEARCH  
METHODOLOGY 
This research project is the one of many pioneering projects to align business 
and social investment. Very little information was found on this particular 
topic, and the researcher hopes that the success within the international 
business arena into could be leveraged onto the social milieu. 
 
The research outcome would be to provide a framework to assist social 
entrepreneurs with international social investment opportunity and entry mode 
selection. The model can also be used as a “guidebook”, containing generic 
key success factors for various difficulties faced within the 
national/international social investment milieu.  
 
Owing to the “novelty” of this topic, a “Grounded Theory Study” template, 
underpinned by Coetzee’s Global Venture Creation model, seemed to fit the 
profile for the research methodology. For the purpose of this study, Leedy & 
Ormond’s (2005) grounded theory study template was used to design the 
seven phase framework, illustrated in figure 4.1 on page 54. 
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Figure 4.1: Project research process. 
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4.1 PHASE1 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first phase started off with a comprehensive literature review of the 
various theories that underpin the Global Venture Creation Vector Model. The 
core definition for each vector was taken from the current body of knowledge 
and roughly translated into a definition applicable to the broader social 
investment environment. 
 
The outcome of this phase was to provide a general framework for the 
qualitative based interviews in phase 2, and can be found in Appendix A. The 
framework is divided into the 16 original vectors, each containing: 
 The vector definition 
 Objectives to be achieved for each vector (during and after the interview) 
 Possible interview questions 
 
4.2 PHASE 2 - DATA COLLECTION  
This stage contained two concurrent modules, one being the sourcing of 
social intervention case studies on the internet and the other being open-
ended interviews. 
4.2.1 Case Study Data 
The objective was to source social investment case studies relating to the 
treatment of poverty related diseases like HIV/AIDS Malaria as well as cases 
dedicated to poverty alleviation through micro-financing.   
 
The data collection was mainly limited to studies done in African but case 
study data from Asia and South America also deemed useful where local 
studies seemed lacking. 
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(a) Limitations 
Most of the cases used in this section were published by Global Business 
Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GBC) on their website 
www.gbcimpact.org. GBC is a coalition of more than 225 renowned 
international companies like Coca Cola, Nike, Anglo American, etc., all 
dedicated to jointly combat the AIDS pandemic though the business sector's 
unique skills and expertise.  
 
The case studies were also not published in their original format but edited to 
support the purpose of the website. Key elements to the success of the 
projects might have been omitted in the process, or the editor might have 
been biased towards non-essential factors. 
4.2.2 Interview Data 
The use of interviews as another source of data was twofold: 
 According to Leedy & Ormond (2005), the restriction on grounded theory 
studies is that the data collected should also contain the voices and 
perspectives of the people being studied. 
 The objective was also to use the interview data to triangulate the case 
results and also to saturate the recurrent themes identified in the case 
data with more descriptive evidence15.  
 
To authenticate the triangulation process, the interviews coincided with the 
collection of the case studies, preventing the case data from biasing the 
interviewer and contaminating the interview. 
 
                                            
15
 Described in paragraph 4.5 on page 61. 
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The sampling strategy was directed at interviewees from 2 specific categories: 
 International social investment firms: The strategy was to gain insight 
from the investor’s perspective; thereby selecting one corporate company 
who frequently donates large amounts of funding as part of their corporate 
social responsibility program and another being a dedicated international 
social investment firm. 
 Ground working social entrepreneurs: The ideal was to source an 
experienced entrepreneur from a well established NGO and compare the 
results to another entrepreneur from a small or newly established NGO. 
 
Table 4.1 lists interviewee selection list, of which only Ashoka’s members did 
not respond to the invitation. 
 
Table 4.1: List of candidates selected for interviews 
International Social Investment Organisations 
Anglo American Chairman’s Fund 
Interviewee 
Dr. Clem Sunter 
Chairman 
A former Chairman and CEO of the Gold and Uranium Division of the Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa, Clem is currently the Chairman of Anglo American Chairman’s 
Fund which, in a recent survey, was rated the premier corporate social responsibility fund in 
South Africa16. 
Ashoka - Innovators For The Public 
Interviewee(s) 
Ms. Leila Akahloun  
Director, 
Africa Programs 
Ms. Vernie Chetty 
Regional Representative,  
Southern Africa 
Bill Drayton to founded Ashoka in 1980 and that continues to guide Ashoka today.  Beginning 
with the first Ashoka Fellows elected in India in 1981, they have grown to an association of 
over 2,000 Fellows in over 60 countries on the world's five main continents. They envision a 
world where everyone is a change maker: a world that responds quickly and effectively to 
social challenges, and where each individual has the freedom, confidence and societal 
support to address any social problem and drive change.  17 
                                            
16
 http://www.companydirectors.com.au/About/Speakers/S/Clem+Sunter.htm 
17
 http://www.ashika.org 
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Table 4.1 (cont) : List of candidates selected for interviews 
Social Entrepreneurs 
Dr. Sunette Pienaar 
Designation 
Executive Chairman of Heartbeat 
Social Entrepreneur of the Year (2006) 
Dr Sunette Pienaar founded the Heartbeat Centre for Community Development in 2000. She 
is currently the Executive Chairman of the board. In partnership with business, government 
and civil society, Heartbeat empowers orphaned and vulnerable children to reach their full po-
tential through quality service provision, development and capacity building. The organisation 
currently reaches 11 000 orphaned and vulnerable children in South Africa, to be scaled up to 
22 000 by the end of 2008, towards a target of 50 000 by 2010. 
 
Dr Pienaar is the Schwab Foundation Social Entrepreneur of 2006 and a Paul Harris Fellow. 
She is the incumbent of the Murray & Roberts Chair for Collaborative Governance and 
Accountability at the Unisa Centre for Corporate Citizenship, where she is responsible for 
research and training on the governance and accountability of infrastructure Public-Private 
Partnerships as fundamental driver for sustainable growth. She has published and presented 
papers to national and international audiences on HIV/Aids, women and the politics of care.18 
Jannie Pretorius 
Designation 
Founder of Acts 2 Change 
Businessman, Pastor and Social Entrepreneur 
Mr. Pretorius started his career as a pastor in Grahamstown in 1970, where he immediately 
became actively involved in uplifting the surrounding townships.  In the 90’s, he changed 
professions to become a lucrative businessman within the clothing industry. In the new 
millennium, he crossed paths with AFNET, a Christian based social investment firm, and 
served them as a social entrepreneur until he founded Acts 2 Change in 2008.  
 
(a) Data Collection Strategy 
Based on the extent and nature of the data required from respondents, it was 
decided to collect data by means of conversational interviews (Lee, 1999) on 
a one-to-one basis.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 59 
Each interview was conducted in the following five stages in order to structure 
the interviews among the study’s purposes: 
1. Introduction and relationship building. In this stage the researcher set the 
scene for the research project as well as the purpose of the interview. It 
was also a good time to test the interviewee’s passion and validate his/her 
experience in the field. 
2. Tap into the “uncontaminated” social investment experience and wisdom 
of the interviewee in order to identify new vectors, practices and/or 
additional key success factors. 
3. Introduce the vector model to the interviewee and the purpose thereof. Ask 
the interviewee to give his/her opinion on the validity of each vector 
definition and the applicability thereof within the social investment 
environment. 
4. Use the questions/definitions designed in phase 1 as a structured 
guideline in order to identify common key success/failure factors for each 
vector. 
5. Conclude the interview by asking the interviewee for additional vectors that 
he/she might deem necessary to ensure project success. 
 
The researcher also made use of unspecified probing questions in cases 
where deemed necessary to identify additional information applicable to the 
study.  
 
(b) Limitations 
Due to logistical reasons and time constraints, interviewees were 
predominantly limited to people/offices residing within the Gauteng Province 
of South Africa. 
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4.3 PHASE 3 - DATA PROCESSING 
4.3.1 Case Study Data 
The researcher used desktop-analysis techniques to scrutinise the collection 
of case studies sourced in the previous phase.  From the 25 cases, 164 key 
success factors were identified, extracted and placed in a spreadsheet 
wheatear each one was coded with generic keywords as per the example 
below. 
 
Key success factor Generic Keyword (s) 
The community program is driven by Xstrata's 
strong commitment to innovation and the vision of 
supporting sustainable local social and economic 
development as the means of building community 
resilience to the vulnerabilities that perpetuate 
HIV/AIDS and TB. 
Commitment 
Aligned with Strategy 
Vision 
Sustainable 
Economic development 
Social development 
 
The researcher then used the generic vector definitions from phase 1 as 
guideline to allocate each keyword to a specific vector. Unallocated keywords 
were set-aside as to identify trends among them that might lead to the 
creation of a new vector. The outcome of this phase is listed in Appendix C. 
 
(a) Limitations 
Labelling allocations were done on the researcher’s own discretion and might 
have biased or influenced the results. 
4.3.2 Interview Data 
All interviews were digitally recorded, with the consent of the interviewee. 
More than 9 hours of data were then transcribed by an external party where 
after the researcher grouped the various discussions in accordance to the 
generic vector definitions created in phase 1. All unallocated discussions were 
also set-aside as to identify trends among them that might lead to the creation 
of a new vector. 
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4.4 PHASE 4 - CASE DATA ANALYSIS 
As per Leedy and Ormond (2005), open coding techniques were used to 
analyse the case data. Each vector was now handled as a separate segment 
of data, whereby only the keywords liked to it in phase 3 are scrutinised. 
 
This implies that all key success factors pertaining to one vector were 
extracted as a group, duplicates removed and then sub-divided into small 
clusters that: 
 Supported an existing theme within the original vector model or 
 Postulated a new theme pertaining to international social investment. 
 
The outcome of this phase is detailed in chapter 5.  
 
4.5 PHASE 5 – INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS 
Again as suggested per Leedy and Ormond (2005), the researcher used 
constant comparative & triangulation where the interview data was aimed 
at confirming and saturating the themes identified in phase 4, learning as 
much as possible and trying to find and disconfirming evidence that may 
suggest revisions in the themes identified and/or interrelations among the 
various vectors.  
 
To then re-enforce what was stated earlier…”To authenticate the triangulation 
process, the interviews coincided with the collection of the case studies, 
preventing the case data from biasing the interviewer and contaminating the 
interview. 
 
The outcome of this phase is detailed in chapter 5.  
 
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 62 
4.6 PHASE 6 - LINKING RESULTS WITH INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS THEORY 
From here on the researcher compared the output provided by the research 
data analysis and compared it to the original Global Venture Creation vectors.  
 
In cases where the supporting data (research and interview) were lacking, the 
researcher decided to apply the original international business vector 
parameters onto the social investment model until further research provides 
more insight. 
 
The output of this phase, documented in chapter 6, was then used as the 
foundation needed to construct the Global/Local Social Investment model. 
 
4.7 PHASE 7 - MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
In this, the final phase, the researcher used a combination of: 
 Lessons learnt through the research data, 
 International business theory, 
 Knowledge gained through the MBL process and 
 Personal experience & creative ingenuity  
to formulate the Global/Local Social Investment Model. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 RESEARCH  
RESULTS 
 
In Chapter 2 the researcher succeeded in formulating the need for social 
entrepreneurs, using internationally published literature. In Chapter 3, he did a 
detailed study on the 16 International Investment Vectors and documented 
the root definition thereof. The next step in the strategy was to use case 
studies and open ended interviews to identify recurring themes, definitions 
and key success factors pertaining to social investment.  
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5.1 CULTURAL DISTANCE (V1) 
5.1.1 Case Study Results 
Five cultural distance related themes manifested continuously through the 
various case studies: 
 
(a) Community Communication 
 Continuous communication/education prior to and during intervention 
 Test multiple communication methods to ensure relevance 
 Use multiple/local languages 
 
(b) Community Consultation 
 Democracy and collective counselling brings unity between all parties 
 Consult with each community regarding their needs and priorities 
 
(c) Community Education 
 Educate the community about the outcome during the different phases of 
the project and how it will influence their lives 
 Transfer skills to the community to ensure sustainability 
 Use local people where possible 
 
(d) Intermediate Parties 
 Approach influential people/leaders within the community 
 Partner with local community based organisations  with strong social links 
to set the foundation for a sustainable program 
 Use existing community support structures where possible 
 These kinds of partners brought deep understanding of cultural issues, 
and barriers of reaching people 
 
(e) Localise the Effort 
 A dedicated team for each zone 
 Regionalised program to reflect priorities of local community 
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5.1.2 Interview Results 
Both interviewees agreed that cultural differences have the ability to hinder a 
project’s efforts if not addressed accordingly. For example, Dr Pienaar 
mentioned an example where they could not penetrate a certain area within a 
specific community due to cultural differences. The community was 
predominantly of Tswana ethnic orientation and thus the reason for appointing 
Tswana ground staff. When management queried the slow progress in a 
specific neighbourhood within the community, it became known that appointed 
Tswana staff was scared and reluctant to go into that specific region because 
it was predominantly inhabited by people from the Zulu culture.  
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of cultural distances techniques used by interviewees. 
 Heartbeat Acts2Change 
Community 
Communication 
Continuous communication 
through program managers 
and ground staff in multiple 
languages. 
 Founder has frequent meetings 
with community at their community 
forums.  
 He strongly believes that you have 
to make your intentions clear from 
the start so that they don’t have to 
“wonder” what you are doing. 
 Consult with key members on local 
culture, norms and values before 
addressing the community in 
public. 
 Protocol in the African culture is 
essential and you always have to 
notify the “chief” within the 
community of your actions 
BEFORE you commence work. 
Community 
Consultation 
CEO feels that it is very 
important for community to 
voice their needs. 
Founder believes that one has to listen 
to their needs, but try to find a golden 
medium through consultation when he 
wants to address needs not yet 
identified by the community. 
Community 
Education 
Upskill local employees Invest time to upskill local school 
headmasters and church leaders. 
Use Intermediate 
Parties to Reduce 
the Distance 
Employ people from the 
community to work on ground 
level. 
Use local churches and schools as 
entry points. 
Network with influential people within 
the community 
Localise the 
effort 
Localise effort within different 
communities 
Localise effort within school and church 
districts 
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The same themes surfaced during the interviews as per the case study 
analysis, but the following additional key success factors/themes were also 
noted as means to overcome the cultural distance: 
 Trustworthy Relationships with influential people and organisations 
within the community deemed as a key success factor to alleviate the 
forces created by cultural barriers. Once you’ve gained their trust, they will 
start to take ownership of the project and “manage” the cultural forces 
within the community on your behalf. 
  Your attitude and motives: As white South Africans, both parties felt that 
they overcame the cultural barrier through a servant leader attitude 
towards the community. They were willing to learn from the community 
and empowered them to solve their own problems. They believe that one 
would increase the forces with any dictorial behaviour or actions that 
sprout from personal and selfish interest. 
 Stay true to your own culture: Both parties were proud of the fact that 
they are white Africans with their own culture norms & values and that we 
as South Africans have a strategic role to play in local community 
development. They did not try to adopt or imitate the local culture in the 
townships, but they respected it, were willing to learn from it and their 
presence at local events were more than enough to convince the local 
people of their loyalty and commitment. 
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5.2 POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISTANCE (V2) 
5.2.1 Case Study Results 
“Working together with the government is the most sustainable way of 
achieving its development goals.” 
– Xstrata, Case 14 – 
 
In many cases where the intervention was directed towards problems of a 
national magnitude, the social organisations approached the local authorities 
and/or national Government during the problem definition phase. This was 
done to: 
 Attain Government’s buy-in early on in the project,  
 Build relationship with the key departments who have jurisdiction over the 
community or the type of intervention used, 
 Align their strategies (V9) with existing Government efforts or to 
 Provide Government with expert advice in defining a national policy. 
 
“GAVI has learned that in many cases the ability of the country to reach more 
children is not related simply to its immunization program. Broader health-
system failures are often to blame. So GAVI has now expanded its funding 
criteria and set aside about half of its resources to help meet broader health-
system needs.” 
– Gates Foundation, Case 2 – 
 
A number of organisations claimed that their projects started to show success, 
and even increased the scope of their intervention dramatically when they 
partnered with Government. This was as result of: 
 Assisting Government to improve the accessibility infrastructure and 
quality of support systems, 
 Leveraging funds that were made available through Government’s social 
programs and 
 Utilising public infrastructure (like clinics) to deliver their private 
intervention to the broader community. 
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5.2.1 Interview Results 
(a) Historical and Political Association 
When asked the question, both Dr Pienaar and Mr Pretorius agreed that the 
political difference between the previously disadvantaged groups and 
themselves tended not affect their operations negatively. The historic 
differences only manifested in cases where they did not respect the local 
culture and failed to follow the correct protocol with regards to community 
groups, authorities and/or influential members within the community. 
 
Building on the momentum of the cultural diversity in South Africa, they rather 
argued that being a “South African” leverages them to be more astute to the 
norms and values other Africans and also to have cognisance of the 
limitations of the local government, infrastructure as well as system delivery. 
 
(b) Government Involvement 
Both Heartbeat and Acts2Change have strong relations with the community’s 
local authorities (ANC Youth League). Both stated their preference of 
including the ruling party’s representatives during the problem definition phase 
of a project.  
 
When asked whether she needs Government’ support, Dr. Pienaar responded 
convincingly “None of my projects would be able to lift-off without their 
assistance. You are bound to run into a brick wall somewhere in the process if 
you do not liaise with them.”  
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Her company has also been accepted into Government’s AIDS program and 
they are now at the point where Government officials are contracting 
Heartbeat to assist them with HIV/AIDS orphan intervention in certain 
communities.   Heartbeat then preferred to utilise a semi “Turn Key” solution 
for the Government, where they:  
 Provided the necessary infrastructure, paid for by donor funding,  
 Upskilled the people in the community to run the community centres, 
 Provided the necessary support and management skills up to the point 
where the centre is self-sustainable.   
 
The projects are then handed over to Government, who must provide the 
necessary funding and support to keep the project sustained. 
 
5.3 GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE (V3) 
5.3.1 Case Study Results 
(a) Infrastructure and Services 
 Many interventions started off without the necessary services and 
infrastructure available in the country/community. 
 In a handful of cases the lack infrastructure and social systems within a 
particular area were seen as a barrier of entry, led to delayed results or 
even project failure.  
 Two of the corporate organisations leveraged their own supply-chain 
network to distribute social supplies throughout the country. 
 Some cases organisations had to strengthen the country’s local 
transportation/infrastructure themselves to be able to deliver while 
 Others went into a partnership with Government in a joint effort to improve 
the infrastructure. (See V2) 
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(b) Distance for the Investor 
It is often the communities in the remote areas that are slow to reach or even 
“not reachable” at all. Some organisations were daring enough to reach out to 
these remote locations, but their projects took longer to complete and required 
more resources than the urban counter-parts. 
 
A number of organisations managed to reduce the investor distance by: 
 Using local community support groups and NGO’s as intermediate 
partners.  
 Maximising the use of local content (products and labour). 
 
This strategy was supported by the provision of full-time “champions” in 
regional sectors across geographical footprint. The champion approach also 
posed the additional benefit of localising the program in accordance to 
regional needs.  
 
The Geographical Distance vector was also neutralised during the start-up 
stages by experimenting with multiple ideas within the communities closest to 
home base. 
 
(c) Distance for the Community to Travel 
Organisations recorded improved results when they localised aid with 
permanent staff in areas that are easily accessible to all members of the 
community.  
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5.3.2 Interview Results 
Both Dr. Pienaar and Mr. Pretorius noted the fact that Geographical Distance 
had the potential to be a hindrance to a project but it will never be deemed as 
a total disqualifier. Both of them also believe that remote areas tend to be in 
greater need for intervention as illustrated in Pretorius’ appropriate remark…  
 
“Yes, less people will be able to reach a remote community that is isolated by 
dilapidated infrastructure. But the truth is that the impact of your efforts within 
that community will be astounding if you do manage to reach them.” 
 
(a) Heartbeat Model 
As result of the access to digital communication technology, Dr. Pienaar feels 
that the “distance” between her office and her international donors are in a 
sense less than the distance between her office and the ground workers. To 
overcome this distance, Heartbeat has erected dedicated regional offices 
across South Africa with full time program-managers assigned to each 
project.  
 
They are willing to enter remote locations with a lower population density, if 
and only if the investors/donors agreed to the fact that the project will: 
 Cost more to operate, 
 Take longer to complete and 
 Will impact fewer children than similar endeavours within urban areas. 
 
(b) Acts2Change Model 
Mr. Pretorius utilises a relational, hands-on management style and feels that 
one must be close enough to the community to build trust. For this reason, he 
is reluctant to operate in his personal capacity in ventures that are too remote, 
but would do his best to empower a “leader” or organisation within that remote 
area to take ownership of the problem.  
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5.4 ECONOMIC DISTANCE (V4) 
5.4.1 Case Study Results 
The following themes were identified after the “Economical Distance” key 
success factors were extracted from the 25 case studies: 
 
(a) Consult with stakeholders 
 Reduce distance by consulting stakeholders and the poor themselves 
during problem definition phase. 
 
(b) Use of Intermediate Groups  
 Make use of existing NGO’s volunteers and/or community support groups 
 Use local people as ground workers  
 
(c) Reduce Economical burden on the poor 
 Project strategies were aimed to reduce economical burden on the 
community caused by malaria, HIV/AIDS, etc. 
 Provide critical resources needed to fill the gap in resource limited 
settings. 
 Provide skills development opportunities that can lead to income 
generating activities. 
 Maximise local content to uplift community. 
 
(d) Solution Must Make Economical Sense 
The community must contain the necessary skills to maintain and have means 
to sustain the operational costs of the implemented program. 
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5.4.2 Interview Results 
Table 5.2: Comparison of economic distances techniques used by interviewees. 
 Acts2Change Heartbeat 
Consult with 
stakeholders 
He strongly feels that one has to 
address the real need, and not your 
interpretation of the need.  
He frequently consults with the 
school’s governing body and 
headmaster with regards to the 
actual needs of the orphans. 
Dr. Pienaar strongly believes that 
the community must be able to 
voice their needs. Community 
consultation therefore forms part 
of the project’s feasibility study. 
Use of 
Intermediate 
Groups  
Mr Pretorius only distributes 
resources to the local church 
leaders and school headmasters. 
They are then responsible to 
identify the needs of individuals and 
distribute the resources accordingly.  
He is the intermediatory between 
international donors and the 
community, allocating all monies to 
a central fund with the capacity to 
prioritise resources in accordance 
to ground-level needs. 
He conducts “sensitivity” and 
“awareness” workshops to all 
international volunteers, 
enlightening them on the realities of 
the economical differences, before 
allowing them to enter the 
community. 
Dr Pienaar does not allow any 
one of the donors to interact with 
the community, unless being 
escorted by one of the team 
members.  
Reduce 
Economical 
burden on the 
poor 
They maximise local content by 
supporting the local community 
organisations, by contracting the 
unemployed and developing skills 
to be applied within the project 
context. 
He believes that his efforts and 
empowerment programs give the 
local people respect and the social 
leaders eventually become 
recognised icons within the 
community. 
Heartbeat’s business model does 
not utilise community 
volunteering groups but allocates 
resources for the full-time 
employment and upskilling of 
local people as the ground staff. 
 
Solution(s) Must 
Make Economical 
Sense 
He prefers to upskill people within 
the community instead of just giving 
them money. They must be able to 
sustain the intervention in the long 
run. 
Money does not go directly to the 
children, but it is used to provide 
food, clothing, education and 
counselling.  
It is very important that the 
children are kept in the same 
economical position as the rest of 
the community. They are 
stigmatised when they stand out 
– richer or poorer 
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During the interviews, another interesting economical distance surfaced… 
  
(a) Economical Distance between Donors and Social Entrepreneurs 
There also seemed to be a distance between the donors and the social 
entrepreneurial organisations themselves. Dr. Pienaar found that her head-
office staff could not manage the international and affluent investors 
effectively. She realised that the power distance was too big and that she, as 
the CEO, is the only one who have enough authority to negotiate investment 
deals that are fair and just. 
 
5.5 CREATE YOUR OWN LUCK (V5) 
5.5.1 Case Study Results 
(a) Build a Trustworthy Brand 
Many organisations earned respect of community leaders, their own 
employees and even governmental leaders through their continuous success. 
The earned respect compounded into a trust relationship that “widened the 
doors” for their future projects. 
 
(b) Create Key Relationships and Partnerships 
Build relationship and trust with:  
 Key opinion makers  
 Key members within the community 
 Key local and national Government leaders 
 Organisations with strong social links within the community 
 Key international organisations and trend setters. 
5.5.2 Interview Results 
(a) Timing is Everything 
Mr. Pretorius also stated that one must be able to read the seasons within a 
community to be able to time your interventions. You have to pre-empt the 
future so that you can align yourself to be “part” of the community when they 
need you the most. 
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(b) Create Key Relationships and Partnerships 
Both Dr. Pienaar and Mr. Pretorius cited that they would not have been where 
they are today, if it weren’t for the relationships forged “yesterday”.  
 
Both of them passionately declared how they had to enter communities (in 
which they had no current investment interest at the time), sourcing influential 
people, spending time with them, and building trust to a point where the 
community’s doors opened for intervention.  
The same strategy was also deployed to gain acceptance with influential 
government officials as well as affluent donor agencies. 
 
(c) Build a Trustworthy Brand 
Dr. Pienaar passionately exuberated that the Heartbeat brand is everything. 
“People trust us - from the donors, Government divisions, right down to the 
communities on ground level. New communities welcome us with open arms 
because they know our name and they believe that we symbolise hope. 
Government is contacting us for assistance. We have shown them over the 
years that we are trustworthy and what our capabilities are…. I am very 
cautious when people want to use our logo on their campaigns. I have to 
know what they stand for before we are willing to be associated with them.” 
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5.6 QUALITY OF BUSINESS PROSPECTS ON OFFER (V6) 
5.6.1 Case Study Results 
(a) Business Prospect Quality Indicators 
The following were used as possible success indicators: 
 Most of the time, “Community based proposals” turned into successful 
business prospects. 
 A number of the entrepreneurs used “sustainability” as an indicative 
indicator for project success. 
 The need for intervention is usually higher in areas that are risky to enter, 
difficult to reach, etc. because most organisations tend to tackle the easy 
ones first. 
 Several organisations increased their scope of supply and effectiveness 
through partnerships in which they found ways to leverage/support existing 
efforts in the field.  
 The opposite was also true. National intervention was more effective in 
cases where groups intentionally prevented duplication of efforts in the 
same area (V7, V10). 
 Project success increased in cases where Government’s policies, 
leadership stance, openness for partnerships (as per V2) were in favour of 
the intervention. 
 It must be noted that a number of the ventures are processes and not 
projects, which implies that “time” is irrelevant and should not be used as a 
qualitative indicator to track project success. 
  
(b) Conduct a Baseline Study 
The majority of the corporate organisation conducted a baseline study prior to 
their social intervention, which were then used as basis for their progress 
tracking. Erroneous baseline studies have the capacity to derail the initial 
assumptions for the business case, and could also lead to the incorrect entry 
mode selection. For this reason, a number of organisations opted to 
outsource the baseline study neutrally biased to third-party experts in the field. 
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(c) Create a Business Case and Project Plan 
From the data contained within the baseline study, organisations had 
“enough” information to construct a business case for the intervention. Key 
success factors from the case data include: 
 Identify and prioritise specific sites where intervention is needed 
 Set realistic targets and benchmark them against similar projects. 
 Be flexible in your planning. 
 
(d) Return on Investment 
From a corporate perspective, social intervention is usually perceived as 
charity with no real return on investment. The opposite was proven in a 
number of the cases…Corporate organisations had a clear business case for 
intervention and they managed to pose a direct or indirect financial return on 
their social investment project. AngloGold Ashanti’s Malaria treatment at 
Obuasi, Ghana (Case 5) is a classical example of how their intervention 
against Malaria in the surrounding communities resulted in a higher staff 
attendance rate which increased their production levels. 
5.6.2 Interview Results 
(a) Business Prospect Quality Indicators 
Mr. Pretorius noted the following business prospect indicators: 
 I always start with the project that would have the maximum impact for the 
least amount of time and effort. This way I earn the community’s respect 
and we can then tackle the larger problems together. 
 The children who are most in need usually gets the highest priority 
 You do not always have to fulfil the need down to the brim to be effective, 
but you must at least show them that you are willing to make a difference. 
 You must consider the community’s needs as priority. You should always 
reach consensus before starting to implement your ideas – they do not like 
to be “told” what to do. I build trust by “waiting” for them to see the same 
problems I see and then we tackle it together as one team. 
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(b) Conduct a Baseline Study 
None of the NGO’s conducted a baseline study prior to intervention. 
Heartbeat conducts only a feasibility study which contains some elements of 
the current community status. 
 
(c) Create a Business Case and Project Plan 
Both NGO’s have a portfolio of detailed business cases from which their 
investors can choose. Each business case contains the: 
 Project scope and deliverables as well as 
 Project cost and duration. 
 
(d) Measuring Return on Investment 
From an investor’s perspective, Anglo American’s Chairman’s Fund only use 
the business cases provided by their grantees as an indicator of their own 
impact in the community, as seen in Dr. Clem Sunter’s response to the 
question “How do you measure your return on the social investments?” 
 
“We don’t actually. We just see that the results are what were promised. Many 
achieve the results promised, and sometimes things go horribly wrong. We 
usually start to look at people and their performance if they come back for 
more money.” 
 
Dr. Pienaar’s response to the same question was quite inspiring… 
 
”The first thing that you must remember about an NGO is that we are not in 
business to make a financial profit but we are here to make a difference. Our 
people work for us because they believe in what we do. They can easily earn 
5 times more in the private sector, but there is also the reward of the internal 
satisfaction when helping others who can’t help themselves. So to answer 
your question on how we measure success…We measure success through 
stories told and letters written by the children to the donors on how our 
programs impacted their lives. “ 
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5.7 COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS (V7) 
5.7.1 Case Study Results 
Two themes were strongly emphasised throughout the case data when 
people referred to the country’s attractiveness: 
 
(a) Dynamics of the Country 
Countries were selected for intervention because politically: 
 They had a stable democracy, 
 The political leadership were in favour of the venture. 
 Government were open to partnerships and had their own resources to 
commit to the projects.  
 
(b) Local Skills and Supporting Industries 
The larger organisations spoke in favour of countries where: 
 Strong local NGO, active ground support groups and/or community 
networks were at their disposal. 
 They could leverage and support any existing efforts. 
 They were able to maximise the usage of the local content 
 The various skills needed that were available within the 
country/community. 
5.7.2 Interview Data 
(a) Dynamics of the Country 
According to Mr. Pretorius, he feels that political instability in a region is not a 
discriminator because violence levels are never constant as it tends to wave 
through the townships. “As a white male, you have to be careful and always 
call your contacts before entering the community. But I personally believe that 
political violence is the community’s waving flag which they use to shout for 
external assistance.” 
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As per the arguments brought forth in “V2 – Political and Administrative 
Distance”, both NGO’s prefer to forge relationships with the political forces 
within Government. 
 
(b) Local Skills and Supporting Industries 
Pretorius stated that he will not discriminate against any community when 
selecting an entry mode, but he did confess that his entrance into 
Soshanguve was partially based on his long standing relationship with an 
active pastor in the township.  
 
He realises that the local skills are scarce and usually not available for NGO 
purposes. He does not look at age, gender or experience when he sources 
people from the community, but he is interested in people who have heart and 
who are willing to make a difference. 
 
Pienaar on the other hand will not enter into a community if another NGO with 
the same mission is actively involved already. Heartbeat appoints people from 
the local community as ground workers, but the local skills have not been 
used as a discriminator against any project – it just takes longer to complete.  
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5.8 COMPANY’S ABILITY TO DELIVER (V8) 
“Usually we get the desired results, but even the most promising projects went 
wrong because you’ve miss-red the person’s abilities to deliver. “ 
– Dr. Clem Sunter – 
5.8.1 Case Study Data 
One would expect that a company would have all the resources in place 
before starting off with a new venture. It seems like a number of the corporate 
organisations were adventurous/desperate enough to start with only an idea 
and then acquired the necessary skills and resources as the project 
progressed. 
 
The following four themes were identified as possible determinants that could 
influence the company’s ability to deliver: 
 
(a) Hard Resources  
Most of the organisations were financially and strategically involved in the 
projects which required them to provide a sustainable cash-flow as well as 
dedicated resources in order to deliver acceptable results.  
 
Companies also invested heavily in systems that gave them the ability to 
control and track the progress of their projects as per “Control (V15)” on page 
100. 
 
Successful projects had full-time staff and dedicated teams assigned to the 
project. The ideal was to set enough employees aside to provide localised 
intervention, easily accessible by all community members. 
 
Corporate giants like Rio Tinto, Anglo American, Abbot, Standard Chartered, 
etc. leveraged their internal talent to assist with their social projects. Standard 
Chartered has even formalised an approach for employee volunteering; 
providing two days paid leave for employees to contribute to community 
projects. 
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“Bralirwa frequently partnered with other players to continually educate its 
doctors, nurses and human resource personnel on the latest ideas and 
practices in the workplace regarding HIV/AIDS programming.” 
- Cisneros Group, Case 18 - 
 
Skills transfer and the training of staff seemed like the crucial link in 
developing the organisations capabilities to deliver. Successful ventures 
invested in frequent training programs – training both management and 
ground staff. A number of them utilised the “champions” approach, where 
agents inside the organisations were developed to take ownership for their 
projects/communities and to train others when needed. Corporate 
organisations went as far as to “import” experts in the field to provide 
guidance and to upskill their staff (as per the extract above).  
 
(b) Create a Body that is Capable of Delivering 
Creating an alliance of existing entities was a better strategy than building a 
new entity. But as the old African proverb says, “If you want to go fast, go 
alone. If you want to go far, go together.” Each of GAVI’s partners has a 
unique role, and brings essential relationships and insights to the table.  
- Gates Foundation, Case 2 - 
 
Social problems are usually bigger than the capacity of a single entity, and 
most organisations were involved in some form of alliance to combat the 
catastrophe. The typical strategy selected by many was to 
obtain/partner/network with any individual/organisation that has the ability to 
compliment their own skills and efforts or that could provide them with the 
necessary experience and/or social links needed to complete the project.  
 
The efforts of these alliances were then unified during the problem definition 
phase through the establishment of project steering committees or focus 
groups. 
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“Combining two specialist projects created synergies resulting in impacts 
beyond those that have been achieved by either organisation independently.” 
- SEF, Case 3 - 
 
In order to cultivate successful partnerships, the organisations had to: 
 Identify their strengths and weaknesses as to 
 Find synergy between partner's strengths and then 
 Outsource non-core competencies to experts. 
 
In a handful of cases, organisations from the corporate sector realised that 
they were out of their depth and decided to contract a panel of experts to 
manage the social project on their behalf, while only monitoring proceedings 
from a “distance”.  
5.8.2 Interview data 
(a) Hard Resources  
Mr Pretorius agreed that he hardly has the necessary resources intact when a 
particular need is made known to him. Acquiring the funds, materials, capacity 
and people are usually part of the project execution plan.  
 
Dr. Pienaar on the other hand believes that they are now sustainable. 
Heartbeat has: 
 A good relationship with Government and communities,  
 International donor focal points are established whereby they have access 
to individual and corporate donors. 
 All structures are in place and  
 Frequent audits ensure sound governance. 
 
Both NGO’s agreed that it is sometimes easier to obtain the necessary 
funding than to source competent people on ground level. 
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Heartbeat does not make use of any community and volunteer networks but 
prefer to employ the ground workers themselves. A permanently employed 
human resource manager makes sure that the:  
 Positions are advertised and 
 Applicants are thoroughly screened for any irregularities and criminal 
records. 
 Successful candidates are then trained to function efficiently as care-
workers within their community.  
 
(b) Leadership 
Although not specifically mentioned, the researcher is of the opinion that both 
the social entrepreneurs interviewed were the cornerstone of their 
organisation’s “ability to deliver”. Both social entrepreneurs are (but not 
equally) mission driven, strategic, creatively resourceful and results 
orientated.  
 
(c) From an Investor’s Perspective 
Dr Sunter was approached to provide clarity on the criteria that they as 
investors use to screen NGO’s funding requests:  
 
“Our criteria to provide support to a specific organisation/individual is quite 
simple: The one is that we only back winners… The recipients must show that 
they are already working on the problem and that they only need our support 
as leverage. Secondly, we are looking for a champion or leader in the group 
that can run with the project. A single point of contact is always most 
preferable.” 
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5.9 STRATEGIC VARIABLES (V9) 
5.9.1 Case Study Results 
From the case study data, organisations had to consider their micro 
environment (corporate strategy) as well as the macro environment (national 
and international efforts) before they could decide on their entry mode. 
  
(a) Company’s Mission and Vision 
 On the one end, a number of projects were conducted by corporate 
organisations that were looking for ways to express their internal value for 
social responsibility. 
 A number of corporate organisations on the other hand had a competitive 
financial business case on the basis that they themselves could benefit 
financially (directly or indirectly) from their social investment. A typical 
example is a lower staff turn-over rate as result of HIV/AIDS 
prevention/education/treatment within the surrounding communities.  
 Dedicated social entrepreneurial firms used their specific long-term social 
development strategy as a guideline to selected/rejected various social 
projects and to determine the entry mode for those projects. 
 
(b) National and International Strategies 
There were 3 major methodologies identified in the various case studies with 
regards to the alignment with national (and sometimes international) efforts: 
 Initial success became the national strategy: The majority of the 
groups used their entrepreneurial spirits to navigate unfamiliar territory. 
They started their projects on a small scale in countries with no national 
efforts, policies or strategies. Results from successful pilot projects were 
then replicated across the country and eventually used as the foundation 
for that particular government’s national strategy. 
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 Partnering with Government to Define a National Strategy: Groups 
that were entering a country with the intent to have a national impact, 
tended to include Government during the problem definition phase.  
The entry modes were then either to assist Government in combining all 
the existing efforts within the country into a single co-ordinated effort or to 
initiate a joint national campaign from scratch.  
 Aligning Efforts with National or International Standards/Trends: As 
time progressed, a number of national/international strategies existed to 
combat global issues like HIV and Malaria. Successful companies then 
aligned their strategies to these national/international policies as to ensure 
the use of best practices and coalition of national and global efforts. Some 
of the leading social investment organisations went as far as to partner 
with international standard setters as to pre-empt the bearing of 
international trends. 
5.9.2 Interview Results 
(a) Company’s Mission and Vision 
Mr. Pretorius runs a smaller operation and thus the reason for selecting an 
array of projects that would compliment the bigger mission of impacting the 
lives of 15 - 17,000 orphans within the next 5 to 10 years. 
 
Heartbeat on the other hand, is a focussed entity with a clear-cut business 
model. “It is very important to stick to your core business so that you do not 
attempt projects that are outside your scope of expertise. In this industry, one 
can easily fall in the trap of trying to help too many people and thus becoming 
ineffective. I had to reject many offers from donors who’ve requested us to 
work on projects that are not in line with our core functions.”  
 
Heartbeat has two strategic initiatives with different entry modes: 
 The one is to establish specialised day-care centres across the country to 
assist HIV/AIDS orphans and  
 To expand their reach by mentoring and accrediting other NGO’s in 
accordance with the Heartbeat model. 
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Although different entry modes, both initiatives are still in line with their vision 
of alleviate the suffering of HIV/AIDS orphans. 
 
(b) Aligned with National Efforts 
Heartbeat is fully aligned with Government’s AIDS plan which made it 
possible for them to run joint projects seamlessly with Government. 
 
5.10 LOCATION SPECIFIC VARIABLES (V10) 
5.10.1 Case Study Results 
(a) Location of Investment 
Two predominant reasons were identified as to why an organisation would 
enter an extremely remote location: 
 Driven by their ethical worldview perspectives: The fervent social 
entrepreneurs specifically aimed to target these feeble and often remote 
locations, which altered the conventional entry modes. 
 Personal Interest: A number of global companies’ operations were 
physically affected by some of the indigent communities in which their 
workers reside. Poverty related diseases like malaria, HIV, hunger, etc. 
had a direct impact on their bottom-line and thus their reason for social 
intervention within that particular location. 
 
(b) Existing Efforts 
The majority of cases alluded to the fact that being knowledgeable on the 
existing efforts within a particular location enabled them to: 
 Gain strategic knowledge of the role players operating in that area 
 Identify gaps in that area and  
 Prevent wasteful duplication of efforts. 
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Many of the social investment organisations tended to outsource the 
groundwork to existing NGO’s or community networks. In far-off remote areas, 
these luxuries do not exist which meant that they had to alter their entry mode 
as to first establish the ground working teams through either  
 Getting personally involved, 
 Importing the necessary skills, 
 Empowering members within the community, 
 Or a combination of the above. 
 
(c) Skills level of local people 
In many cases the necessary skills need were not available in a particular 
location. In some cases the companies altered their entry mode by 
establishing training centres as a support function. These centres trained new 
workers & existing community workers, up-skilled health workers and 
educated the youth in that area as to sustain the future skills pool.  
 
(d) Infrastructure & Social Systems within a Specific Area 
“The model used in Botswana relied heavily on medical infrastructure and it 
would be difficult to implement in countries with fewer resources.” 
– Gates Foundation, Case 1 - 
 
As seen in “Geographical Distance (V3)”, there were cases where 
Government lacked the infrastructure, personnel and administrative systems, 
which were then provided by the social partner as to ensure project success. 
The available infrastructure in the particular location therefore affected their 
entry mode selection and commitment level. 
5.10.2 Interview Data 
Heartbeat’s model is almost cast in concrete and location specific variables 
have little impact on their entry mode selection. Existing efforts in the same 
community will defer them from entering, but it will not alter their entry mode. 
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On the other hand, Mr. Pretorius feels that the skills level in the community 
will alter his entry mode and commitment level; he has to be more hands-on 
involved in areas where the skills levels are lacking.  
 
5.11 TRANSACTION SPECIFIC VARIABLES (V11) 
5.11.1 Case Study Results 
(a) Project Scope and Design 
Social projects tend to be outcomes based, rather than time bound. These 
projects are therefore more of continuous nature and the average life cycle 
ranges from 3 to 10 years (and even beyond).  
 
Now with this in mind, the majority of cases stated that a long term project 
mission and vision, along with effective management, were essential to 
achieving their goals and staying on track.  
 
Some organisations stated that the project’s strategy had to be clear and 
simple, with clear boundaries as to prevent being side-tracked by the 
enormous need out there. 
 
On the other hand, many social entrepreneurs felt that their project scope was 
too narrowly focussed (only delivering HIV/AIDS medication) and believed 
that more effective results could have been achieved if they opted for a more 
holistic approach. An example was where the Gates Foundation had to 
broaden their scope to include “Public Service Delivery Improvement” before 
their ARV project started to pose positive results in Botswana. 
 
(b) Partnership Design 
The scope, mission and vision of a project along with the company’s ability to 
deliver (V8) influence the entry mode decision substantially. It was noted that 
partnerships (private or public) was used as an effective means to broaden 
the scope of the project. 
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“By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically 
scale up the scope of its intervention.” 
– Dunavant, Case 17 – 
 
“By partnering with three additional local NGOs—Scout Associations, Save 
the Children and CISP—the scope of the intervention was broadened.” 
– INTESA, Case 19 – 
 
“Marathon formed an implementation team with partners, government and 
world-class experts in the field of malaria and social development.” 
– Marathon Oil Company, Case 8 – 
 
From the case data, the pre-requisite for effective partnerships were: 
 Government/existing role players must be open for partnerships 
 Only select complementing partners that would create synergy 
 Minimise bureaucracy through a small focussed steering group 
 Define clear goals to ensure effective use of each partner's strengths 
 Direct engagement of the leadership of each partner and frequent 
communication is essential to success. 
 
(c) Sourcing the Project Funding 
The primary condition for project funding is that it should be sustainable. 
Various different entry modes were selected in order to source sustainable 
funding: 
 Some organisations preferred to fund the entire venture  
 Others partnered with a diverse collection of donors to secure the 
necessary funds for a fixed period (3-5 years). 
 There were also a number of cases where organisations applied for 
Government funds (that were typically allocated for specific causes like 
HIV/AIDS treatment), to ease their own financial burden and broaden the 
scope of the project. 
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(d) Transaction Cost 
In the ideal world, one would expect that successful social organisations 
channel every cent down to ground level, but the case results seem quite 
contradictory (and supported by the Gates Foundation’s comments)  
 
“The foundation was initially reluctant to allow GAVI to use a significant 
amount of our funding to support grantee operating expenses - as opposed to 
purchasing vaccines. But we’ve learned that funding operating expenses is 
vital for getting new entities up and running, for attracting donors that have 
greater funding restraints and for giving grantees the ability to innovate.” 
 
5.11.2 Interview Results 
Acts2Change’s operational costs are less than 12% of their funding budget 
while Heartbeat’s operational costs are between 15% and 25%. Mr. Pretorius 
still “hopes” to be in a position where all donor funds are being channelled into 
the projects themselves while overhead costs minimised through volunteering 
and internal cash generating efforts. 
  
Dr. Pienaar on the other hand believes that operational costs are costs that 
are paid for activities that enhance the children’s lives. Every activity is costed 
against its own project, and she provides detailed statements to the donors on 
a frequent basis. She feels that high quality workmanship is a key success 
factor for sustainable funding and will not alter their entry mode to lower the 
transaction costs. 
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5.12 FIRM SPECIFIC VARIABLES (V12) 
5.12.1 Case Study Results 
(a) Firm’s Size and Access to Resources 
It was also noted that social investment projects costs are proportional to the 
intervention scope. A sustainable supply of cash and resources were needed 
by the social entrepreneurs in order to deliver on their commitments and to 
ensure optimal performance. Smaller organisations were therefore obliged to 
form partnerships with other organisations in order to be able to supply the 
sustainable funding and resources. 
 
(b) Experience19 
From the case study data it seems as that corporate firms steered away from 
running social projects on their own, or seldom took the leading partnership 
role when the project’s social requirements was not in line with their core-
business functions.  
 
(c) Key Relationships 
Another organisational specific determinant for entry mode selection was the 
organisation’s existing relationships with: 
 Experts in the field,  
 Community leaders,  
 Other social organisations, 
 Relevant Government departments and 
 International agencies.  
 
These strong relationships often resulted in collateral agreements or full 
fledge partnerships. 
                                            
19
 Only firm specific related. Refer to Vector 13 on page 94 for a complete description on the effect that experience 
has on the entry mode.   
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5.12.2 Interview Results 
(a) Firm’s Size and Access to Resources 
Acts2Change’s community-partnership entry model resides on the fact that 
they are not a large organisation. In their upliftment projects they provide the 
infrastructure, resources and necessary training while the partner inside the 
community takes ownership of the day-to-day operational requirements. 
 
Heartbeat is a well established, well funded, medium to large organisation, 
which translates to the benefit of: 
 Appointing their own ground staff on a permanent basis, 
 Supplying all the resources needed to establish the much needed 
infrastructure in the communities, 
 Negate the option of partnering with smaller NGO’s operating in the field. 
 
Seemingly enough, they do prefer to partner upwards with well established 
international organisations as well as the various Government divisions.  
 
(b) Key Relationships 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of key relationships utilised by interviewees. 
 Acts2Change Heartbeat 
Community 
leaders 
Partner with community church 
leaders, care workers and district 
leaders. 
Incorporate District leaders in 
problem definition phase 
Other social 
organisations 
Alliance with other churches who 
supply funding. 
Mentor other NGO’s to use the 
Heartbeat model. 
Relevant 
Government 
departments  
Relationship with Department of 
Health. 
Relationship with Department of 
Health. 
Active partner of Government’s 
AIDS program 
International 
Agencies  None 
Partnered with PEPFAR, 
UNAIDS, Starfish 
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5.13 EXPERIENCE (V13) 
5.13.1 Case Study Results 
From the case data it seems that the organisations with: 
 Low experience levels opted to SUPPORT other existing efforts in the 
field.  
 Moderate experience levels opted to start their own ventures on a small 
scale, utilising a core group of permanent staff and leveraging existing 
social ground networks.  
 Medium to High experience levels tend to tackle problems on a national 
and international level. They prefer to partner with various stakeholders 
on a strategic management level and then outsourced as much as 
possible of the ground work to experts, strong NGO’s and local 
community workers. 
 
In the case data, it seems as if organisations gained their experience over 
time, acquired additional experience through partnerships or shared their 
knowledge with others in the field. 
  
(a) Gain Experience 
The majority of the groups within the case study data started off on a clean 
slate. The first obvious step therefore was to conduct a small pilot study within 
a nearby community to validate and optimise their social strategies. 
 
The mainstream strategy was also to gain experience systematically and 
incrementally, continuing to improve their efforts as they went along. Some 
grew exponentially in stature, posed astounding results and eventually 
assisted Government in formulating a national intervention policy.20    
 
                                            
20
 As detailed in “Strategic Variables (V9)” on page 85. 
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(b) Acquire Additional Experience 
From the case data, it seems that the following options were very successful 
in “acquiring” experience: 
 Consulting with influential members within the community, stakeholders 
and opinion makers and gain their views/perspectives on what the 
problems are and how they perceive it to be solved. 
 Maximise experience level through partnering with a diverse portfolio of 
experts, industry leaders, NGO's, ground workers, etc. 
 
(c) Share Experience with Others 
Some of the highly successful organisations seemed to opt for exponential 
expansion. They shifted their focus from an operational entity to a mentoring 
body by taking the “not-so-successful” organisations under their wings and 
developing their skills/capacity to a world class standard. 
5.13.2 Interview Results 
(a) General Social Entrepreneurship Experience  
Mr. Pretorius has been involved in social upliftment as the pastor of a church 
since 1970. He has been involved with AFNET (missions based social 
investment organisation) the last couple of years until he founded 
Acts2Change in 2008.  It is almost safe to assume that the organisation’s 
primary entry mode, partnering community churches, is centred on Mr. 
Pretorius’ personal experience base. 
 
Dr. Pienaar was intrigued by South Africa’s social dilemma during the ’94 
transition period. More than 8 years ago she and a few friends decided to 
enter a township in Carltonville with no experience but with a willingness to 
learn from the people within the community. Gradually they grew in stature, 
fashioned relationships with the community, government and donors up to the 
point where she won the Schwab Foundation’s “South African Social 
Entrepreneur of the Year Award” in 2006.  Today Heartbeat is truly a 
renowned brand within South African social entrepreneurial circles. 
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(b) Decision-specific experience 
Acts2Change is a newly founded organisation, but the founder already prefers 
to use the same entry mode (partnering with local churches and schools) for 
all his projects. 
  
Heartbeat is well established and experienced with its business model and 
prefers to use the same template for their strategy when entering a new 
community. 
 
(c) Community-specific experience 
Both NGO’s: 
 Are familiar with the South African population and the typical community 
structures being employed.  
 Liaison with the district authorities to gain insight and access to the 
community. 
 Use people from the community as employees/ground workers. 
 
Heartbeat also sustains their community experience gained by: 
 Allowing grass-roots community workers to be promoted up through the 
ranks into management positions, 
 Giving the orphans (who have benefited from their programs) the 
opportunity to apply for positions within Heartbeat after they have 
matriculated.  
  
5.14 RISK (V14) 
5.14.1 Case Study Results 
The following success factors, grouped into the four primary international 
business risk categories, were identified in the case data: 
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(a) Investment Risk 
 Sometimes you have to be the first one in: Based on the risk analysis 
done during the problem definition phase, a number of investments were 
bound to fail. Unfortunately (and fortunately) the need for intervention 
within those areas was so overwhelming that the social entrepreneurs 
decided to continue against all odds. At the end, with perseverance and 
determination, these projects posted astounding results and paved the 
way for others to follow. 
 Be willing to invest in powerful ideas: Social entrepreneurship is still in 
its infancy and everybody has yet a lot to learn. Just as in the industrial 
pioneering days, the organisations that were willing to invest in risky 
powerful ideas were not disappointed.  
 
(b) Financial Risk 
 Multi-sector donor selection: For a single project was opted by most 
organisations within the case study sample to provide a sustainable fund 
base and to negate other financial risks. Funding commitments varied 
between 3, 5 and 10 year intervals, in single payments or annual delivery.  
 Approval Process: Like in the corporate environment, the donor 
organisations preferred to make use of a formal approval process where 
small donations are delegated to line managers. Donations or business 
cases that exceeded a certain expenditure threshold were escalated to 
board level for consent and final approval. 
 Meet you in the middle: Many PPP were based on the principle where 
the social donors gave a dollar for every dollar raised by the local 
Government. This principle reduced the investment risk, cultivated long-
term sustainability as well as Government’s immediate buy-in. In many 
cases the donor funding tapered off as the infrastructure and operational 
systems were established. 
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(c) Contractual Risks – Reduce Risk of Failure 
 Planning and Control: A number of companies felt that their risk of failure 
was minimised through effective planning and control (as detailed in 
Vector 15, page 100) 
 Diverse Portfolio of Partners: Many of the financial donors opted to 
surround themselves with a diverse portfolio of world-class experts, 
opinion makers and other stakeholders in order to assist them in strategy 
formulation, decision making and operational issues. Small focus groups 
deemed to be the most effective panel format and mostly used. 
 Democracy and Collaboration: It was found that democracy & 
collaboration within the community setting, involving the various 
stakeholders during the problem definition phase, brought unity in the 
community and thus reduced the risk of resistance.  
 
(d) Country Risk 
As stated in the literature study, Country Risks encompass all the vectors 
pertaining to country specific barriers of entry like Culture, Political Distance, 
Political stability, etc. and were not repeated again within this section. 
5.14.2 Interview Results 
(a) Investment Risk 
It seems like NGO’s do not carry the full investment risk but rather abdicate a 
great portion of the investment decision to the donors/investors themselves. 
Both NGO’s give their investors the freedom to page through their portfolio of 
projects, visit the possible sites and discuss the various risks contained within 
each project before they have to “sign” any commitments.  
The investors also try to minimise their risk by tracing the NGO’s: 
 Track records of previous projects 
 Financial statements as well as  
 Referrals from previous donors/investors.  
  
Dr Pienaar also noted that she had to consider the long-term implications of 
associating with certain donors. She mentioned examples where companies 
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in the banking sector refused to partner with her when they found out that she 
had relational links with donors from the beer brewing industry. 
 
From an investor’s perspective, Dr Sunter had the following to say… 
 “We do not do this to be in the lime-light. Some organisations believe in one 
BIG project, with the media and large cheques being signed. No, we believe 
in thousands of small projects (R10, 000 – 20,000 grants).  
 
For larger projects, we use more complex systems than just giving money and 
reading the report at the end. We evaluate their business cases and make 
sure the project will be feasible in the long run. We create steering 
committees with enough expertise and professional skills onboard to influence 
decisions, give expert guidance, make sure sub-contractors are charging 
reasonable prices, benchmark the quotes and even provide means of saving 
money.”  
 
(b) Financial Risk 
Heartbeat minimises their financial risk by: 
 Allocating multiple donors on a single project in as to secure a sustainable 
funding basis. 
 Giving large donors special priority and personalised feedback. 
 Quote their international investors in their local currency “Rands”, as to 
defer their exposure to currency fluctuations. 
 
For large Government projects, the Anglo American Chairman’s Fund prefers 
to donate a rand for every rand sourced by the Department of Education. 
“This way there is a natural partnership and we automatically validate their 
commitment.” 
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(c) Contractual Risks – Reduce Risk of Failure 
Apart from planning and control, it seems like both NGO’s prefer to use 
effective screening techniques to prevent unnecessary failures: 
 Mr. Pretorius prefers to spend time with his clients (donors or community 
leaders) prior to any formal agreements. During this period he will try to 
establish a trust relationship and will abort immediately if he believes that 
they would expect him to achieve the impossible. 
 Heartbeat uses a screening process during their staff enrolment process to 
validate their staff’s credibility.  
 
Both NGO’s also make use of performance contracts between themselves 
and their employees, beneficiaries and suppliers to ensure optimal output and 
to reduce their own risk in the event of failure. 
 
(d) Country Risk 
None of the NGO’s had an exit strategy and hope not to be ever confronted 
with a situation where they have to withdraw from a project due to safety 
reasons. They have placed projects on hold when violence erupted in the 
surrounding areas and then re-entered again once everything settled down 
again. 
 
5.15 CONTROL (V15) 
Forward control is enforced from the strategic level down to the operational 
level, utilising a feedback mechanism to monitor operational progress/results 
from the strategic level. 
5.15.1  Case Study Results 
(a) Strategic Level 
 Control Strategy: Many organisations preferred to use a simple control 
strategy, driven by clear and definite targets. A number of the green field 
projects’ strategies were slightly off-target during start-up and success 
could only be attributed to their management’s flexibility and willingness to 
learn as the project unfolded. 
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 Centralised vs. Decentralised: International organisations used a 
tailored mixture of local global control where they centralised the critical 
strategic functions and decentralised the operational control. This implied 
that the critical functions revolved around a central theme, but local teams 
were allowed to customise their operational control system according to 
local conditions. 
 Approval Process: Board of directors have to approve large projects 
(Same as per Financial Risk in the previous vector) 
 
(b) Operational Level 
 You have to be cruel to be kind: One of the most difficult aspects to 
control in a poverty stricken country is to ensure that aid only reaches 
those originally destined for help. Many a time ground workers come 
across someone who is also in need of help, but that person does not 
qualify for help and was thus not included in the original project’s scope. 
(E.g. Research has shown that pregnant woman and children below the 
age of 5 are most vulnerable for Malaria and the business case only had 
enough money to distribute mosquito nets to this target population. 
Unfortunately by doing a “good” deed, one would inhibit the project’s 
success, causing young children to die from malaria if ground workers 
suddenly start to distribute the limited supply of mosquito nets to men in 
the community as well.)   
 Managing Multiple Partners: In most of the larger social investment 
projects, there are a number of organisations working 
together/simultaneously on a single project or within a single community. It 
is often difficult to achieve success through these composite partnerships 
and close collaboration of all efforts is essential to ensure delivery. In 
some cases, the investment organisation then opted to appoint full-time 
program co-ordinators to oversee project progress and to co-ordinate all 
parties’ efforts to ensure synergy.  
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(c) Feedback Mechanism 
Some of the investment firms opted to make use of frequent site visits as an 
instant feedback mechanism, while the majority of the organisations utilised a 
simple, robust & rigorous monitoring/evaluation system to provide “remote” 
feedback. These systems were mainly designed to collect operational data 
onto an electronic database and then feeding relevant information back to the 
following stakeholders on a monthly and/or annual basis:  
 Project management team,  
 Executive committee,  
 Company shareholders and  
 Other stakeholders. 
 
Multi-partner projects had the additional complexity of providing a harmonised 
monitoring and evaluation system that enables management to keep track of 
their own achievements as well as the outputs of their partners. 
5.15.2  Interview Results 
(a) Strategic Level 
Being a smaller organisation, Acts2Change prefer to have centralised control 
over their donors but decentralises all field work as much as possible. 
 
Heartbeat on the other hand is a larger, more experienced organisation with 
strong controls in place. They centralise the donor management, resource 
management as well as strategic decision making. The operational control is 
delegated to the various branch offices, with a strong feedback loop to head-
office.  
 
(b) Operational Level 
When asked about ground level control mechanisms, Mr. Pretorius smiled 
and said: “I am not a control freak and do not believe in micro-management. 
The trust relationship between us is more than enough to ensure success.”  
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As stated earlier, Heartbeat also prefers to appoint their own ground workers 
because it enables them to have better control over their product delivery. 
  
Heartbeat operates in some of the poorest communities with much poverty 
related issues. Unfortunately they were forced to take a hard stance on needy 
people and only provide assistance to their core group - AIDS orphans. In 
order to prevent social uproar, they had to re-enforce their core values and 
mission statement repeatedly to community leaders and ground workers.  
 
At this point Dr. Pienaar interrupted herself and said: “We are very strict with 
our controls and I am afraid that we might even be getting to a point where we 
are too strict. Some of my staff said they liked it better in the early years when 
we were small and not so structured. The matter of the fact is that we are 
working with vulnerable children and I promise you that we will not be able to 
get any future funding if we do not deliver on our promises.” 
 
(c) Ground Level Feedback Mechanism  
Mr. Pretorius measures ground level progress and success through: 
 Frequent site visits 
 Discussions with the teachers regarding the children’s improvement in 
general. 
 Quarterly documented reports generated by the care-workers, stating the 
progress of each child.  
 
Program managers within Heartbeat are responsible for the continuous quality 
assurance programs on ground level. The children attend day-care centres 
after school, and care workers note each child’s attendance at remedial 
sessions as well as any abnormal behaviour. The data is then captured on an 
electronic database, accessible by head-office. 
 
Other qualitative indicators to top management include: 
 Stories written by the children, care workers and teachers. 
 Public speeches by their youth ambassadors 
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(d) Feedback to Investors 
Both NGO’s had to provide their investors with “detailed” reports on their 
project’s progress as well as the reasons for non-conformance. Other 
feedback mechanisms include newsletters and letters written specially for the 
donors by the children. 
 
From the investor’s perspective, Anglo American’s Chairman’s fund had the 
following philosophy on progress reporting: “Do not clutter their lives with 
paperwork and burocracy. These people usually don’t have the means or 
understanding to fill in complex reports. We expect a simple progress report 
once per annum.” 
 
5.16 COMMITMENT (V16) 
5.16.1 Case Study Results 
On average, the case data have shown that the social entrepreneurial 
projects can have a project implementation lifespan of 3-5 years for 
community related projects and a 5-10 year lifespan for large national 
campaigns. Although these projects have a relative long lifecycle, the end-
product itself must be sustainable for 50 years and longer. For example, the 
Abbot foundation provided the Tanzanian Government the necessary 
infrastructure that enabled them to meet the lifelong treatment needs of 
people with HIV. 
 
With such long project and product lifecycles one must keep in mind that the 
selected entry mode, and thus project success, is highly dependant on the 
long-term commitment levels of all stakeholders in the process. 
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(a) Visionary Commitment 
“Star School was established by Dan Olofsson, a Swedish businessman who 
recently decided to invest in Thanda Game Reserve. His commitment to 
addressing HIV/AIDS in this vulnerable community and his continued 
leadership has helped secure consistent support and roll-out of the 
programs.” 
- Thanda Private Game Reserve, Case 22 - 
 
Many a time it is the visionary that provides the enthusiasm and drive to turn 
the dream into reality, especially during the inception, problem definition and 
start-up phases. Sustainable commitment frorm the founder/visionary during 
these stages (and beyond) were found to be contributing to project success. 
 
(b) Donor Commitment 
Most cases supported the notion that long-term committed funding allow for 
better planning on sustainable programs which are aimed at improving 
livelihoods in the long-run. It seems as if the industry standard is a minimum 
commitment of 3 to 5 years, but the Gates foundation found that 10 years 
were a more realistic figure when attempting to instigate programs on a 
national level. 
 
(c) Social Organisational Commitment 
With such long time horizons, successful organisations managed to stay 
focussed by means of formalised commitments on strategic level. This implies 
an element of senior management commitment and support to the cause, 
which manifested through the provision of the necessary support structures, 
resources, permanent staff, commitment to continuous improvement, etc.  
 
Inspiring mission statements with specific target levels like “Reach 1 million 
people in three years” were successfully utilised to keep all parties committed, 
focussed and motivated. The advantage of a target specific mission statement 
was that all parties were committed to the definition of success and they used 
it to benchmark their current progress. 
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(d) Partner Commitment 
Partner commitment ranged from: 
 Verbal agreements,  
 Memorandum of understandings,  
 Contractual agreements right up to   
 Equally sized financial contributions. 
 
(e) Commitment from the “Client” 
There is a certain level of commitment required from the recipients/community 
in order to ensure project sustainability. Tactics utilised within the cases 
include: 
 Grantee must match commitment 
 Get commitment of opinion makers in the community 
 Community members had to form small support groups, which could 
provide moral and financial support during the intervention, before being 
eligible for assistance. 
5.16.2 Interview Results 
(a) Visionary Commitment 
Mr. Pretorius stated that he personally commitment himself for the next 5-10 
years to Soshanguve. He later interrupted himself and said: “Actually it is a 
lifelong commitment, and I need to start thinking of preparing someone to 
follow in my footsteps” 
  
(b) Donor Commitment 
Acts2Change only requires their donors to deliver on their promises and do 
not have any other “demands” on them. “If they want to employ some of the 
children once they've completed grade 12, that’s fine, if not, it’s also OK. They 
just better stick to their commitment once they’ve made a promise to the kids.”  
 
Heartbeat is much more formal in their approach. They require a minimum 
commitment of 3 years from the donors along with a financial declaration of 
R600, 000 before they consider going into partnership. 
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From a donor’s perspective, Dr. Sunter made the following comment on their 
commitment level: “Once we start on the ground, we never abort. It only 
takes a few meetings to test their commitment to the project. And remember, 
we only back winners. So we will pull the plug during the early stages when 
we see that they lack commitment, otherwise we follow through.” 
 
(c) Social Organisational Commitment 
Neither Heartbeat nor Acts2Change ever even considered exiting prematurely 
from any project.  
 
“We will look for any means possible to continue, even if it means that we 
have to put the project on halt for a while… Sometimes we had to go back to 
the donors to negotiate additional funding but we never considered 
abandonment.” 
– Dr. Sunette Pienaar – 
 
Both of them have learned through experience that by “under-promising and 
over-delivering”, one can manage the expectations of the community…  
 
“I am very slow to make promises to the community because if you promised 
something you better deliver. So the best way is not promise anything unless 
you are 100% sure that you can deliver.” 
– Dr. Sunette Pienaar – 
 
“I never make promises to the people, but I do tell them that I can only do my 
best to solve the problem.”  
– Jannie Pretorius – 
 
(d) Partner Commitment 
Dr. Pienaar prefer not to partner with any other NGO unless really necessary 
while Mr. Pretorius on the other hand seek  partners that are filled with 
passion and driven by vision. 
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(e) Commitment from the “Client” 
Acts2Change have formal service level agreements with the church leaders in 
the community. They will supply the necessary infrastructure while the church 
should take responsibility of the operational requirements of the day care 
centre. The contract states that Acts2Change holds the right to transfer the 
operational rights to another church in the community if they do not conform to 
the requirements stipulated in the contract. 
Dr. Sunter also explained how Anglo American’s Chairman’s fund preferred to 
use PPP’s when worked with South Africa’s Department of Education. In 
these partnerships they tended to provide the necessary skills needed to erect 
for instance a new school, along with 50% of the funding. Government had to 
provide the other half, along with some sort of commitment that they were 
willing to sustain the future operational requirements of the school. 
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5.17 INTERVIEWEE’S ADDITIONS TO THE EXISTING MODEL 
Both Mr. Pretorius and Dr. Pienaar strongly felt that “Trust” should be added 
as another vector. For instance, halfway through the vector model 
questionnaire Dr. Pienaar made the following remark: 
 
“You have a wonderful model, and you ask me all this questions on 
partnerships, risks and experience. I believe that trust should be in there as 
well. I would not have been able to look my investors in the eye if there were 
no trustworthy relationship between us. Many a time I had to humble myself 
and apologise for the mistakes made. If it weren’t for their trust in me, they 
wouldn’t have extended our contracts.  
… 
Trust operates in all four directions: 
 You need to trust your people on ground level;  
 You need to trust your peers, partners and suppliers,  
 You need to trust Government and the local authorities and 
 You need to trust your investors. 
 
In the modern-day business environment, a contract is as good as the paper it 
is written on. You use it when things go bad, but it does not deliver products 
on the table. For that – you need trust.” 
 
Mr. Pretorius stated that he strongly believes that trustworthy relationships 
should be seen as the key ingredient to any social development project.  
 
“A trustworthy relationship between the community and the contact person is 
extremely important if one wants to expand the bigger vision and empower 
the people. The project is never about getting the job perfectly done, but it is 
about the passion that you cultivate. The new building can be a bit crooked as 
long as you’ve empowered someone and you’ve cultivated a long lasting 
relationship.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
6 CONLUSIONS AND 
RECCOMENDATIONS 
This chapter concludes the research report, linking the international business 
literature discussed in Chapter 3 with the social investment research data 
captured in Chapter 5.  
 
These correlations then unite the efforts to date, re-defining the vectors for the 
social investment environment and discussing of the building blocks of the 
Social Investment Model. 
 
The chapter also contains: 
 Application notes for the social investment model 
 Conclusions on the research as well as 
 Recommendations for future research. 
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6.1 LINKING RESULTS WITH OPPORTUNITY SELECTION 
MODELS 
6.1.1 Ghemawat’s CAGE Model (V1 – 4) 
The research data has shown that Cultural, Political, Geographic and 
Economic distances have the capacity to hamper project success if not 
managed intelligently. Specific comments on each vector’s applicability within 
the social entrepreneurial realm include:   
 Cultural Distance: It is real and has a definite effect on social projects. It 
seems like the social entrepreneurs uses their inherent experience to 
navigate through the difficulties caused by cultural distances rather than 
official measurement tools. 
 Political & Administrative Distance: There was a definite positive drive 
towards partnering with Government when implementing social programs 
on a national level. Social entrepreneurs were aware of the fact that this 
route might seem slower but deemed necessary to increase the scope of 
the intervention and to ensure future sustainability. Although a number of 
cases involved cross-border intervention, none specifically mentioned the 
effects of tariffs, trade quotas, restrictions, etc. 
 Geographic Distance: Contradictory to the theory, geographic distance 
were never deemed as a social project selection disqualifier – the 
interviewed social entrepreneurs just seemed determined to assist the 
needy in remote areas while being aware of the fact that remote projects 
require more resources  and take longer to complete. The lack of 
established information and communication technologies in the rural areas 
seemed to increase the effects of geographic distance.    
 Economic Distance: As per cultural distance, the impression is that the 
entrepreneurs manage economic distance through knowledge and 
experience, without utilising any formal measurement tools. 
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Essentially the conclusion is that CAGE distances exist within the social 
investment realm. They exist between: 
 Donors and the contact persons within the social entrepreneurial 
organisations, 
 Various internal members and divisions working on the same project, 
 The social investment firm  and other partners working on the project, 
 Social investment firm’s ground staff and the community. 
 
These distances should first be measured, quantified and then appropriately 
managed in order to prevent them form hampering the project’s success.  
 
(a) Measuring CAGE Distances 
Taking the teachings from the international business body of knowledge into 
account, the recommendation is to use the following tools to21: 
 Measure the existence of the distances and to  
 Quantify the intensity of these forces relating to the investment project. 
 
 
                                            
21
 These recommendations are based on the author’s experience. Any other tool may be used that are more 
applicable to a specific situation/organisation. 
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Table 6.1: Recommended tools to measure the CAGE distances between host and 
home country. 
Distance Measurement / Tool 
Cultural Distance Hofstede’s or Schwartz’s four dimensions of cultural 
distance. 
Political & Administrative 
Distance 
 Historical and Political associations 
 Regulations and policies 
 Tariffs and taxes 
 Trade quotas 
 Restrictions on foreign direct investment 
 Local supplier preference 
 Availability of subsidies 
 Favouritism 
 Quality of social systems and infrastructure 
Geographical Distance 
 Physical size of the home and host countries. 
 Average within country distance towards borders and 
exporting facilities. 
 Access to waterways and the ocean. 
 Country topology. 
 Access to the country’s communication, transportation 
and electrical supply infrastructure. 
Economic Distance 
 Compare average income (GDP, GNP, actual incomes, 
etc.) 
 Compare income difference (GINI index) 
 
(b) Managing CAGE Forces 
There was a substantial amount of overlapping found during the allocation of 
the various key success factors to overcome the distances within Ghemawat’s 
CAGE Model. It made more sense to colligate all the key success factors into 
a single group, illustrating their relationship with the various vectors in table 
format (table 6.2) 
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Table 6.2: Colligated Key Success Factor map for Ghemawat’s CAGE Model22. 
Key Success Factors 
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Use Intermediate Parties where needed • • • • 
Localise the Effort • • • • 
Trustworthy Relationships • • •  
Continuous Communication • • •  
Consultation and Involvement • •  • 
Education and Skills Development • •  • 
Infrastructure,  Services and Critical Resources  • • • 
Historical and Political Associations  •   
Serving Attitude • •  • 
Solutions must make sense • • • • 
 
6.1.2 Create Your Own Luck (V5) 
Comparing the research results to Dagnino’s Opportunity and Space model, it 
seems like social entrepreneurs also use a unique mixture of foresight, 
mindfulness and entrepreneurial judgement to orchestrate a measurable 
degree of luck. There are numerous strategies for creating luck, but the 
following three variables were identified as possible means to create future 
luck: 
 
(a) Sourcing Key Relationships 
Both social entrepreneurs openly declared that they would not have achieved 
the level of success today, if it were not for the relationships forged yesterday.  
 
As per international business tactics, social entrepreneurs have the tendency 
to scout for key members within communities long before they have any 
investment interest in the area.  
                                            
22
 Detailed application notes for each success factor can be found in Appendix D, page 220. 
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The entrepreneurs will then build relationship with these key members with 
the hope that these relationships will bear fruit at the time when investment 
opportunities arise in that area. 
 
Generally speaking, the sourcing and building of key relationships takes time 
and energy before it contributes to current success. It is therefore 
recommended to source and forge relationships with the following people as 
early as possible in order to increase the possibility of future success: 
 Key opinion makers 
 Key members within a community 
 Key local and national Government leaders 
 Organisations with strong social links within the community 
 Key international organisations and trend setters 
 National and international donor agencies and individuals. 
 
(b) Be On-Site to Gain Insight 
A secondary spin-off of having an “agent” in a community is the ability to 
engage with local leadership and “read the seasons” within the community so 
that you can pre-empt possible needs that may arise in the future. If you time 
your intervention right, you will be able to be “part” of the community at the 
moment when they are in most need for intervention. 
 
(c) Success Breeds Success 
It was found that communities, influential leaders, donors, international 
institutions, etc. were more open to liaison with social investment firms who 
has a successful brand and reputation.  
 
So, from a social entrepreneur’s perspective, one must first earn peoples’ 
respect through achieving success in smaller projects, establishing a 
trustworthy brand over time. One must also be careful in selecting projects 
that are destined to fail from the outset as result of unreasonable expectations 
set forth by either the donors, partners or the community themselves. 
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6.1.3 Quality of Business Prospects on Offer (V6) 
The variables for measuring the “quality of prospects” seem to be all in the 
eye of the beholder. They vary from project-to-project, genre-to-genre and 
even country-to-country. Case data has shown that one must consider the 
challenges and opportunities relating to: 
 Long-term sustainability,  
 Intervention size, percentage of population in need of help, geographic 
coverage and intervention population density,  
 The contribution needed to alleviate the problem,  
 Existing efforts in the area and possible partnerships, 
 Interventions feared or sneered upon by other social investors, etc. 
 
One can easily be trapped by the subtle seduction of selecting a business 
prospect on merit instead of evaluating it within context. Glorious opportunities 
that brought success in one country might be doomed in another, or the not 
so attractive proposal might be the only solution for a particular case. It is 
therefore recommended to keep ones options open until the entire project has 
been evaluated and optimised before selecting / rejecting a proposal.  
Social entrepreneurs have used the following tools to estimate and extract the 
inherent quality within a business proposal: 
   
(a) Create a Business Case and High Level Project Plan 
The case data revealed that most successful organisations conduct a 
baseline study prior to intervention, as to create a reference point for progress 
measurement and to determine the actual level of need within the community.  
 
The data is then used to define a sound business case with realistic targets 
(cost & duration) and measurable outcomes (scope and deliverables).  
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Key success factors for successful project plans include: 
 Identify and prioritise specific sites where intervention is needed, 
 Give highest priority to the people that are most in need of help, 
 Start with small projects that would have the maximum impact for the least 
amount of time, effort and resources if you still need to earn the respect of 
the community. 
 Benchmark the targets and outcomes against similar projects within the 
industry. 
 Be flexible in your planning. 
 
One must be open-minded during this phase of the project, not only focussing 
on the primary objectives of the investment, but also investigating the 
necessity to improve the secondary services needed to sustain the 
intervention.  
 
(b) Return on investment 
Essentially the aim of any social project should be to achieve positive 
sustainable change in clients’ lives. Generally, non-profit aid organisations 
(and their respective donors) invest in social projects for the greater good of 
humanity and do not care as much about return on investment as they do 
about ensuring sound governance on monies spent. 
 
Opposed to this culture, a number of corporate organisations who manages 
their sustainability through the triple bottom-line approach23, have published 
cases where mutual benefits were realised for society and themselves; posing 
direct financial return on their social investment. 
 
It is therefore recommended to marry these two cultures, brining forth tools to 
measure social profit which will assist management in investing their time, 
money and energy into the most “profitable” social projects. 
 
                                            
23
 Economic gains, Environmental Stewardship, Social Improvements 
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6.1.4 Country Attractiveness (V7) 
The assumption is that “Country” and “Community” attractiveness should be 
synonymous within the social entrepreneurial realm and seen as if the 
community is a small country on its own. 
 
The following can be concluded when comparing the theoretical model with 
the research data: 
 Sovereign Risk: Until further research proves otherwise, one must make 
the assumption that sovereign risk in its totality is also applicable to social 
entrepreneurial organisations. This implies that one should consider the 
business risks in terms of the Economic, Business and Legal systems 
provided by the host country when evaluating the country’s attractiveness. 
 People: The research results have shown that social entrepreneurs did 
not only consider local skills when rating a community’s attractiveness, but 
also it’s supporting industries like community networks and NGO’s. For the 
purpose of social investment projects, one would therefore re-define this 
entity to “Local skills and Supporting Industries” to encompass all the 
requirements for analysing a country’s attractiveness. 
 Dynamics of the Country: The research data only included elements like 
“political stability” and “government leadership support” when considering 
the country’s attractiveness. One can also include the up/downward trends 
of the need for intervention (like increase in HIV prevalence rate) when 
prioritising one country/community above the other. 
 National Competitiveness:  This dimension is not applicable to social 
entrepreneurship within its original context. One can either delete it from 
the attractiveness model, or consider using measurements like the Poverty 
and GINI indexes to attain the overall social forces and possible needs 
within a particular country/community.  
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6.1.5 Company’s Ability to Deliver (V8) 
(a) Leadership 
The researcher is of the opinion that leadership qualities, especially that of the 
social entrepreneur, are the cornerstone for project success. The interview 
and case data did not provide much detail on key leadership attributes 
required for successful social entrepreneurs but both of the interviewed 
entrepreneurs passed the requirements set forth by the Skoll Foundation in 
section 2.1 on page 11. 
 
The recommendation is to use a creative blend of Edith Penrose’s comments 
on the quality of entrepreneurial services of the firm24 and the Skoll 
Foundation’s social entrepreneurial characteristics to construct a template for 
leadership qualities required by Social Entrepreneurial firms: 
 
The quality of the services delivered by a social entrepreneurial firm is 
encapsulated in their leadership’s entrepreneurial versatility, ambition and 
judgement. The nature of the environment requires them to be creatively 
resourceful and excel in fund-raising ingenuity. To achieve success, they do 
not only require a passion for cause and the people but they also need to be 
strategic, mission driven and results orientated. 
 
(b) Required Resources 
The research has shown most of companies that entered the social 
investment realm did not have the initial hard and soft resources in place 
during the problem definition phase of the project. They either opted for 
organic growth or created a body that is capable of delivering through 
strategic outsourcing or full fledged partnerships. 
 
                                            
24
 Listed in section 0 on page 38 
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The following items have also been identified as key/critical resources needed 
to sustain social investment projects: 
 Full-time staff and dedicated resources,  
 Expert skills and products,  
 Knowledge and experience,  
 Sustainable funding, 
 Progress monitoring, control, auditing and other internal systems  
 Governance structures and policies,  
 Reputation and brand, 
 Key relationships with community leaders, Government officials, donors, 
international aid agencies and other social investment firms. 
 
(c) Creating a Body that is Capable of Delivering 
Many corporate and social investment firms did not have the necessary 
internal skills, resources and experience needed to alleviate their problem at 
hand.  
 
Their strategy was simply to obtain/partner/network with any 
individual/organisation that has the ability to compliment their own skills and 
efforts or that could provide them with the necessary experience and/or social 
links needed to complete or expand the scope of the project.  
 
This idea of “creating a body that is capable of delivering” can be seen as the 
golden thread between the opportunity selection and the entry mode selection 
models.  
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6.2 LINKING RESULTS WITH ENTRY MODE SELECTION 
MODELS 
Just by browsing through the case and interview data, one immediately starts 
to correlate the practical entry mode selection criteria with Hill’s theories noted 
in section 3.4.1 on page 41. 
 
For example: Heartbeat’s core competence is their technical know-how on 
establishing HIV/AIDS orphan care centres in rural areas. As predicted by 
Hill’s theory, they prefer to make use of wholly owned subsidiary as their entry 
mode, and in some cases, specially structured joint ventures/licensing 
agreements to limit their risk of failure. 
 
Corporate organisations who were involved in social investment as part of 
their corporate social responsibility programs seemed to leverage their 
management know-how to ensure success. As per Hill’s theory, these 
organisations selected structured joint-ventures with experts in the field as the 
preferable entry mode.  
6.2.1 Wild, Wild & Han’s evolution of entry mode decisions 
Dr. Pienaar’s narrative of Heartbeat’s evolution of entry mode selection 
revealed a most surprising correlation with Wild, Wild and Han’s model.  
 
One can clearly see Heartbeat’s business model evolved from being a 
supportive partner to the needy people in Carltonville during the initial stages. 
As they grew in stature over the years, they gained more experience, 
implemented better control systems and were willing to take on more risky 
ventures. Today Heartbeat is a highly successful non-profit organisation, 
subsidised by private donor funding and government grants, operating mostly 
as the leading partner in either a wholly owned equity mode or PPP. 
 
Dr. Pienaar also explained that a number of her ventures were structured as a 
semi-turnkey projects, where Heartbeat was responsible for establishing a 
new community centre from scratch with private donor funding.  
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They were entirely responsible for all aspects of the project, ensuring that the 
centre is fully operational and sustainable before “donating” it to Government 
for their use. 
 
Heartbeat also has another pillar in their business model. They equip hand-
picked NGO’s with the necessary skills needed to be honoured as Heartbeat 
certified partners. Using typical franchise techniques, they: 
 Expose the leadership to rigorous training interventions and 
 Applying strict quality control over their processes and products. 
 
Once these NGO’s have proven themselves to be self-sufficient and worthy of 
the cause, Heartbeat will lessen their control over them and issue them with a 
licence to operate as “Heartbeat Partners”.  
 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of the social investment entry mode decisions  






Adapted from: Wild, Wild & Han (2006)  
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Using the case data, one can re-interpret Wild, Wild and Han’s model to be 
applicable to the social investment environment: 
 Supportive and Strategic Guidance Role: Smaller / less socially 
experienced organisations tended to enter in a supportive role, acting 
secondary partner to an existing NGO, only providing the necessary 
resources and strategic guidance. 
 Management Contract: Many corporate organisations preferred stay 
involved on a strategic level, but the existence of well established 
community care networks and strong NGO’s operating within a particular 
location assisted in the decision to outsource various tasks within the 
operational level. 
 Joint Partnership: Another option was through joint partnerships or 
strategic collaborations with other social organisations operating in that 
area as to attain maximum impact through co-ordinated efforts. 
 Private Public Partnership: Government’s involvement within a particular 
area, or willingness to participate in partnerships within that area, paved 
the way for using PPP as the desired entry mode. A number of projects 
claimed that their partnership with Government substantially increased 
their intervention scope and future sustainability. 
 Wholly owned subsidiary: A number of corporate organisations went full-
out with their social interventions, paying for everything, using their own 
resources and only sub-contracting experts where needed. 
6.2.2 Conceptual framework of entry mode choice  
The model developed by Shi, Sui & Ho (2001) was designed to give direction 
on whether the organisation should opt for shared or full ownership. The 
model itself was not validated in this study, but the individual vectors posed 
promising results on being applicable to the social investment realm. These 
observations are documented on vector level in section 6.3. 
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6.2.3 Hierarchical model of Entry Modes (Pan & Tse) 
The research data have not conclusively proven or disproven Pan & Tse’s 
(2000) Hierarchical model of entry modes and more research is needed to 
define social investment specific entry modes. The assumption therefore 
remains that their model can be used as an indicative tool to match the 
international social investment firm’s required commitment level to the 
selected entry mode.  
 
6.3 EXPANDING ON ENTRY MODE SELECTION VECTORS 
6.3.1 Strategic Variables (V9) 
Shi, Sui & Ho’s (2001) theory states that one must take the firm’s long and 
short-term strategy into account when selecting an entry mode.  This 
phenomenon manifested in a number of cases whereby organisations used 
their long-term strategy as basis for selecting/rejecting social opportunities 
and possible entry modes. 
 
The research data has also highlighted the strategic importance of aligning 
ones efforts with national and international social development 
standards/policies as to: 
 Compliment the coalition of efforts across the globe,   
 Expand their project scope to a national/international level, 
 Strategically position themselves to qualify for governmental and 
international aid funding/support. 
6.3.2 Location Specific Variables (V10) 
The research data highlighted four variables that have an impact on the entry 
mode selection: 
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Table 6.3: Location specific variables, applicable to the social investment realm.  
Variable Effect on Entry Mode 
Location of Investment 
Generally, the social investment organisations found that the 
people who are most in need of help live in highly endemic 
regions and are very difficult to reach.  These widespread areas 
are usually more poverty stricken; people are less educated and 
they have weaker social community networks compared to similar 
communities in urban areas. Contradictory to international 
business theory, social investors did not steer away from these 
ventures but opted to increase their commitment and entry mode 
level in order to achieve success. 
 
Corporate organisations on the other hand preferred to enter 
locations in which their operations, their staff, or surrounding 
communities were personally affected by a pandemic. 
Existing efforts in the 
location 
Wholly owned subsidiaries (Heartbeat) rather preferred to steer 
away from areas where there would be a duplication of efforts. 
 
Managerial based organisations (i.e. Gates Foundation and 
corporate social responsible firms) preferred to use joint ventures 
in areas where there was a strong local NGO presence.  
 
In cases where no efforts existed in the area, managerial based 
organisations were forced to alter their entry mode; they had to 
establish the ground working teams themselves through either 
 Getting personally involved 
 Importing the necessary skills 
 Empowering members within the community 
 Or a combination of the above. 
Skills level of the local 
people 
Companies that use local people as part of their entry mode must 
adopt their strategy when local skills are scarce or not up to 
standard. In many cases they either had to be more personally 
involved or partner with experts to facilitate the community 
upliftment and knowledge transfer process. 
Infrastructure and 
Social Systems within 
a specific area 
Lack of infrastructure and social systems (V2) forced 
organisations to either partner with Government or with experts to 
bring about the necessary infrastructure and systems to support 
the venture. 
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6.3.3 Transaction Specific Variables (V11) 
As predicted by their theory, the social investment firms retained more 
managerial control over their remote ventures when the perceived contractual 
risks were high, especially when there was a risk of deterioration in the quality 
of the product/service delivery. 
 
On the other hand, assets specificity seemed to be more applicable to cases 
where corporate organisations leveraged their core competencies for the 
greater good of society.  Organisations like pharmaceutical and logic 
companies enforced tight control over their area of expertise, but were more 
than willing to outsource other aspects of the social investment project. 
 
Above and beyond these factors, the research data has identified the impact 
of the following variables on social investment projects and entry mode 
selection:  
 
Table 6.4: The impact of transaction specific variables within the social investment 
realm. 
Variable Effect on entry mode 
Project Scope 
Social investment firms sourced complementing partners, especially 
preferring a PPP when it was time to increase their project 
intervention scope. 
 
In reasonably large projects, organisations included a diverse 
portfolio of partners to secure a sustainable funding base and to 
gain access to the wide range of skills/resources needed to solve 
the problem. 
Transaction Cost 
The research has shown that overhead costs are real and 
absolutely necessary to support the venture, especially during 
inception phases. Care should be taken during the entry mode 
selection process as to select the most cost effective partnership 
model needed to attain success. 
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6.3.4  Firm Specific Variables (V12) 
The categorisation of the key success factors form the research data have 
illustrated the moderate correlation between the firm specific variables 
specified by Shi, Sui & Ho (Firm size, International experience, Host Country 
Experience, Relationship with local organisations) and those firm-specific 
variables impacting entry mode selection within the social investment 
environment. Future research is needed to pinpoint the exact variables, but 
the following baseline translation is recommended for the time-being: 
 Firm’s size and access to resources:  Social investment firms should 
partner with donors or other strategic/operational partners if the project 
scope exceeds the capacity and capabilities of the organisation. 
 Experience: This variable is extensively covered in Vector 13. 
 Key Relationships: Key relationships within the social investment 
environment include experts in the field, community leaders, other social 
development/investment organisations, relevant Governmental 
departments and international governing bodies/agencies. The probability 
of entering in some sort of partnership with any of these entities increases 
with the quality of the relationship and thus affects the entry mode 
selection. 
6.3.5  Experience (V13) 
As per international business theory, it seems as if experience is also the 
cornerstone for all international social investment activities. Not only does the 
interview data correlate with Wild, Wild and Han’s (2006) theories, but 
Padmanabhan & Cho’s international business theories (p47) perfectly predicts 
the entry mode decisions taken by the interviewees: 
 Both social entrepreneurs preferred to use the same entry mode with 
which they are currently experienced with. 
 Initially, Heartbeat partnered with others in the community but they 
gradually migrated to full-ownership entry modes as their internal control 
systems and general community experience levels improved. 
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 Heartbeat’s community-related experience allowed them to craft a 
business model that minimises the cultural barrier risks when starting a 
venture in a new community.  
 Heartbeat’s social entrepreneurial- and decision based experience allowed 
them to reap the benefits and bear the risks associated with full ownership 
in their community based operations. 
 
These correlations therefore prompt one to translate Padmanabhan & Cho’s 
(2005) three categories for measuring a firm’s level of experience into the 
following international social investment dimensions: 
 General social entrepreneurial experience 
 Decision specific experience 
 Community-specific experience 
  
Within each of these three dimensions, social entrepreneurs can (and have) 
either decided to:  
 Gain experience through the use of small pilot studies,  
 Acquire experience through consultation and/or partnering, 
 Share experience with others through the open forums (Export strategy), 
accredited training and certification programs (Licensing agreements) or 
mentoring programs with limited control measures (Franchise). 
 
The research has shown that managerial based organisations with: 
 Low experience levels prefer to support other existing efforts in the field.  
 Moderate experience levels tend to start their own ventures on a small 
scale, utilising a core group of permanent staff and leveraging existing 
social ground networks.  
 Medium to High experience levels tackle problems on a national and 
international level. They partner with various stakeholders on a strategic 
management level and then outsource the majority of the ground work.  
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6.3.6 Risk (V14) 
From a social investment perspective, the international business risk factors 
could be translated to: 
 Investment Risk: Perceived risks associated with investing in a particular 
social project along the risks contained in the partnership creation process. 
 Financial Risk:  Exposure to fraud, large sums of monies to be sourced 
for social investment projects, fluctuating exchange & interest rates as well 
as donors not being able to live up to their commitments. 
 Contractual Risks and Cost of Failure: Cost relating to contracts, 
agreements and the bridging thereof as well as the secondary effects and 
costs of failure. 
 Country Risk: Risks contained in the project environment analysis. 
 
Table 6.5: Key success factors for identifying and mitigating social investment risks. 
Variable Mitigation Factors 
Investment Risk 
 Sometimes you have to be the first mover in, no matter how 
great the perceived risk. 
 Be willing to invest in powerful ideas. 
 Conduct a partnership assessment25 of prospective partners 
before signing any agreements. 
 Consider the long-term implications of associating with specific 
partners/donors. 
 Dilute the organisation’s risk through investing in a multitude of 
smaller projects instead of one big idea. 
                                            
25
 Example listed in section Error! Reference source not found., page Error! Bookmark not defined. 
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Table 6.5 (Cont): Key success factors for identifying and mitigating social investment 
risks. 
Variable Mitigation Factors 
Financial Risk 
 Multi-sector donor selection minimises financial risk. 
 Quote international investors in your local currency to mitigate 
risks associated in currency fluctuations. 
 Make use of a formalised approval process, escalating larger 
projects/funding requirements through the appropriate ranks of 
the organisation. 
 Meet your PPP clients in the middle, allowing them to contribute 
financially from the outset of the project. This reduces the 
financial burden on the project and facilitates buy-in from early 
on. 
Contractual Risks 
and Cost of 
Failure 
 Effective planning and control systems minimises the risk of 
failure. 
 A diverse portfolio of partners, confined to a small focus group, 
can bring more realistic insights to in identifying and solving the 
problem at hand thereby minimising the risk of failure. 
 Negotiate performance contracts with suppliers, donors, 
communities, workers, etc. to ensure optimal output and to 
mitigate risk of failure.   
 Spend enough time with prospective partners prior to contract 
signing as to build trust and to identify any obscurities that might 
signal abandonment. 
 Democracy and collaboration with all stakeholders during the 
project definition phase will increase buy-in and reduce risk of 
resistance.  
Country Risk 
 Use Vectors 1-4 and 7 to attain the country and project 
environment risks. 
 Craft an emergency exit strategy that could be used to put the 
project on hold if the country risk suddenly becomes too high. 
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6.3.7 Control (V15) 
There is an intrinsic balance between risk, control and entry mode selection:  
 
“The greater the risk, the more control a company would like to retain; thereby 
opting for equity modes instead of non-equity modes.”  
- Padmanabhan & Cho (2005) - 
 
The research has shown that effective social investment organisations 
implemented control measures on strategic as well as operational levels in 
accordance to their entry mode selection. These two layers are then 
interlinked by an effective feedback mechanism as to: 
 Provide all relevant stakeholders with timely feedback on the project’s 
progress. 
 Validate that the operational activities and outputs are in line with the 
investment strategy. 
 Allow management to track the results of their investment strategy over 
time which will empower them to make the necessary alterations if and 
when needed. 
 
(a) Strategic level 
The ideal is to craft a control strategy that is fit for the selected entry mode; 
honouring the basic art of balancing control with expansion. The literature 
research has shown that too little control might cause synchronisation 
mismatch between host and home country while too much control will slow 
the expansion process down.  
 
Experience and knowledge are counter measures to lower the distance 
barriers between countries, and thus deemed to be very effective when low 
control levels are critical for success. 
- Padmanabhan & Cho (2005)-  
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Successful organisations have also proven that: 
 No matter how big or small the venture, the minimum strategic 
requirement is a simple control strategy, driven by clear and definite 
targets. 
 There should be a formalised approval process as to ensure sound 
governance. 
 Based on the investment strategy and environmental conditions, one need 
to craft a unique project structure that balances the pros and cons of 
centralised vs. de-centralised management options. 
 
Table 6.6: Comparing the pros and cons of centralised and de-centralised 
management. 
Management 
Option Advantages Disadvantages 
Centralised 
Management 
(i.e., management of 
partnership 
or project taken on by one 
partner organisation on 
behalf of the 
partnership) 
 Maximum efficiency 
 Unambiguous decision 
making procedures and 
day-to-day management 
systems 
 Familiar / conventional 
management approach 
 ‘One-stop shop’ for external 
agencies / individuals 
 Quicker response time 
 Too distant from experience 
/potential contribution of 
other partners 
 Too much influence / control 
perceived to be in the hands 
of one partner 
 Too conventional for flexible 
needs of the partnership 
 May take decisions 
inappropriately quickly 
De-Centralised 
Management 
(i.e., different aspects of 
management shared 
between the partner 
organisations)  
 Maximum diversity at 
operational levels 
 More opportunities for 
individual leadership 
 Shared sense of 
‘ownership’ 
 Moving away from 
conventional ‘power bases’ 
 Greater freedom of 
operation 
 Greater potential for conflicts 
of interest 
 Partners / individuals feeling 
isolated 
 Cumbersome decision-
making processes 
 Lack of coherence 
Adapted from: Tennyson (2003:p 21) 
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(b) Operational level 
The research has highlighted the fact that operational teams are being 
confronted by the actual problem at hand and they need the freedom to 
localise the effort in order to be effective. 
 
Unfortunately the problems within the poverty-stricken communities are 
greater than being catered for within the project scope. Operational teams 
often become emotionally overwhelmed by this great cry for help; becoming 
very ineffective when they try to save everybody at once. For this reason, 
successful investment organisations provided their operational teams with a 
clear vision, mission and strict boundaries in order to sustain their focus on 
solving the specific problem at hand. 
  
When using multiple partners in a venture, the research data eluded that 
successful social investment organisations increased their control by 
appointing full-time program co-ordinators; ensuring close collaboration of all 
efforts.  
 
(c) Feedback Mechanism 
For relatively small companies working on a handful of projects, a simple site-
visit seemed sufficient to track the project’s progress. Larger and multi-
national organisations gained success by investing in a simple, robust and 
rigorous monitoring/feedback mechanism. For a multi-partner project, partners 
synchronised their internal feedback systems, thereby harmonising feedback 
from the various sources which enabled the executive team to monitor the 
overall project progress. 
 
Feedback sampling rates can range anything from weekly, monthly to annual 
intervals. These intervals should be dynamic of nature and should be linked to 
the progress and criticality of the operations within the project.  
 
Experts have warned against the possibility of over-burdening ground-working 
teams with laborious and complex feedback mechanisms, preventing them 
from focussing on the actual problem at hand.  
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Many of the ground-working employees are local community members and 
might not have the necessary skills of generating complex reports. The 
general rule is to keep it simple, requesting only the data that is relevant, 
really necessary and in a format that is familiar to them. 
6.3.8 Commitment (V16) 
One vital aspect highlighted by the research is the fact that the outcome of a 
social investment project is linked to the commitment levels of the following 
key stakeholders throughout the project lifecycle: 
 
Stakeholder Commitment Contribution 
Visionary 
The visionary provides the enthusiasm and drive to turn the dream 
into reality, especially during initial and start-up phases. 
Social 
Entrepreneurial 
Firm 
The firm should see the project through from cradle to grave. With 
such long time horizons, successful organisations managed to stay 
focussed by means of formalised commitments on strategic level. This 
implies an element of senior management commitment and support to 
the cause, which manifested through the provision of the necessary 
support structures, resources, permanent staff, commitment to 
continuous improvement, etc.  
Donors 
Their funding is essential for project execution and long-term 
commitments from them will provide the opportunity for more efficient 
project planning. 
Strategic and 
Operational 
Partners 
Partner commitments range from verbal agreements, memorandum of 
understandings, contractual agreements right up to equally sized 
financial contributions. 
Client 
The project will fail if there is no buy-in from the end-user or client. In 
many cases, grantees had to prove their commitment levels through 
either performance contracts, financial contributions, joining support 
groups, etc. before being eligible for assistance. 
  
It is therefore imperative to obtain and stipulate the commitment levels of all 
these stakeholders before finalising the entry mode. The venture is almost 
certain to fail if one selects an entry mode which requires a higher 
commitment level than what the stakeholders are willing to offer. 
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6.4 TRUST - THE ADDITIONAL SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
VECTOR 
Just glancing at the illustration of the dimensions, consequences and 
antecedents of trust, one can clearly see why the interviewed social 
entrepreneurs value trust so much in their industry.  
 
Figure 6.2: Dimensions of trust as seen by various authors (organised by authors of 
the paper) 
 
Adapted from: Seppänen et al. (2005) 
 
So, based on their recommendations, it was decided to add “Trust” as an 
additional vector. The next step was to identify a suitable position for this new 
vector within the Social Investment Model… 
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First of all, social entrepreneurs create their own luck (V5) by sourcing key 
relationships. Eventually the quality of any relationship is determined by the 
level of mutual trust between the parties at the time of doing business.  
 
Secondly, the research has shown that the social entrepreneurs use 
trustworthy relationships to reduce the effects of cultural (V1), political (V2) 
and geographic (V3) distances.   
 
Thirdly, trust is also engraved into the entire entry mode selection process. 
Parties will not go into agreement unless there is a certain degree of trust; a 
sort of virtual glue that will keep them together through the tough times. 
 
With these arguments in mind, the ideal was not allocate trust to either of the 
two processes, but rather to define “Trust” as the encompassing link between 
the opportunity and entry mode selection processes. 
 
Dr. Pienaar’s comments on trust (page 109) hinted to the fact that there are 
four separate directions of trust within the social investment environment. 
According to her, there is a trust relationship (with its own unique 
characteristics, challenges and opportunities) between the social 
entrepreneurial firm and: 
 Donors and aid agencies 
 Peers, partners and suppliers 
 Government and local authorities 
 Ground working teams 
 
For the purpose of evaluating a social investment proposal, the ideal would be 
to quantify the level of trust in each of these directions at the time of going into 
agreement.  It is recommended to use Dietz and Den Hartog’s (2006) 
“Continuum of Degrees of Intra-Organisational Trust” to quantify the trust 
levels because it encapsulates the rich variety of competing 
conceptualisations and definitions found in the management and 
organisational literatures. 
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Figure 6.3: The continuum of degrees of intra-organisational trust 



	








	








Adapted from: Dietz, Den Hartog (2006) 
The main objective is therefore to: 
 Specify the level of trust needed in each direction, 
 Quantify the current level of trust in each direction 
 Where possible, improve weaknesses identified within the current 
relationships or else 
 Consider the option to forge new trustworthy relationships.  
 
Figure 6.4: Directions of Trust within the Social Investment Realm 
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This concludes the vector translation process. The next step is to encapsulate 
all the learning into a single social investment model.  
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6.5 CONCLUDING THE SOCIAL INVESTMENT MODEL 
6.5.1 Crafting the Model 
“Micro finance institutions need to make a strategic choice to integrate 
additional services, form partnerships with other organisations or remain 
focused on financial services alone. This choice will be determined by the 
capacity of the organisation, the environment in which it operates, and 
the degree to which its ability to achieve positive change in clients’ lives 
is constrained by other structural factors”. 
- Institute of Development Studies, Case 3 - 
 
The Institute of Development Studies’ comments in case 3 encapsulated the 
heart of the Social Investment Model. For this reason, the author decided to 
use the same three layers within his graphical representation of the model 
(figure 6.5, page 139). 
 
(a) Project Environment 
This layer is founded on the notion that external forces within the environment 
can have a significant impact on the project and should be considered during 
the project selection process. Ideally, one would start the analysis with 
conditions surrounding the global environment and then home into the 
country’s attractiveness up to the point where one quantifies the CAGE forces 
between host and home country. 
 
(b) Achieve Positive Change in the Client’s Lives 
In this realm, there are a number of opportunities that exist. Most of these 
opportunities are not visible to the “naked eye”, but rather sprouting forth from 
existing relationships with the community, Government departments, peers, 
donors or international agencies.  The quality of the business prospects is 
determined by a combination of trust between stakeholders, the organisation’s 
ability to deliver and elements of luck. 
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Figure 6.5: Social Investment Model 
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(c) Group’s Ability to Deliver 
The enormity of many social investment projects forces the social 
entrepreneur to forge relationships, alliances and partnerships with other 
stakeholders in the field.  
 
A core team will usually take ownership of the venture while various elements 
within the project will be outsourced to experts, peers, community members, 
volunteers, etc; each with its own characteristics, strengths and specialities. 
 
This segregated organisational structure implies that one should not only 
consider the social investment firm’s ability to deliver, but rather optimise and 
evaluate the entire body’s ability within context. The partnership forming 
process inherently encompasses the selection of an appropriate entry mode 
into the community/country. 
6.5.2  Model Application 
Without repeating the knowledge gained thus far, one could summarise the 
application of the Social Investment Model into the following three processes: 
 
(a) Selecting an Opportunity  
The objective of this process is to allow top management to compare the 
attractiveness between two or more prospects during executive decision 
making. For this, they would primarily use vectors 1-8, but also 9-17 to: 
 Evaluate the quality of the current and future social investment projects 
within the opportunity space. 
 Use the definitions, measurement tools and key success factors from the 
listed vectors to evaluate the environmental conditions in which these 
opportunities exeunt. 
 Evaluate the group’s ability to deliver a successful sustainable solution to 
the problem at hand. 
 In terms of the partnership forming process, specify the minimum 
requirements for vectors 9-17 that would ensure the group would achieve 
project success.  
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Table 6.7: The opportunity selection process 
Opportunity Space 
V5 Creating your own luck 
V6 Quality of Business prospects on offer 
V17 Trust levels between the external environment and the organisation 
Project’s Environment 
V7 Country Attractiveness 
V1 Cultural Difference 
V2 Administrative or Political Distance 
V3 Geographic Distance 
V4 Economic Distance 
Group’s Ability to Deliver 
V8 Company’s ability to deliver – Hard & Soft Resources 
V9 Strategic variables needed to ensure success 
V10 Location specific variables needed to ensure success 
V11 Transaction specific variables needed to ensure success 
V12 Firm specific variables needed to ensure success 
V13 Experience needed to ensure success 
V14 Identify possible risks within the venture 
V15 Define controls needed to mitigate there risks 
V16 Define commitment needed to ensure success 
V17 Quantify inter-group levels of trust needed to ensure success 
 
(b) Identifying and Optimising the Required Entry Mode 
The requirements set forth for V9-16 in the opportunity selection process 
provided management with a structure that defines the capabilities needed 
from the group to attain success. 
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The purpose of the entry mode selection process is to match these ideal 
conditions to a theoretical entry mode and then optimise this theoretical entry 
mode according to transaction specific conditions. 
 
Step 1: Select an appropriate theoretical entry mode 
The requirements specified for V9-V16 during the opportunity selection 
process should be used as inputs when selecting the theoretical entry mode. 
 
a) Use the requirements specified for control, experience and risk as inputs 
for Wild, Wild & Han’s (2006) “Evolution of the entry mode decisions”.26 
 
b) Use the requirements specified for the strategic- , location specific- , 
transaction specific -, firm specific variables to validate the equity mode as per 
Shi, Sui & Ho’s (2001) “Conceptual framework of entry mode choice”.27  
 
c) Use the requirements specified for the commitment levels against Pan & 
Tse’s (2000) “Hierarchical model of entry modes requirements”.28 
 
d) Ensure that the required levels of trust for the entry mode are either 
existing or realistically obtainable.  
 
Step 2: Optimise the entry mode 
Use the best practices for entry mode selection29 to scrutinise each vector on 
its own for clues that might highlight a need to customise the entry mode.  
 
Finally, ensure that you are comfortable with the advantages and 
disadvantages of the selected entry mode, as stipulated in table 3.3, page 42. 
 
 
 
                                            
26
 Figure 6.1, page 121 
27
 Figure 3.5, page 44 
28
 Figure 3.6, page 45 
29
 Section 6.3, page124 
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It is also recommended to close the loop by glancing over vectors 1-8 again 
as to identify any significant fact that would require one to alter the selected 
entry mode, or that would highlight any opportunities that might arise as result 
of the selected entry mode.  
 
(c) Identify Weaknesses within the Proposal 
One must keep in mind that the aim of any social investment project is to 
orchestrate a sustainable change in the clients’ lives.  
 
Theoretically speaking one can therefore say that sustainability should 
encompass all investment decisions, irrespective whether it is opportunity or 
entry mode selection related. With this in mind, one can improve one’s social 
investment plan by identifying and addressing any sustainability related (and 
other) weaknesses within the proposal, using all 17 vectors as reference. 
 
Practically speaking, this process entails: 
 Benchmarking one’s proposal against the key success factors identified 
for each vector in Chapter 5, 
 Using the vector themes as a guideline for an open-ended questions 
and answers session, with the objective of identifying any additional 
weaknesses within the investment strategy. 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
This concludes the development of the Social Investment Model. This model 
is by no means perfect or complete, and many reasearchers will add or alter 
the structure through the years to come. For the time being, the model 
contains enough paradigm shifts to alleviate the majority of risks and pitfalls 
associated with current cross-border investment programs. 
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6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Now with the foundation being laid, correlations drawn between successful 
social investment firms and international business best practices, one could 
almost start to believe that the sky might be the limit. 
 
This paradigm shift might allow social investment firms to use existing 
international business theories to leapfrog their capital based counterparts; 
embracing the new business realm of social profitable organisations.  
6.6.1 Future Research 
The fact that this research project was a foundational study, establishing a 
new paradigm shift, allows for a wide variety of researchers to latch onto the 
findings and produce more detailed and optimised results. 
 
The researcher then would like to invite researchers from all spheres to focus 
on topics like: 
 Create a model that would allow management to track the success of a 
social investment project by converting the qualitative success measures 
(like the letters from the orphans) into predictive quantitative measures. 
 Create a social investment project management system. 
 Define a model would measure the investment projects sustainability 
levels. 
 Create partnership structures and entry modes that are tailored for the 
social investment realm. 
 Define corporate governance policies and control structures for 
international social investment firms. 
6.6.2 Social Entrepreneurship Mindset 
The researcher would like to challenge non-profit organisations to alter their 
naming convention. A “non-profit” mindset might lead one to believe that  you 
are successful if you are not in business to make a profit, spending the 
monies promised, showing the investors/donors the necessary governance 
and auditing reports as proof that there was no fraudulent activities involved.  
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Being a non-profit organisation makes it difficult to answer the following 
questions: 
 What is the return on your investment? 
 Was the business plan optimised? 
 Could you have made a greater impact? 
 How are you doing compared to others in the industry? 
 
In fact, most NGO’s are not just in business to be non-profitable, but rather to 
make a difference in society. If this is the case, why not considering to 
quantify your contribution in terms of social profit? This will allow you to 
calculate your return on investment for each project and benchmark it against 
industry norms. This way you will be able to grow and become the best you 
can be – investing in projects that will have the maximum impact. 
6.6.3 Social Project Management Dimensions 
The classic project management dimensions are cost, quality and time as key 
indicators for project success. The problem is that a number of social 
investment projects aim to change human behaviour instead of delivering the 
perfect product on time. In essence, time seems relative… 
 
“The project manager tells you that if you meet this person on Monday, we 
can deliver on Wednesday. In real life, that person might not be available on 
Monday. An even worse, during your meeting you might realise that this 
person is not the influential community member you were looking for.” 
- Dr Sunette Pienaar - 
 
The recommendation therefore is to trade “time” for a more important variable;  
“sustainability”. There is no use in compromising quality, cost, or sustainability 
to get the project completed in time. 
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First-world countries took more than 100 years to evolve into their current 
state, but suddenly we are expecting developing countries to adapt to these 
new technologies/trends within a 3-5 year period. Rather spend your time to 
do things right the first time instead of doing them over and over again. 
 
6.7 FINAL WORD 
There's a fine line between fishing and just standing on the shore like an idiot. 
- Steven Wright-  
 
As social investors and entrepreneurs, we should continuously ask ourselves 
the question:  Are you giving a man a fish or are you actually teaching them to 
fish? One should not help when no help is needed and should always strive to 
help those who can’t help themselves. 
 
May we then continue our fight against evil, and may we be vigilant enough to 
reject prospective and lucrative offers that are not going to be for the greater 
good of the community.   
 
I heard a president of one of the African nations plead, “Do not send aid to 
Africa when we don’t have an emergency. You are breaking our economies. 
Our people won’t work.” 
- Loren Davis, The race for Africa - 
 
 
. 
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Case 1 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Working with Botswana to Confront Its Devastating AIDS Crisis 
Executive 
Summary 
Through an innovative partnership between the government of Botswana, Merck, and the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation, demonstrate for the first time in Africa a successful national 
effort to treat those living with HIV, slow the transmission of the virus, and minimise the 
impact of the epidemic. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. However, the model we have helped to build in Botswana requires significant 
medical infrastructure, which could make it difficult to adopt in countries with fewer 
resources. 
2. Botswana also had a stable democracy and significant resources of its own to 
commit. 
3. Bold political leadership is essential: The person most responsible for leading 
Botswana’s response to AIDS is President Festus Mogae. 
4. By July 2000, Merck and the Gates Foundation created the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships and formally joined forces with President 
Mogae to support the country’s already ambitious efforts to combat the epidemic. 
5. The Merck Company Foundation and the Gates Foundation each committed $50 
million over five years to help Botswana strengthen its health infrastructure, such 
as training new health workers and managers, and establishing new laboratories 
and mobile clinics. 
6. Create a national HIV/AIDS strategy—that is, to turn a serious but fragmented 
response into a comprehensive and coordinated national campaign. 
7. But many challenges remain. For example, roughly 50,000 people who could 
benefit from ARVs—especially those in remote districts—still have not been 
reached. 
8. Be Realistic: But the fact that the spending has been slower than we anticipated is 
an indicator that we underestimated just how hard it is to build up the systems 
necessary to confront HIV/AIDS across an entire country. 
9. Community must be able to sustain intervention: We believe Botswana will, over 
time, be able to sustain the costs of its treatment program.  
Reference www.gatesfoundation.org/whatwerelearning 
Publication Date June 2006 
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Case 2 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
Ensuring the World’s Poorest Children Benefit from Lifesaving Vaccines 
Executive 
Summary 
Prevent needless deaths in the world’s poorest countries by increasing access to basic 
vaccines and speeding the introduction of new vaccines. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. The blueprint for GAVI called not for a large new international bureaucracy but 
rather for a lean secretariat housed within UNICEF’s offices in Geneva, 
administered by widely respected Norwegian immunologist Tore Godal, and 
governed by a 12-member board.  
2. These 12 members represented all the major partners in the alliance, including 
developing-world governments, the World Health Organisation, UNICEF, the 
World Bank, pharmaceutical companies, NGOs, research institutes, and the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation. 
3. GAVI invites the 75 poorest countries in the world to develop plans and submit 
proposals for increasing vaccine coverage and use of newer vaccines. 
4. An independent committee made up largely of developing-country public health 
experts then reviews and makes recommendations on the proposals. GAVI’s 
board then meets to review the recommendations. Once the board approves a 
proposal, it requests that the GAVI Fund release payment. 
5. GAVI looks across all the approved plans to forecast how many doses of each 
vaccine will be required overall. This demand-forecasting helps guarantee an 
adequate supply of vaccines. We hope that over the long term it will also reduce 
unit prices. 
 
Key Lessons: 
1. Sometimes you have to be the first dollar in. GAVI Fund in 1999, we were its 
only funder, and we did not require that the grantee match our commitment (as we 
often do today). It was a risky bet. 
2. “Five years only” does not work. GAVI is now requiring countries to “co-pay” 
from the start—that is, to assume a small percentage of the cost of the program 
right away, with the percentage increasing every year.(Only back winners not 
beggars, and co-ownership of the problems) 
3. GAVI did not pay enough attention to developing-country priorities. Driven in 
large part by the foundation’s eagerness (even impatience) for results, GAVI often 
moved at a pace that made it impossible to get full buy-in from developing 
countries. 
4. Funding operating expenses is essential. The foundation was initially reluctant 
to allow GAVI to use a significant amount of our funding to support grantee 
operating expenses - as opposed to purchasing vaccines. But we’ve learned that 
funding operating expenses is vital for getting new entities up and running, for 
attracting donors that have greater funding restraints, and for giving grantees the 
ability to innovate. 
5. GAVI was too narrowly focused. From the start, GAVI has recognised that 
funding vaccine purchases alone would not allow the 75 poorest countries in the 
world to overcome their infrastructure challenges, so it has provided “immunisation 
system support” to help countries improve their ability to deliver vaccines to a large 
portion of their children. GAVI has learned that in many cases the ability of the 
country to reach more children is not related simply to its immunisation program. 
Broader health-system failures are often to blame. So GAVI has now expanded its 
funding criteria and set aside about half of its resources to help meet broader 
health-system needs. 
6. Creating an alliance of existing entities was a better strategy than building a 
new entity But as the old African proverb says, “If you want to go fast, go alone. If 
you want to go far, go together.” Each of GAVI’s partners has a unique role, and 
brings essential relationships and insights to the table.. 
Reference www.gatesfoundation.org/whatwerelearning 
Publication Date June 2006 
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Case 3 
Institute of Development Studies 
Using microfinance to fight poverty, empower women and address gender-based 
violence and HIV 
Executive 
Summary 
SEF provides credit and facilitates savings through solidarity groups for poor and vulnerable 
women in rural South Africa. By December 2007, 250 staff were serving more than 45,000 
women, with an operational self-sufficiency of 113 per cent. SEF targets the poorest women 
– two-thirds of its clients live on less than US$1 a day, and 70 per cent of clients interviewed 
had had to beg for food during the previous year.  
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. SEF integrates simple social performance indicators into its management systems. 
2. Lancet study shows that integrated microfinance programs can change family 
dynamics in fundamental ways, and along dimensions associated with HIV 
transmission.’ 
3. The IMAGE project (Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS & Gender Equity) is a 
partnership between SEF and the Rural AIDS and Development Action Research 
(RADAR) Programme. IMAGE combines poverty-focused, group-based 
microfinance with structured training and discussion about social norms, gender-
based violence and HIV/AIDS. Combining two specialist projects created 
synergies resulting in impacts beyond those that have been achieved by either 
organisation independently. 
4. The training provided the awareness, self-confidence and support necessary to 
challenge violent behaviour within the household: 
5. The training element of the IMAGE project enabled women to strengthen existing 
social networks and form new ones – an important source of support in times of 
crisis – thereby reducing their vulnerability 
6. A recurring theme throughout the study was the fundamental role of solidarity and 
trust in shaping the project’s success 
7. MFIs need to make a strategic choice to integrate additional services, form 
partnerships with other organisations or remain focused on financial services 
alone. This choice will be determined by the capacity of the organisation, the 
environment in which it operates, and the degree to which its ability to achieve 
positive change in clients’ lives is constrained by other structural factors. 
Reference www.ids.ac.uk/go/microfinance 
Publication Date May 2008 
 
Case 4 Micro Enterprise Alliance, South Africa Rural Finance Expansion: Experience in Commercialization 
Executive 
Summary 
This paper uses experiences of what went wrong in two micro finance institutions in South 
Africa, the practices of one development organization and the current unique Micro 
Enterprise Alliance HIV/AIDS workplace tool kit, to contribute to the theme of 
Commercialization: Profitability versus quality. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Identify the target group and use poverty identification model to focus on the poor 
of the poorest 
2. Promote, teach and facilitate Household Food Security so that the money from 
other enterprise undertakings is not used for consumption 
3. Stimulating economic activities and establishing profitable businesses. 
4. Promoting the establishment of Entrepreneurial Groups, Business Cooperatives 
and Financial Services Co-operatives ( village banks). 
Reference http://www.basis.wisc.edu/live/rfc/ 
Publication Date Unknown 
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Case 5 AngloGold Ashanti Malaria treatment at Obuasi, Ghana and surrounding districts 
Executive 
Summary 
The global health emergencies of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria represent significant 
health risks to certain AngloGold Ashanti operations, and in order to mitigate the impact of 
these diseases on the business, they are managed within the broader context of AngloGold 
Ashanti's Wellness in its Workplace strategy.  
Three million cases of malaria were reported in Ghana during 2005 - associated with 
increased susceptibility of younger children and pregnant women. Malaria is also the leading 
cause of disease in Obuasi. During January 2006 some 11,800 cases were reported in the 
Obuasi district. Total malaria cases in the community however are not accurately measured 
due to under-reporting in the Public Health Service but are considered to be extremely high. 
For the AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) Obuasi Mine in 2005, between 6,000 and 7,000 cases 
were diagnosed monthly among employees, contractors and employee dependants - with a 
monthly case incidence rate of 24% for employees and contractors. 
Transmission has historically been continuous throughout the year, and during 2005 seven 
employees died as a result of malaria. The overall reported case fatality rate at Obuasi was 
0.2%. Treatment costs for malaria at the AGA Edwin Cade Hospital were some US$ 55,000 
per month. The impact on productivity at the Obuasi Mine was significant with an average of 
7,400 shifts per month in 2005 being lost due to malaria. 
Prior to the full implementation of the Obuasi Malaria Control Program, AGA commissioned 
the Noguchi Research Institute based at the University of Ghana to conduct a baseline 
community parasite prevalence study. This survey confirmed high prevalence rates ranging 
between 45% and 90% in 10 randomly selected samples of primary schoolchildren. 
Beyond a clearly evident business case, and based on AGA's values and business 
principles, AGA decided to implement a broad-based Malaria Control Program which would 
incorporate the whole Obuasi community and outlying villages. It was recognised that the 
town and district infrastructure, as well as the insecticide resistance patterns would 
significantly influence the complexity of the program, and that no single magic bullet was 
available - thus requiring an integrated approach. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Baseline Studies were conducted prior to intervention by experts 
2. Community education and communication prior to intervention 
3. Defined a clear strategy/policy to solve the problem. 
4. Program was aligned with Government and International policies/efforts   
5. Ongoing surveillance, monitoring and progress reporting during the project 
6. Appointed a FULL TIME control manager, with support staff 
7. Similar process to be rolled out by Ashanti in other countries. (Gained experience) 
8. Beyond a clearly evident business case, and based on AGA's values and business 
principles  
Reference http://www.gbcimpact.org/live/cases/cases.php?id=41 
Publication Date February 23, 2007 
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Case 6 General Motors Global AIDS Education and Intervention 
Executive 
Summary 
General Motors was inspired to establish its global HIV/AIDS community programs by three 
interrelated perceptions and realities: first, the enormously destructive power of the epidemic 
itself, and its threat not only to the health and security of its own workforce, but to the 
communities, regions, and nations in which GM employees live and work; second, the 
company's historic commitment to health, dignity, and human rights both in  GM communities 
and the world at large; and third, a belief, inspired and sustained by the remarkable film, A 
Closer Walk,  that broader awareness and better education are essential priorities if the 
battle against HIV/AIDS is to be won.  
General Motors has operations in 33 countries and over 12,000 communities.  Many of its 
global locations are in high risk communities: South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Thailand, India, 
Indonesia, and China, to name a few. Many of these communities represent the very 
epicenters of the AIDS epidemic, past, present, and future. Given the challenge represented 
by the sheer magnitude of these global constituencies, a GM-driven program on awareness 
and education held most promise of meaningful impact for two reasons: it represented an 
opportunity to target those who are vulnerable to the disease by providing such individuals 
with basic information and knowledge that could, in fact, save their lives; and, on a broader 
scale, greater and more meaningful awareness could mobilise a general public that has 
historically been ill-informed about AIDS and its underlying causes, and therefore incapable 
of influencing policymakers and effecting meaningful change at national levels. 
There are two basic approaches to GM's awareness and education policies and programs:  
first, on the health and safety front, its programs are directed at the workforce, their families 
and communities; and, second, on the global outreach front, through GM's Public Policy 
Center (PPC), GM's programs are designed to mobilise the general public, drive action, and 
create partnerships with industry, governments and NGOs.  
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Stay focused - have a clearly defined strategy and stay the course. 
2. Social Responsibility is not a competition - aligning with and complementing 
community outreach efforts where they exist already 
3. Align all efforts INTERNALLY (Corporate Responsibility, Communication, 
Marketing, and Healthcare Initiatives). 
4. Leverage GM’s talent and resources to solve the problem 
5. Partner with 3rd party organisations: NGOs, governments, business partners and 
HIV/AIDS coalitions. 
6. Many of its global locations are in high risk communities  
7. Efforts are in line to the company's historic commitment to health, dignity, and 
human rights both in  GM communities and the world at large 
Reference http://www.gbcimpact.org/live/cases/cases.php?id=30 
Publication Date February 23, 2007 
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Case 7 Interpipe Group Community HIV/AIDS Awareness in Ukraine, Europe 
Executive 
Summary 
In 2005, Interpipe Corporation implemented a HIV@Workplace Program at two pilot 
enterprises: ICTV (Kiev TV channel) with a core competencies program and VtorMet (metal 
scrap producer in Dnipropetrovsk) with a community program. In the beginning, the VtorMet 
program was very challenging as the local situation was defined by four factors: the highest 
prevalence rates in Ukraine, low awareness on HIV/AIDS, low education and wages, and 
being remote to the city. Thus, the community was very exposed to HIV and reluctant to 
endorse any HIV policy. The Dnipropetrovsk region has the highest HIV prevalence rate in 
Ukraine (356, 5 for 100 thousand people) and the highest number of newly registered HIV-
infection cases. Moreover, the epidemic in the region is fuelled by one of the highest drug 
abuse rates in Ukraine. 
With an estimated adult HIV prevalence rate of 1.46% (WHO/UNAIDS estimates 2006), 
Ukraine remains the worst-affected country in Europe. The epidemic is rapidly spreading 
among the general population. 60% of infected people don't know that they have HIV. 50% 
of all new HIV cases are amongst the youth aging from 20 to 29 years old. The epidemic is 
fueled by unsafe intravenous drug use and unprotected sex (number of people infected 
through IDU is 45%, through unprotected sex increased up to 35% in 2006).  
During trainings for enterprise employees, Interpipe received direct request to conduct such 
trainings for their children and for children living in the community in general. "Children are 
our future, we must teach them how to protect themselves", - one of the workers wrote in the 
questionnaire. Thus, it was decided to extend Interpipe's HIV@workplace program to the 
community, by embracing two community secondary schools and educating the youth. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Request for intervention came from community 
2. School principle was sceptic but they took the RISK and taking the first step. 
3. Program was financed by Interpipe 
4. Small beginnings: Success in one community caused management to roll the 
SAME program out to other communities. 
Reference http://www.gbcimpact.org/live/cases/cases.php?id=31 
Publication Date February 23, 2007 
 
APPENDIX  A  SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 159 
 
Case 8 Marathon Oil Company Combating Malaria in Equatorial Guinea 
Executive 
Summary 
When Marathon acquired production interests on Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea (EG) in 
2002, and through engagement with the Equatorial Guinea Government and the EG Ministry 
of Health and Social Well-being (MoH), the company quickly identified malaria (Plasmodium 
falciparum) as the key health issue facing employees and local communities. It became clear 
that elimination or at least a drastic reduction of malaria on Bioko Island would not only 
reduce the health care and economic burden of this devastating disease on the local 
population where it accounts for almost half of child mortality, but that this would also help 
protect the local workforce. 
To meet this critical challenge head-on, Marathon and its business partners teamed with the 
Equatorial Guinean Government and leading health specialists to design a comprehensive 
malaria eradication program -- the Bioko Island Malaria Control Program (BIMCP).  The 
partnership has worked collaboratively to roll out a three-pronged malaria control program at 
an exceptionally rapid pace.  The program, which was initiated in 2003, consists of three 
principal interventions:  1) Vector Control:  Primary intervention is accomplished through 
indoor residual spraying (IRS), which breaks the cycle of infected mosquitoes transmitting 
the parasite to new victims; 2)  Case Management: This required medical staffs to be trained 
to diagnose and treat malaria cases using new protocols that rely on combination drug 
therapies to overcome resistance to long-standing treatments based on use of a single drug; 
and 3) Monitoring and Surveillance:  Designed to monitor the effectiveness of the program 
(reduction in mosquito numbers and their level of infectivity), this component checks ongoing 
project results and facilitates necessary operational adjustments. 
After only two years of indoor residual spraying, results show a 95% reduction in malaria 
transmitting mosquitoes (based on average number of infected mosquitoes caught in the 
home per 100 nights from pre-spray baseline research) and a 44% reduction in the presence 
of malaria parasites in children (based on blood smear testing).  Furthermore, the program 
has achieved tremendous economic benefits to the community.  
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Effort was to reduce the health care and economic burden of malaria on the local 
population and also help protect the local workforce. 
2. Engaged with the Equatorial Guinea Government and the EG Ministry of Health 
and Social Well-being during the problem definition phase. 
3. Formed Implementation team with partners, government and world class experts 
in the field malaria and social development. 
4. Team was led by medical experts, not Marathon itself. 
5. Formulated clear and simple control strategy 
6. Community information, education and communication program (communication 
materials were developed to explain why this was necessary, and to provide 
general information about the project and the prevention and treatment of malaria) 
7. These communications materials used multiple languages and multiple methods 
and pre-tested by focus groups to ensure relevance. 
8. Up-skilling/training of community workers at health centers to deal with the 
problems of Malaria. 
9. All new visitors to the project site on Bioko are provided an in-country orientation 
that focuses on malaria prevention and treatment. 
10. Conduct baseline surveys prior to intervention 
11. Continuous (monthly and annual) surveillance, evaluation and progress monitoring 
12. Marathon and partners committed to provide finances for pre-defined 
services/medication. 
13. Intervention protocol became national policy for malaria treatment 
14. Use of drama as an accepted cultural medium to improve awareness 
15. Ensure sustainability by continuing and improving existing efforts 
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Case 9 Modicare Community HIV/AIDS Awareness in New Delhi, India 
Executive 
Summary 
Modicare has devised various strategies to reach out to its diverse target groups: 
 NGOs 
 Adolescents 
 Community Men and Women 
 Workplace Employees 
 HIV infected and affected individual 
Modicare foundation has been involved in both direct and indirect community intervention 
programs for different target groups. The foundation is supporting local NGOs in organising 
mass awareness campaigns as well as awareness sessions on HIV/AIDS for community 
men, women and adolescents. Keeping in mind the needs and concerns of the adolescents 
Modicare has come up with a module called "Demystifying Adolescence - Bujho, Jaano, 
Samjho" Regular session on growing up and related issues are discussed with adolescents 
(in and out of school) in government and private school to equip them with the skills to deal 
effectively with day to day situations. Through its testing center, the foundation has catered 
to more than 4,500 people who have come for testing and counseling services on HIV/AIDS. 
The center is considered as one of the best VCTCs in town and is one of the most 
successful examples of Public Private Partnership. Modicare also implements Workplace 
Intervention programs by advocating, customising, implementing HIV/AIDS programs and 
providing technical assistance. Modicare is also working with the OKHLA INDUSTRIAL 
AREA workers. The Foundation also networks with corporate houses and other NGOs for 
care and support services.  The Foundation is presently supporting the ARVs and nutritional 
requirements of 10 people living with HIV/AIDS.
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. The foundation is supporting local NGOs in organising mass awareness 
campaigns as well as awareness sessions on HIV/AIDS for community men, 
women and adolescents 
2.  	
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3. Clear STRATEGY to SUPPORT community needs: Modicare has been working 
with a single minded mission of giving back to the society that has made it capable 
of giving, whatever it needs for its sustenance and development. 
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Case 10 Palabora Mining Company Community HIV/AIDS management in the Limpopo Province of South Africa 
Executive 
Summary 
South Africa has the highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world with as 
many as 6.5 million South Africans estimated to be HIV positive. The Limpopo Province's 
HIV/AIDS infection rate is estimated at 14%. Limpopo Province is one of the three poorest 
provinces in South Africa and is largely rural. Palabora Mining Company has a 
comprehensive site based on HIV/AIDS Program for company employees and contractors 
that include education and awareness training, VCT and affordable access to ARVs for 
employees and their spouse. However, the families of employees do not have access to all 
of these programs. Senior management of Palabora felt that there was a lack of health care 
facilities and capacity within the government health care structures to address this pandemic 
in the community. Palabora Mining Company therefore initiated the HIV/AIDs program as 
one of its three pillars to support sustainable development, the other two being skills and 
local economic development, and solicited other partners to assist. 
 
The purpose of the program is to use an effective HIV/AIDS management system to 
minimise the impact of HIV/AIDS in the community by "Educating communities to change 
social behavior and to monitor incidences and trends in order to measure the effectiveness 
and impact of the program." 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Worked in collaboration with local government and other NGO’s 
2. Conducted a baseline study prior to involvement 
3. Treatment is now more accessible to local communities and better managed 
through the support structures set up by the Phelang Community Center. (HIV 
positive patients had to travel 100 km to local hospital in the past) 
4. Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s 
5. Used community peer group educators in high transmission areas 
6. Leveraged governmental funds to pay for home based workers 
7. Run pilot projects 
8. Monthly progress reviews 
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Case 11 Rio Tinto Community HIV/AIDS management inMadagascar 
Executive 
Summary 
HIV/AIDS was identified in the Social and Environmental Impact Assessment as a significant 
issue for the local community in view of the potential for migration, the arrival of foreign 
workers and increase in disposable income in male workers isolated from their families, all 
potentially contributing to the spread of the disease in a vulnerable population. QMM 
conducts mining operations in countries where HIV/AIDS has reached epidemic proportions. 
So in line with their commitment to sustainable development, they are proactive and 
responsible in supporting its employees in both the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Strategic commitment to sustainable development 
2. Created regional sectors and prioritised according to the needs of each sector. 
3. Created a dedicated task force for each zone. 
4. Crafted, along with local committees of each zone, strategies unique to each zone 
5. Received technical assistance from international leaders in the industry 
6. Outsourced certain programs to specialist NGO’s 
7. Training of staff and health officials 
8. Maximise local content 
9. Continuous dialogue with community 
10. Rio Tinto invests heavily in education and training of youth and local health care 
workers to ensure the skills needed to maintain the program remain in the local 
community 
11. Multi-sector partnerships with the government, NGOs and the private sector 
ensure a broad and sustainable funding base. 
12. Fifty-four volunteers run support groups across the 16 municipal wards in the 
region including 20 local farms, ensuring convenient access for all members of the 
community 
Reference 
http://www.gbcimpact.org/live/cases/cases.php?id=37 and, 
Business Action, GBC awards for business excellence issue, Summer 2008, p41 
Downloaded from http://www.gbcimpact.org 
Publication Date February 23, 2007 
 
APPENDIX  A  SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 163 
 
Case 12 Scope International Pvt. Ltd. Creating HIV/AIDS champions in the community, Asia 
Executive 
Summary 
HIV/AIDS is a global issue. Efforts are being made by different groups to tackle this 
epidemic. As a social responsibility towards prevention of its further spread, Standard 
Chartered Bank (SCB) launched its global initiative, L`iving with HIV' in 2002.  
HIV/AIDs is a subject of critical concern in India (India accounted for the second largest 
HIV/AIDS cases). SCB's wholly owned subsidiary based out of Chennai, Scope International 
Pvt. Ltd developed a peer education program in 2003 to raise awareness on HIV/AIDS 
amongst employees in the workplace (1,800) and their families. Staff volunteers underwent a 
training to become C`hampions' so as to roll out the awareness program within the 
organisation.  
Fortunately, Scope International's initiative did not stop there as it realised that an important 
and worthy potential spin-off from workplace programs would be to percolate those into the 
communities. The learning from the internal program, desire to learn, share knowledge and 
take it forward as C`hampions' were so overwhelming that Scope decided to broad-base its 
initiative by reaching out to vulnerable communities - the illiterate and the ignorant residing in 
rural and peri-urban areas, students and teachers and even the educated and high profile 
white-collared executives working in the corporate sector. Ever since, combating the 
pandemic has become an integral part of Scope International's core values. The efforts to 
create more C`hampions' continue as the company is steadfast in looking beyond business 
to make a difference in society. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Conducted baseline survey prior to intervention. 
2. Identified SPECIFIC sites where training was needed. 
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4. Create HIV/AIDS “Champions”, using the train-the-trainer principle 
5. Forged understanding with educational institutions including schools and private 
blue-chip companies to take the C`hampion' model forward as best practice in 
generating awareness on HIV/AIDS. 
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Case 13 Standard Chartered PLC Creating HIV/AIDS champions across the globe 
Executive 
Summary 
In 1999, Standard Chartered estimated that 10% of its employees in Kenya were absent 
from work at any one time due to HIV/AIDS. More recent, business impact assessments 
undertaken in Kenya and Zambia identified that the cost of HIV/AIDS to the business was 
0.5% and 1% of total costs respectively (US$270,000 and $US 300,000 annually). This 
situation is indicative of the position in many of Standard Chartered markets. Standard 
Chartered Bank felt compelled to respond and a peer education program called ‘Staying 
Alive' was launched across Africa. In December 2003 this program was extended. This 
revised program, ‘Living with HIV', aims to address the global challenge of HIV/AIDS.  
 
As one of the world's most international banks, Standard Chartered employs almost 60,000 
people, representing over 100 nationalities, worldwide. This diversity lies at the heart of the 
Bank's values and supports the Bank's growth as the world increasingly becomes one 
market. With strong organic growth supported by strategic alliances and acquisition and 
driven by its strengths in the balance and diversity of its business, products, geography and 
people, Standard Chartered is well positioned in the emerging trader corridors of Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East. Standard Chartered derives over 90% of its profits from Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. Serving both Consumer and Wholesale Banking customers 
worldwide, the Bank combines deep local knowledge with global capability to offer a wide 
range of innovative products and services as well as award-winning solutions. 

Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Standard Chartered's HIV Champions, who have driven the program forwards 
across the business. In 2006 the Bank had 300 HIV Champions across its 
geographic footprint. They are responsible for preparing programs that reflect the 
priorities of their own country and delivering awareness raising activities for 
employees. 
2. Standard Chartered's HIV Champions develop relationships and work closely with 
NGOs operating in their country or with target groups to develop and deliver 
education activities. 
3. Resources are made widely available both through central mechanisms such as 
the Bank's website (e.g. the HIV e-learning resource) as well as through individual 
activities led by HIV Champions. 
4. Use of pilot projects before rolling out on major scale 
5. The Bank is keen to build on the success of the program; using the skills and 
capacity developed to benefit a broader network of people. The new Vision is to 
reach one million people in three years. The mission is to achieve this by 
strengthening its commitment to existing partnerships, including those with 
customers, suppliers and NGOs. 
6. In 2006, Standard Chartered's HIV Champions partnered with Chi Heng 
Foundation to raise funds. 
7. Commitment: The Bank has also formalised an approach for employee 
volunteering; providing two days paid leave for employees to contribute to 
community projects. 
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Case 14 Xstrata HIV/AIDS workplace program 
Executive 
Summary 
Xstrata is committed to ensuring that the past 5 years of sustained investment into its 
workplace program remains effective and continues to show real results. Xstrata has 
demonstrated how it is possible to achieve a high impact workplace program based on a 
trend response methodology that gets all employees to say "I KnowTM the way to live". 
Xstrata believes that it has started to address the challenge of sustaining results in a 
workplace program that is responsibly monitored and evaluated. It is now putting this into 
practice through a ‘whole community' approach. The risks of social, nutritional, poverty, 
health and welfare deprivation and vulnerability to new HIV and TB infections are extremely 
high.  35% of women attending Mpumalanga antenatal clinics are HIV infected. 11% of 
children in Mpumalanga are maternally orphaned, which reflects the high rate of AIDS 
deaths. Many infected community members have difficulty accessing accredited public 
sector HIV treatment sites, which are distances away. Xstrata's response to this is to 
leverage the Xstrata Group influence, organisational capacity, corporate social investment 
financing and momentum of the workplace program towards taking effective and sustainable 
local action. Through integrated community interventions, Xstrata believes that the health 
action trends that it has established in the workplace can be cascaded into the community. 
It is estimated that approximately 20% of Xstrata's South African workforce is HIV positive, 
making this the most significant health risk facing the organisation
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Excluded no person and driver by driven by "100% Targets" 
2. The community program is driven by Xstrata's strong commitment to innovation 
and the vision of supporting sustainable local social and economic development as 
the means of building community resilience to the vulnerabilities that perpetuate 
HIV/AIDS and TB. 
3. Xstrata has incrementally and systematically carried the momentum and learning 
from its workforce responses to the households and communities by means of the 
door to door approach by working with its implementing Partner, Re-Action!. 
4. Work and community based Wellness Champions, Community Outreach Workers, 
Treatment Counselors, and program coordinators who are trained and supported 
to mobilise the community at the grass roots level implement various tools to help 
the community. 
5. It invests in interlinked health, social and food security projects and  working 
towards sustainable livelihoods through supporting skills development and income 
generation activities. 
6. Working together with the government is the most sustainable way of achieving its 
development goals so Xstrata has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Provincial Department of Health to implement a Public-Private Mix model 
that will extend its forerunner project in the Breyten community to other sub-
districts.  
7. This collaboration also reduces duplication, identifies gaps and achieves 
efficiencies, such as improvements in the supply chain for ARV and TB 
pharmaceuticals for both public and private clinics. 
8. Having earned the respect of employees and the communities in which it operates, 
XCSA is now able to venture into new partnerships and facilitate further 
sustainable local development and social developments. 
9. Its methodology states that deep democracy and collective counsel creates a 
platform to retain and maintain the unity and value of individual response which in 
turn addresses behavior change. 
10. Sustainability and continuous innovation is imperative. Xstrata's next steps will be 
to continue to augment and develop its relationship with its partners and to explore 
opportunities for future collaborations. 
11. Monitoring and evaluation systems will now have to be harmonised so that 
achievements in the community (by the NGO’s) and workplace (internal 
champions) can be captured accurately and consistently 
12. Committed to ensure that the last 5 year’s sustained investment in their workplace 
program remains effective. 
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Case 15 Abbot Aids relief in Tanzania 
Executive 
Summary 
Like many countries in Africa, Tanzania faces a significant HIV/AIDS epidemic. Since 2001, 
the Abbott Fund and the Government of Tanzania have formed a unique public-private 
partnership to address critical areas of need in the fight against HIV/AIDS. In total, the Abbott 
Fund has invested $35 million to modernise the health care system, expand access to HIV 
testing and treatment, and assist orphans and vulnerable children impacted by HIV/AIDS. 
The partnership is implemented through Axios, an organisation specialising in health 
management in developing countries. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. The Abbott Fund’s partnership with the Government of Tanzania was designed to 
adapt resource-limited health systems to meet the lifelong treatment needs of 
people with HIV/AIDS, including improving facilities, upgrading administration and 
systems, training staff, increasing access to VCT and HIV care and assisting OVC. 
2. The program is managed through close collaboration between the Tanzanian 
Ministry of Health, led by Minister of Health Anna Abdallah; the Abbott Fund; and 
Axios, an organisation specialising in health management in developing countries. 
3. The staff frequently visits Tanzania to coordinate the program and monitor 
progress. 
4. Additionally, highly skilled Abbott employee volunteers spend significant time 
onsite in laboratories and construction sites in Tanzania to work together with their 
Tanzanian counterparts 
5. When the Abbott Fund’s program was started in 2002, there were very few donors 
in the country and a significant need for improvement in its health care 
management, infrastructure and services. 
6. The country was politically stable and demonstrated leadership to fight HIV/AIDS 
and openness to partnerships with the private sector, such as those supported by 
the Abbott Fund. 
Lessons Learnt: 
1. Effective partnerships require clear goals and effective use of each partner’s 
strengths. 
2. Direct engagement of the leadership of each partner and communications is 
essential to success 
3. Program strategies need to support national AIDS plans and work with nationals of 
the country 
4. Sustainability means investing in people: a major focus of the Abbott Fund’s 
program in Tanzania is the development of human resources through training 
health care workers and other staff 
5. Be flexible and be prepared to learn and revise 
6. Listen to local partners and understand local needs: working with community 
based organisations ensures local viability and sets the groundwork for a 
sustainable program 
7. Be willing to invest in powerful ideas 
8. Continue to work with the Tanzanian government to identify and evaluate how best 
to address new challenges in the national scale up of HIV testing and treatment. 
9. A large investment in monitoring and evaluation of its programs with its primary 
implementation partner Axios. 
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Case 16 Accor Aids workplace program 
Executive 
Summary 
What sets Accor’s workplace program apart is the reach of its advocacy efforts - going 
beyond the company’s workforce to its customers—and its leadership in an industry that has 
been slow to engage in the global fight. In the company and its subsidiary operations in 
highly-affected countries, such as South Africa, prevention, education and awareness remain 
the key areas of focus through dissemination of HIV-specific posters and free distribution of 
condoms in hotel rooms. 
Accor’s HIV/AIDS strategy includes individualised action plans in 19 African countries. 
These action plans provide awarenessraising programs to prevent HIV transmission among 
employees, increase voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) uptake, distribute condoms on 
hotel premises, and treat and care for employees living with HIV. Employee training is also 
conducted across sub-Saharan Africa, utilising a network of 150 peer educators. The 
company’s advocacy efforts have resulted in 100 percent of all Accor employees in South 
Africa participating in voluntary HIV testing. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. By adopting action plans for each country in which it operates, Accor has 
effectively localised its HIV/AIDS program. 
2. Used a DVD production as central theme through all country efforts. 
Reference 
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Case 17 Dunavant AIDS testing and counselling, Zambia 
Executive 
Summary 
Through its strategic leveraging of the company’s distributor networks, Dunavant has 
established a true best practice program that reaches one of the hardest-to-reach 
populations in Zambia: the rural poor. The comprehensive program is the result of a public-
private partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), focusing on 
the provision of HIV sensitisation, counseling and testing services and access to treatment 
throughout the Dunavant community. By leveraging Dunavant’s vast network of suppliers 
and distributors and USAID’s resources, the partnership is able to reach over one million 
Zambians. A number of other partners help with program implementation and support on the 
ground. Technical support and services are provided by Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
Management Programme (CHAMP), a local non-profit organisation, and the Zambian 
government, which provides HIV rapid test kits through the Zambia Voluntary Counseling 
and Testing Services program and male and female condoms through the Ministry of Health. 
HIV sensitisation and voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) services are carried out 
through a partnership with the HIV Resource Persons Network. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Through its vast distribution networks—including transportation and 
communication infrastructure—the company is able to successfully deliver health 
information and VCT services to its contractors in the field, in addition to its 
broader supplier and distributor network. 
2. By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically scale 
up the scope of its intervention. 
3. A number of other partners help with program implementation and support on the 
ground. 
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Case 18 Balirwa AIDS testing and counselling,Rwanda 
Executive 
Summary 
Bralirwa’s workplace testing and counseling program is outstanding due to its 
comprehensive nature, which includes tracking HIV-positive patients and couples counseling 
for employees. Despite being a small company, Bralirwa has successfully leveraged the 
resources and experience of its parent company, Heineken International, to deliver quality 
voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) to its employees. 
While Bralirwa’s program offers fundamental HIV/AIDS services –including guaranteed ARV 
therapy for employees—it goes beyond the standard, providing on-site medical personnel, 
addressing the psycho-social needs of HIV positive patients, and counseling employees 
directly on sexual health and relationships. 
The program includes a heavy emphasis on counseling and testing—over 90 percent of 
employees and their spouses have taken part in VCT through the company’s clinic. Bralirwa 
frequently partners with other players—including its parent company—to continually educate 
its doctors, nurses and human resources personnel on the latest ideas and practices in 
workplace HIV/AIDS programming. The company focuses on the efficacy of tests, 
conducting repeat testing on those who initially test positive to ensure that results are 
accurate. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. While Bralirwa is a small company based in a highly-endemic region, it has 
leveraged the experience and resources of its parent company, Heineken 
International, to improve VCT services and overall healthcare delivery. 
2. Patient health is tracked through an electronic database which can easily monitor 
the progression of their condition and treatment regimens 
3. Bralirwa frequently partners with other players to continually educate its doctors, 
nurses and human resources personnel on the latest ideas and practices in 
workplace HIV/AIDS programming 
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Case 19 INTESA SANPAOLO Community philanthropy, Malawi 
Executive 
Summary 
Through collaboration with the local government and a number of NGOs, Intesa Sanpaolo 
has designed and implemented Project Malawi—a multifaceted intervention aiming to break 
the poverty cycle by addressing health care, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and local development 
and microfinance. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. By partnering with three additional local NGOs—Scout Associations, Save the 
Children and CISP—the scope of the intervention was broadened. 
2. In preparation for launching the program, each area of intervention was discussed 
with local authorities and large players on the ground—such as the World Bank 
and UNAIDS. The final program draft was submitted for approval to the President 
of Malawi and the local ministries involved. 
3. By building a multifunctional center that hosts the activities of Project Malawi’s four 
partners, the company was able to improve synergies between the multiple 
services provided by each association. 
4. Project Malawi has been able to improve antiretroviral (ARV) therapy adherence 
and reduce stigma through community support groups. 
5. Sustainable Funding Improves Adherence to ARV Therapy 
6. By committing itself to a three-year investment, Intesa Sanpaolo was able to 
greatly enhance the impact its funding would have on people on the ground. Long-
term investments allow for better planning and programs that can improve 
livelihoods in the long-run. 
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Case 20 TOTAL E&P ANGOLA Community philanthropy, Angola 
Executive 
Summary 
Through its partnership with Centro de Apoio aos Jovens (CAJ), an Angolan NGO focusing 
on the prevention of STIs among youth, Total E&P Angola has helped to scale up community 
outreach, providing life-saving prevention and testing information to youth in the poor 
suburbs of Luanda. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Total’s partnership with a local NGO whose central focus is to develop programs 
for a vulnerable population—young people—in a social environment with limited 
services makes this program a true best practice in community philanthropy. 
2. By contributing its funding to a local NGO on the ground in Angola, Total increased 
the ability of its investment to reach the target group.  
3. CAJ brought to the table a deep understanding of local cultural issues and 
knowledge of the barriers to reaching local youths that the different initiatives 
would need to overcome. 
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Case 21 Cisneros Group  Community philanthropy, Latin America 
Executive 
Summary 
The Cisneros Group of Companies has focused its efforts on the development of the 
“HIV/AIDS Guidance in Elementary Schools” program, which aims to educate teachers on 
HIV/AIDS issues through a virtual classroom system. After a three-month training, teachers 
then bring the course information into their classrooms, educating their students on 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Through its partnership with the Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia, a private 
university in Lima, Peru specialising in medicine and education, Cisneros was able 
to create a relevant and impactful course. The company contributed its multimedia 
platform to create the virtual classroom and e-learning tools, while materials were 
developed by professors from the university. 
2. Professors also assist with teaching the course, evaluating classroom activities 
and monitoring the progress of teachers through the virtual classroom. 
3. One unique feature of this initiative is the partnership forged between Cisneros 
and the Ministry of Education. 
4. The course was developed in partnership with Aid for AIDS, one of the region’s 
largest HIV/AIDS advocacy organisations. Through the collaboration, people living 
with HIV/AIDS were given a say in the creation of the courses and ensured that all 
materials were presented factually and were indicative of the realities of life with 
HIV/AIDS. 
5. By targeting its educational programs at students living in periurban centers and 
rural areas, Cisneros ensured that the messages presented were reaching those 
most at risk. 
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Case 22 THANDA PRIVATE GAME RESERVE  Community philanthropy, South Africa 
Executive 
Summary 
Thanda Private Game Reserve initiated the Star School program in 2005 in response to 
thedevastating effect HIV/AIDS was having on employees, their families and the community. 
The Star School program now operates in 40 South African Schools throughout KwaZulu 
Natal province and recently expanded into Namibia. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
Star School uses a holistic approach to education about HIV/AIDS; rather than focusing 
exclusively on HIV/AIDS prevention information, the program’s curriculum aims to empower 
students to make better choices. 
Star School partnered with the University of Zululand to perform a baseline evaluation of 24 
schools, surveying knowledge, attitudes and behaviours relating to HIV/AIDS at the outset of 
the program. Star School contracted Health and Development Africa (an independent 
consultancy based in Johannesburg) to evaluate progress against that baseline across the 
40 current schools, helping the program to evaluate rates of information uptake and 
behaviour change. 
Star School was established by Dan Olofsson, a Swedish businessman who recently 
decided to invest in Thanda. His commitment to addressing HIV/AIDS in this vulnerable 
community and his continued leadership has helped secure consistent support and roll-out of 
the programs. 
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Case 23 Mercedes-Benz South Africa  Expanded Community initiatives, South Africa 
Executive 
Summary 
The Mercedes-Benz S.A. HIV/AIDS Workplace Program extends universal access to quality 
prevention, treatment, care and support to employees and their dependants. Through a 
partnership, the Siyakhana Project , involving provincial government, the local Chamber of 
Business, and DEG, co-financed with public funds of the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, MBSA has expanded its workplace program to 
provide the same HIV/AIDS and TB services to SME’s and the broader community. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. By taking on a mentoring role to these smaller businesses, MBSA was able to 
expand its prevention, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) and treatment 
services to reach a large number of vulnerable community members. 
2. Seventeen companies participated in the program’s pilot phase, 
3. MBSA’s program also features a robust monitoring and evaluation component 
which provides data for reporting to company stakeholders. 
4. Further, the company’s program is closely aligned with national and provincial 
HIV/AIDS and TB strategies. Through an agreement with the provincial 
government, MBSA is supplied medication for its expanded programs with SMEs 
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Case 24 DEBSWANA DIAMOND COMPANY Expanded Community initiatives, South Africa 
Executive 
Summary 
Since it was first established in 2001, Debswana’s workplace HIV/AIDS program has 
ensured that HIVpositive company employees receive life saving HAART. Through an 
agreement with the Government of Botswana, Debswana now leverages its facilities and 
personnel to bring HAART to thousands of people in the communities in which it works. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Leveraging existing company infrastructure and personnel, Debswana developed 
a unique partnership with the Government of Botswana to scale-up access to 
Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy (HAART) treatment to reach 100,000 non-
Debswana employees. 
2. When the government program was launched, Debswana realigned its efforts 
such that it was able to efficiently contribute its competencies and resources 
3. The program has a rigorous monitoring and evaluation component, which includes 
audits by hospital administrators and monthly reports to the government on the 
status of Masa patients. 
4. Debswana’s program is a model example of business filling critical health gaps in 
resource-limited settings. In the case of Masa, the Government of Botswana was 
capable of procuring medication, but lacked the necessary infrastructure and 
medical personnel to effectively administer it to the people. 
5. All patients are required to have a treatment buddy; buddies are responsible for 
encouraging each other to take their medication (community involvement) 
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Case 25 Mozal, BHP Billiton VCT Program, Southern Africa 
Executive 
Summary 
Since mid 2005, the Company has been sponsoring the establishment of clinical trials to test 
a potential new vaccine for the treatment of HIV. The clinical trials, taking place over three 
years, are to be conducted in southern Africa. This initiative is an extension of our 
involvement in the HIV/AIDS issue, from the implementation of quality programs for our 
employees and their dependants to community-based activities that offer more widespread 
impact. 
Identified Key 
Success Factors 
1. Effective planning of the program from the outset. 
2. Senior management commitment and support. 
3. Assurance of confidentiality, as HIV is still a highly sensitive issue. 
4. Effective disease management to ensure support to those who require it. 
5. Involvement of all relevant stakeholders in planning and implementation. 
6. We have also learnt that this is a process not to be rushed. The results are 
important, but so is how we go about obtaining those results. 
Reference 
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VECTOR 1 Cultural Distance 
 
Definition: 
National cultural distance can therefore be defined as the “extent to which the shared norms 
and values in one country differ from those in another” 
- Chen & Hu, 2002; Hofstede, 2001; Kogut & Singh, 1988 - 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena. 
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
3. Correlate Hofstede’s Cultural Distance model with case results as an indicator to predict 
social investment project failure.  
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe cultural distance can hamper a social investment project? 
2. Did you experience any difficulty in terms of Cultural Barriers between yourself and the 
host country?  
3. How much experience / knowledge, either directly (self) or indirectly (guide / host), of the 
target population’s culture, norms, values, language, etc did you acquire before the 
venture and how did you acquire it? And during the venture?  
4. List some Key Success Factors of how the cultural barrier was eliminated or even 
leveraged in this case study. 
5. List the Key Failure Factors of how the cultural barrier hindered project success or even 
caused failure. 
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VECTOR 2 Cultural Distance 
 
Definition: 
“Historical and political associations between two countries greatly affect trade between 
them.” 
- Ghemawat (2001, p142)  - 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena. 
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that administrative / political distance played any role during your venture 
and how did you overcome these difficulties? 
2. Did the historical or political ties/barriers hamper or leverage your venture? How? 
3. How did the political barriers (tariffs, trade quotas, restrictions on foreign direct 
investment, local supplier preference, favouritism in procurement policies, etc ) affect your 
venture? 
4. Did the host country’s social and political services influence (enhanced or hamper) your 
venture? How? 
5. How did you handle the foreign currency exchanges? Did you use forward cover options? 
6. Did your venture utilise (0), hamper (3) or destroy (5) local companies that are: 
(a) A large supplier or national champion 
(b) Vital to national security 
(c) Produce staple foods or goods 
(d) Produces entertainment goods or foods 
(e) Exploits national resources 
(f) Involve high sunk-cost commitments 
and what effect did it have on your venture? 
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VECTOR 3 Geographic Distance 
 
Definition: 
“It is very important to consider the accessibility and availability of communication and 
infrastructure networks when assessing the geographic influences on cross-border activity.”  
- Ghemawat (2001)  - 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena. 
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that geographical distance played any role during your venture and how 
did you overcome these difficulties? (I.e. Local suppliers ?) 
2. Did the country’s infrastructure influence (hamper or leverage) your project? 
3. How did you manage communication between head quarters and base stations and how 
important was it to maintain the communications link? 
4. Did accessibility/inaccessibility of ground staff have an influence on your venture and was 
it of positive/negative nature?  
5. How did you transport your facilities/supplies/resources? 
6. Did you require an extensive distribution network to get the supplies to their destination? 
Did it exist? How well is it functioning?  
7. What is the coverage radius of each depot / base station and how accessible are the 
people in need? 
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VECTOR 4 Economic Distance 
 
Definition: 
“The wealth or income of consumers is the most important economic attribute that crates 
distance between countries.”   
- Ghemawat (2001)  - 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena. 
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
3. Correlate project success to economic distance between Host and Home countries, 
Ground staff and beneficiaries and Ground staff and head-office 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that Economic Distance played any role during your venture and how did 
you overcome these difficulties?  
 
Distance between ground staff and social beneficiaries 
2. What is the income difference between your ground staff and the beneficiaries? 
3. What are the Key Success Factors (Or key reason for failure) to overcome the 
difference? (E.g. Did you use mediatory organisations or middle men? Are your staff 
members educated/experienced and sensitive to the economic conditions in the target 
country?) 
4. Does your solution make economical sense to the beneficiary – would they be able to 
comprehend, sustain and benefit from it? 
 
Distance between ground staff and home country 
5. What is the income difference between your ground staff and head office?  
6. Does management understand the difficulties of economic distance between their 
corporate strategy, ground staff and beneficiaries? 
7. Do you adapt salary/compensation structures for people placed in other international 
countries? Do you think it affects project performance? 
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VECTOR 5 Creating Your Own Luck 
 
Definition: 
“Luck can be created. One can use foresight, mindfulness and judgement to predict future (tn) 
opportunities and align the current (t1) resources to maximise returns at tn.”  
- Ghemawat (2001)  - 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena. 
(Find out whether social entrepreneurial organisations craft their own future luck.) 
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that future luck can be orchestrated in social entrepreneurial ventures? 
2. Did you experience any form of luck that contributed to success of the venture? If yes, 
describe briefly. 
3. Did you do anything deliberately that played a role in realising this fortune? (Garry Player 
- The more I practice, the luckier I get…) 
4. Can you repeat it in another country/venture? 
5. Rate the success of the venture due to the fortune of events vs the absence thereof. 
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VECTOR 6 Quality of Business Prospects on Offer 
 
Definition: 
a) Compare options  
In business we use strategic tools like SWOT, Porter’s Five Forces, GIS Marketing Analysis, 
Net Present Value comparisons and any other tool that might give insight to the quality of the 
business prospects on offer. Usually if one has limited funding & resources, the wisest 
investment would be to invest in those projects that would bring about the greatest return on 
investment, or ones that are of most strategic significance..    
 
b) Minimum acceptable standards 
In a scenario where you have more capital than projects, the focus is rather on spending the 
money wisely. Therefore, the value of the vector can be exploited by means of reverse 
engineering where one define the minimum acceptable quality/social returns that any 
prospect must adhere to before the company will even consider investment. In this mode of 
operation, one forces everyone in the company (engineers, scientists, marketing managers, 
strategists, social workers, etc.) to reach beyond the existing mediocre prospects and create 
new exciting proposals that will maximise return on investment. 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena. 
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
3. Source quality social entrepreneurial benchmarking and decision analysis tools. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
Project Selection 
1. Does this project support your corporate strategy? 
2. Do you have spare capital in your budget, or do you have to reject/postpone some of your 
projects? 
3. How do/would you decide between 2 ventures if you only have enough resources to 
complete 1? 
4. How do you decide to accept/reject a proposal? (Did you draw up a business case for the 
project? What key elements did you consider and what were the measurements for 
success?) 
5. Will you start the project if (4) is marginal, and what is your definition of marginal? 
6. How do you measure the returns on your social investment? 
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Project Execution  
1. How did you scope your project plan and how do measure project progress? 
2. How do you know that the project was successful? Do you consider quality, time and 
cost?  What else do you use to define project success? 
3. Did you follow up after project completion to ensure that the results were sustained? Did 
the community/stakeholders take ownership? 
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VECTOR 7 Country Attractiveness 
 
Definition: 
During this phase of the evaluation, one typically scrutinises the existing body of knowledge 
available for the particular country and rate the various ones according to overall 
attractiveness. Typical variables include: 
 Sovereign Risk: A three layer analysis (Country, Province, Local Area) of the business 
risk in terms of Economic, Business and Legal Systems provided by the host country. 
 People: One would typically use the human development index, labour 
productivity/efficiency, cultural distance/compatibility between host and home country 
when evaluating the people within the country’s attractiveness. 
 Dynamics of the Country: Rather consider the trend (up/down) of the country’s stability 
during the evaluation, instead of making judgements on their current position. 
 Determinants for National Competitive Advantage: Here one evaluates a county’s 
competitive advantage, using Porter’s diamond (Factor Conditions, Demand Conditions, 
Related Supporting Industries, Strategy & Structure & Rivalry) 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
3. Identify other quality “Country Attractiveness” indicators related to Social Investment. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Why did you select the particular country/community for this project? 
2. Did you analyse the country/region attractiveness before entering into your venture? If 
yes, what elements did you use in your analysis? 
3. Which of the typical International Business indicators do you feel are applicable to Social 
Investment Projects? Rate them from 1 (very applicable) to 5 (no relevance) and say why. 
4. What other indicators do you recommend and why? 
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VECTOR 8 Company’s Ability to Implement or Deliver 
 
Definition: 
Company abilities can be divided into two categories: 
 Hard capabilities could include finance, technology, infrastructure, support and strategic 
fit in relation to the timing & time span and competitive advantage.  
 Soft capabilities are more complex because it includes issues like risk tolerance, ethics 
& corporate governance acceptance levels, cultural tolerance, willingness change 
business processes, patience, entrepreneurial services available and many more. 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Identify common key success and failure factors that could predict social investment 
success/failure. 
3. Identify additional abilities needed to ensure social project success. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Did this project fall under your company’s core competence and what portions did you 
outsource to sub-contractors? (Was there someone else who are available and who could 
have or was willing to do a better job within the same constraints?) 
2. Did your company/team have the ability to implement the project PRIOR to project 
initiation? I.e. Did you have the resources (hard and soft) to complete the project within 
time, budget, quality? 
(a) Were all the financing approved prior to contract initiation? 
(b) Were the project deadlines reasonable? 
(c) Did you screen the new applicants thoroughly? 
(d) Were they equipped, trained for the project? 
(e) Did you have a project support & accountability office in place? 
(f) Was the project feasibility tested? 
3. Did you acquire any of these resources DURING the project? Was that part of the original 
project plan? 
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4. Do you believe the following virtues are needed for Social Investment Projects? Rate 
them on a scale 1 (very applicable) to 5 (no relevance): 
(a) Entrepreneurial Versatility: which is achieved through imagination, creativity and 
vision and not necessarily through managerial and technical versatility. 
(b) Fund raising ingenuity: The ability to convince the market and/or investors to invest 
in your visions 
(c) Entrepreneurial Ambition: Building social wealth 
(d) Entrepreneurial Judgement: Is about the process of gathering information, 
dissecting it though consultation and eventually the process of decision making. 
5. Which of these virtues are cultivated in your core team and how do you cultivate them? 
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VECTOR 9 Strategic Variables 
 
Definition: 
In general, one has to take the long and short-term strategy of the firm into account when 
selecting an entry mode. The end-results could be catastrophic if the international venture is 
not in line with the firm’s strategy (and visa versa.) 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that social investment projects should be related to a corporate 
company’s mission and vision? Why? 
2. What is your company’s mission and vision and how does this project assist in achieving 
that goal? 
3. What entry mode did you select for this venture and why? 
4. Do you believe it was the correct entry mode, given your long term mission and vision for 
your COMPANY? 
5. Do you believe that your company’s vision, mission and culture supported this venture (or 
did it lead to project failure) 
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VECTOR 10 Location Specific Variables 
 
Definition: 
According to Shi, Shu & Ho (2001) location specific variables include: 
(a) Local market potential 
(b) Local production costs 
(c) Local government policies 
(d) Location of investment 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Source additional Location Specific Variables that are related to Social Investment 
projects.  
3. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that Location Specific variables have an impact on your entry mode 
selection? Why? 
2. Was there anything to the particular location that assisted in project success or caused 
failure? 
3. Did any of the following items positively or negatively affect your venture and how? 
(a) Local market potential 
(b) Local production costs 
(c) Local government policies 
(d) Location of investment 
4. Did any of the above factors determine your entry mode selection? 
5. What other Location Specific factors had a positive/negative effect on your venture?  
6. Did they influence your entry mode selection? 
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VECTOR 11 Transaction Specific Variables 
 
Definition: 
Shi, Shu & Ho (2001) have predominantly used “Perceived contractual risks” and “Specificity 
of assets” as variables in their conceptual framework: 
Contractual Risks are associated with: 
(a) Perceived costs of making and enforcing contracts,  
(b) Risk of knowledge leakage and  
(c) Risk of product quality deterioration.  
When these perceived risks are high, investing firms will tend to retain more managerial 
control on overseas ventures to reduce these risks (Shi, Shu & Ho, 2001). 
Assets specificity refers to the uniqueness of the technology and knowledge used by the 
investing firm. Normally, the more highly specific the asset, the more likely investing firms 
would prefer to keep their proprietary technology internal by increasing their control over their 
subsidiaries (Shi, Shu & Ho, 2001). 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Source additional Transaction Specific Variables that are related to Social Investment 
projects.  
3. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Do you believe that Transaction Specific variables have an impact on your entry mode 
selection? Why? 
2. What in a transaction will cause you to decide between the various entry modes?  
3. Was there a risk of knowledge leakage, quality deterioration, any other transaction 
specific variable and did it influenced your entry mode selection? Why? 
4. Where did the need for this project came from (Community, Internally from within the 
company, external body like the UN, WHO)? 
5. What was unique to the configuration of this project that caused success/failure? Do you 
believe that this configuration can cause repeated success/failure? 
6. Did the perceived contractual risks or asset specificity positively or negatively affect your 
venture and how? 
7. What other Transaction Specific factors had a positive/negative effect on your venture?  
8. What was their influence your entry mode selection? 
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VECTOR 12 Firm Specific Variables 
 
Definition: 
Shi, Shu & Ho (2001) used firm specific variables as the forth input to their model. These 
inputs consist of: 
 Firm size 
 International Experience 
 Host Country Experience 
 Relationship with local organisations 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Source additional Firm Specific Variables that would influence the entry mode for Social 
Investment projects.  
3. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Does your company select different entry modes for different 
projects/communities/countries? How ? 
2. Do you believe this project (and entry mode selection) would have been approached 
differently (and how) if your company: 
(a) Was bigger in size? 
(b) Had more international experience in general? 
(c) Had more host country experience? 
(d) Had better relationships with local organisations? 
3. How long will your company be visible for other projects within the country/community? 
Did it influence your entry mode selection? 
4. What firm specific variables are critical for Social Investment success? 
5. What firm specific variables will guarantee failure in Social Investment projects? 
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VECTOR 13 Experience 
 
Definition: 
Padmanabhan & Cho (2005) identified three different categories for measuring a firm’s level 
of experience:  
 General international business experience  
 Host country-specific experience and, 
 Decision-specific experience (experience in the context of a particular strategic decision) 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Source additional Experience Variables that would influence the entry mode for Social 
Investment projects.  
3. Identify common key success and failure factors. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. Rate the organisation, especially the teams international experience on a scale of 1 
(excellent) to 5 (poor) 
2. Rate the core team’s host country-specific experience on a scale of 1 (excellent) to 5 
(poor) 
3. Rate the organisation’s / teams knowledge and experience on the specific project on a 
scale of 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor). 
4. Does the entry mode support the experience levels? 
5. What other Experience variables would be needed to ensure a successful Social 
Investment Project? 
6. What other lack of Experience variables would be almost guarantee failure of a Social 
Investment Project? 
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VECTOR 14 Risk 
 
Definition: 
 Investment Risk: As result of high amounts of capital required for foreign direct 
investment projects.  
 Financial Risk: Exposure to fluctuating exchange and interest rates, as well as failure to 
produce the predicted profit rates. 
 Contractual Risk: Costs relating to contracts, agreements and bridging thereof. 
 Country Risk: This includes all vectors mentioned earlier relating to country specific 
barriers like culture, distance, political stability, etc. 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Identify common social investment risks and means to mitigate them. 
3. Identify risk aversiveness of social entrepreneurs. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. What are the primary risks within your social investment project(s) and how would you 
mitigate them? 
2. What are the secondary risks within your social investment project(s) and how would you 
mitigate them? 
3. Which risks would determine your entry mode? 
4. Would you continue with a social investment project if there are unavoidable risks under 
the following conditions: 
(a) LOW probability and (LOW  or MEDIUM or HIGH) severity 
(b) MEDIUM probability and (LOW, MEDIUM OR HIGH) severity 
(c) HIGH PROBABILITY and (LOW, MEDIUM OR HIGH) severity 
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VECTOR 15 Control 
 
Definition: 
Too little control will not ensure that the efforts from the home country are synchronised with 
the host country. On the other hand, too much control will slow the expansion process down, 
which could be detrimental to high-tech projects/products with short product life cycles. 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Identify best practices on control within social investment projects. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. What control measures do you apply in your social investment projects on team 
members, recipients, donors, contractors, etc.? 
2. How much delegated authority/freedom would the project manager/staff of the remote 
venture have? 
3. How much say/responsibility did the community have in: 
(a) Defining the Project scope 
(b) Project execution 
4. How did you hand the project over to the community? How much control do you retain or 
do they take FULL ownership? 
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VECTOR 16 Commitment 
 
Definition: 
It is imperative to consider management and the company’s the level of commitment prior to 
finalising the entry mode. Social projects create expectation and hope. The consequential 
damages caused as result of premature termination or inability to deliver are more severe 
than not doing anything at all. 
 
Objective(s): 
1. Correlate international business theory applicability within the social investment arena.  
2. Identify best practices on keeping commitments. 
 
Interview Questions to Consider: 
1. What was the lifecycle of the project and how low was your company planning to be 
involved? 
2. Does the entry mode suit your level of commitment? 
3. Is the core team or key members willing and proven committed to see the project 
through? How do you know? 
4. Do you have the same level of commitment from your sponsors? 
5. What do you do to ensure commitment (team, community, sponsors, management)? 
(a) Do you have well defined staff retention strategies in place?  
(b) Does the leader of the project own (eat, drink, dream, sleep) the vision? 
(c) Do you rotate staff to prevent burn-out? 
(d) Would you start a project when in doubt? 
(e) Etc. 
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Vector 1: Cultural Distance 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.5 
The Merck Company Foundation and the Gates Foundation each 
committed $50 million over five years to help Botswana strengthen its 
health infrastructure, such as training new health workers and 
managers, and establishing new laboratories and mobile clinics. 
Train people in the community 
2.8 
GAVI did not pay enough attention to developing-country priorities. 
Driven in large part by the foundation’s eagerness (even impatience) 
for results, GAVI often moved at a pace that made it impossible to get 
full buy-in from developing countries. 
Consult community for their 
priorities 
3.4 The training provided the awareness, self-confidence and support 
necessary to challenge violent behaviour within the household. Train people in the community 
5.2 Community education and communication prior to intervention. Community Education and Communication 
8.6 
Community information, education and communication program 
(communication materials were developed to explain why this was 
necessary, and to provide general information about the project and 
the prevention and treatment of malaria). 
Community communication and 
education about the project 
8.7 
These communications materials used multiple languages and 
multiple methods and pre-tested by focus groups to ensure 
relevance. 
Multiple language 
communication 
Multiple communication 
methods tested to ensure 
relevance 
8.8 Up-skilling/training of community workers at health centres to deal 
with the problems of Malaria. Transfer skills into community 
8.14 Use of drama as an accepted cultural medium to improve awareness. Community Education and Communication (Drama) 
9.3 
Clear STRATEGY to SUPPORT community needs: Modicare has 
been working with a single minded mission of giving back to the 
society that has made it capable of giving, whatever it needs for its 
sustenance and development. 
Support community needs 
10.4 Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s. 
Used existing community 
support structures 
10.5 Used community peer group educators in high transmission areas. Used community peer group 
educators 
11.2 Created regional sectors and prioritised according to the needs of 
each sector. 
Regional sectors, 
prioritised/customised according 
to need of each sector 
11.3 Created a dedicated task force for each zone. Dedicated team for each zone 
11.4 Crafted, along with local committees of each zone, strategies unique to each zone. 
Consult with each community 
regarding their needs 
11.7 Training of staff and health officials. Train local/community staff 
11.9 Continuous dialogue with community. Continuous dialogue with 
community 
12.3 
Tied up with local NGO's having strong community linkages and 
experience in community development activities especially in areas of 
HIV/AIDS and education. 
Minimise distance through 
NGO's with strong social links 
12.6 Community theatres were set up at locations convenient to groups to disseminate anti-HIV/AIDS messages via audio-visual media. 
Community communication and 
education 
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Vector 1: Cultural Distance 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
13.1 
Standard Charterer's HIV Champions, who have driven the program 
forwards across the business. In 2006 the Bank had 300 HIV 
Champions across its geographic footprint. They are responsible for 
preparing programs that reflect the priorities of their own country and 
delivering awareness raising activities for employees. 
Regionalised program to reflect 
priorities of local community 
14.4 
Work and community based Wellness Champions, Community 
Outreach Workers, Treatment Counsellors, and program coordinators 
who are trained and supported to mobilize the community at the 
grass roots level implement various tools to help the community. 
Train local/community staff 
14.8 
Having earned the respect of employees and the communities in 
which it operates, XCSA is now able to venture into new partnerships 
and facilitate further sustainable local development and social 
developments. 
Positive reputation in community 
reduce risk of community 
resistance 
14.9 
Its methodology states that deep democracy and collective counsel 
creates a platform to retain and maintain the unity and value of 
individual response which in turn addresses behaviour change. 
Democracy and collective 
counselling brings unity 
15.10 
Sustainability means investing in people: a major focus of the Abbott 
Fund’s program in Tanzania is the development of human resources 
through training health care workers and other staff. 
Skills transfer to local people 
15.12 
Listen to local partners and understand local needs: working with 
community based organizations ensures local viability and sets the 
groundwork for a sustainable program. 
listen to local people,  
partner with local community 
based organisations to set the 
foundation for sustainable 
program 
16.1 By adopting action plans for each country in which it operates, Accor has effectively localized its HIV/AIDS program. Adopt program for each country 
19.2 
In preparation for launching the program, each area of intervention 
was discussed with local authorities and large players on the 
ground—such as the World Bank and UNAIDS. The final program 
draft was submitted for approval to the President of Malawi and the 
local ministries involved. 
Listen to local people and large 
players on the ground 
19.4 Project Malawi has been able to improve anti-retroviral (ARV) therapy 
adherence and reduce stigma through community support groups. 
Reduce distance through 
community support groups 
20.3 
CAJ brought to the table a deep understanding of local cultural 
issues and knowledge of the barriers to reaching local youths that the 
different initiatives would need to overcome. 
Partner brought deep 
understanding of cultural issues, 
and barriers of reaching people 
24.5 
all patients are required to have a treatment buddy; buddies are 
responsible for encouraging each other to take their medication 
(community involvement). 
Community collaboration was 
mandatory 
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Vector 2: Administrative and Political Distances 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
2.10 
GAVI was too narrowly focused. From the start, GAVI has recognized 
that funding vaccine purchases alone would not allow the 75 poorest 
countries in the world to overcome their infrastructure challenges, so 
it has provided “immunization system support” to help countries 
improve their ability to deliver vaccines to a large portion of their 
children. GAVI has learned that in many cases the ability of the 
country to reach more children is not related simply to its 
immunization program. Broader health-system failures are often to 
blame. So GAVI has now expanded its funding criteria and set aside 
about half of its resources to help meet broader health-system needs. 
Health system failures to blame 
8.2 
Engaged with the Equatorial Guinea Government and the EG 
Ministry of Health and Social Well-being during the problem definition 
phase. 
Minimise distance by involving 
Government during problem 
definition phase 
10.1 Worked in collaboration with local government and other NGO’s. Reduce distance through government involvement 
10.3 
Treatment is now more accessible to local communities and better 
managed through the support structures set up by the Phelang 
Community Centre (HIV positive patients had to travel 100 km to 
local hospital in the past). 
Treatment is better managed 
through improved community 
support systems 
10.4 Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s. 
Used existing community 
support structures 
10.6 Leveraged governmental funds to pay for home based workers. Leverage Government funds to pay home based workers 
14.6 
Working together with the government is the most sustainable way of 
achieving its development goals so Xstrata has entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Provincial Department of 
Health to implement a Public-Private Mix model that will extend its 
forerunner project in the Breyten community to other sub-districts.  
Public Private partnership with 
Government is the most 
sustainable way of achieving 
development goals 
15.1 
The Abbott Fund’s partnership with the Government of Tanzania was 
designed to adapt resource-limited health systems to meet the 
lifelong treatment needs of people with HIV/AIDS, including 
improving facilities, upgrading administration and systems, training 
staff, increasing access to VCT and HIV care and assisting OVC. 
PPP was designed to improve 
systems and infrastructure 
15.2 
The program is managed through close collaboration between the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Health, led by Minister of Health Anna 
Abdallah; the Abbott Fund; and Axios, an organization specializing in 
health management in developing countries. 
Minimise distance through PPP 
15.14 
Continue to work with the Tanzanian government to identify and 
evaluate how best to address new challenges in the national scale up 
of HIV testing and treatment. 
Include government during 
problem definition phase 
15.5 
When the Abbott Fund’s program was started in 2002, there were 
very few donors in the country and a significant need for 
improvement in its health care management, infrastructure and 
services. 
Start up with low political 
services and infrastructure 
15.6 
The country was politically stable and demonstrated leadership to 
fight HIV/AIDS and openness to partnerships with the private sector, 
such as those supported by the Abbott Fund. 
Government open for 
partnerships 
16.1 By adopting action plans for each country in which it operates, Accor has effectively localized its HIV/AIDS program. Adopt program for each country 
17.2 By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically scale up the scope of its intervention. 
Partnering with Government - 
able to increase scope of 
intervention dramatically 
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Vector 2: Administrative and Political Distances 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
19.2 
In preparation for launching the program, each area of intervention 
was discussed with local authorities and large players on the 
ground—such as the World Bank and UNAIDS. The final program 
draft was submitted for approval to the President of Malawi and the 
local ministries involved. 
Include local authorities in 
problem definition phase and 
send to president for approval  
21.3 One unique feature of this initiative is the partnership forged between Cisneros and the Ministry of Education. Partner with government  
21.5 
By targeting its educational programs at students living in peri-urban 
centres and rural areas, Cisneros ensured that the messages 
presented were reaching those most at risk. 
Lower infrastructure, more the 
need for intervention 
23.4 
Further, the company’s program is closely aligned with national and 
provincial HIV/AIDS and TB strategies. Through an agreement with 
the provincial government, MBSA is supplied medication for its 
expanded programs with SME's. 
Agreement with government 
24.1 
Leveraging existing company infrastructure and personnel, 
Debswana developed a unique partnership with the Government of 
Botswana to scale-up access to Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy 
(HAART) treatment to reach 100,000 non-Debswana employees. 
Relationship with Government 
24.4 
Debswana’s program is a model example of business filling critical 
health gaps in resource-limited settings. In the case of Masa, the 
Government of Botswana was capable of procuring medication, but 
lacked the necessary infrastructure and medical personnel to 
effectively administer it to the people. 
Government Lacked 
infrastructure, personnel and 
administrative systems, which 
was provided by social partner 
to provide synergy 
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Vector 3: Geographic Distance 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.5 
The Merck Company Foundation and the Gates Foundation each 
committed $50 million over five years to help Botswana strengthen its 
health infrastructure, such as training new health workers and 
managers, and establishing new laboratories and mobile clinics. 
Strengthen Infrastructure 
1.7 
But many challenges remain. For example, roughly 50,000 people 
who could benefit from ARV's—especially those in remote districts—
still have not been reached. 
Slower or unreachable 
2.10 
GAVI was too narrowly focused. From the start, GAVI has recognized 
that funding vaccine purchases alone would not allow the 75 poorest 
countries in the world to overcome their infrastructure challenges, so 
it has provided “immunization system support” to help countries 
improve their ability to deliver vaccines to a large portion of their 
children. GAVI has learned that in many cases the ability of the 
country to reach more children is not related simply to its 
immunization program. Broader health-system failures are often to 
blame. So GAVI has now expanded its funding criteria and set aside 
about half of its resources to help meet broader health-system needs. 
Infrastructure challenges make 
some groups unreachable 
7.4 Small beginnings: Success in one community caused management to 
roll the SAME program out to other communities. 
Minimise effect via small 
beginnings in local community 
10.3 
Treatment is now more accessible to local communities and better 
managed through the support structures set up by the Phelang 
Community Centre (HIV positive patients had to travel 100 km to local 
hospital in the past). 
New clinics reduce distance for 
patients to travel 
11.3 Created a dedicated task force for each zone. 
Dedicated team for each zone 
ensure access for all member in 
the community 
11.8 Maximise local content. Maximise local content 
12.6 Community theatres were set up at locations convenient to groups to disseminate anti-HIV/AIDS messages via audio-visual media. 
Easy access locations for 
community 
13.1 
Standard Charterer's HIV Champions, who have driven the program 
forwards across the business. In 2006 the Bank had 300 HIV 
Champions across its geographic footprint. They are responsible for 
preparing programs that reflect the priorities of their own country and 
delivering awareness raising activities for employees. 
300 champions distributed over 
the operating footprint of the 
company 
15.3 The staff frequently visits Tanzania to coordinate the program and 
monitor progress. Frequent site visits 
16.1 By adopting action plans for each country in which it operates, Accor has effectively localized its HIV/AIDS program. Adopt program for each country 
17.1 
Through its vast distribution networks—including transportation and 
communication infrastructure—the company is able to successfully 
deliver health information and VCT services to its contractors in the 
field, in addition to its broader supplier and distributor network. 
Own vast transportation and 
communication network 
17.3 A number of other partners help with program implementation and 
support on the ground. Partnered with ground workers 
19.4 Project Malawi has been able to improve anti-retroviral (ARV) therapy 
adherence and reduce stigma through community support groups. 
Reduce distance through 
community support groups 
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Vector 4: Economic Distance 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.9 
Community must be able to sustain intervention: We believe 
Botswana will, over time, be able to sustain the costs of its treatment 
program.  
Community will be able to 
sustain costs of implemented 
programs 
2.3 
GAVI invites the 75 poorest countries in the world to develop plans 
and submit proposals for increasing vaccine coverage and use of 
newer vaccines. 
Ask the poor for their opinion 
8.1 Effort was to reduce the health care and economic burden of malaria 
on the local population and also help protect the local workforce. 
Project aims to reduce 
economical burden caused by 
malaria 
10.4 Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s. 
Minimise distance through 
relying on local support 
structures/people 
10.5 Used community peer group educators in high transmission areas. 
Minimise distance through 
relying on local support 
structures/people 
11.8 Maximise local content. Maximise local content 
12.7 
Opinion makers like key family members, teachers, panchayat 
members and health workers were involved in the workshops which 
were followed by discussions. 
Reduce distance by consulting 
stakeholders during problem 
definition phase 
14.4 
Work and community based Wellness Champions, Community 
Outreach Workers, Treatment Counsellors, and program coordinators 
who are trained and supported to mobilize the community at the 
grass roots level implement various tools to help the community. 
Use ground workers 
14.5 
It invests in interlinked health, social and food security projects and  
working towards sustainable livelihoods through supporting skills 
development and income generation activities. 
Skills development provide 
income generating activities 
15.10 
Sustainability means investing in people: a major focus of the Abbott 
Fund’s program in Tanzania is the development of human resources 
through training health care workers and other staff. 
Skills transfer/development 
16.1 By adopting action plans for each country in which it operates, Accor has effectively localized its HIV/AIDS program. Adopt program for each country 
19.4 Project Malawi has been able to improve anti-retroviral (ARV) therapy 
adherence and reduce stigma through community support groups. 
Reduce distance through 
community support groups 
24.4 
Debswana’s program is a model example of business filling critical 
health gaps in resource-limited settings. In the case of Masa, the 
Government of Botswana was capable of procuring medication, but 
lacked the necessary infrastructure and medical personnel to 
effectively administer it to the people. 
Social Entrepreneurship fills gap 
in resource limited settings 
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Vector 5: Creating your own luck 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.4 
By July 2000, Merck and the Gates Foundation created the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships and formally joined forces 
with President Mogae to support the country’s already ambitious 
efforts to combat the epidemic. 
Support Winners 
2.2 
These 12 members represented all the major partners in the 
alliance, including developing-world governments, the World Health 
Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, pharmaceutical companies, 
NGO's, research institutes, and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation. 
Partner with international trend 
setters 
Set national/International 
standards 
2.5 
GAVI looks across all the approved plans to forecast how many 
doses of each vaccine will be required overall. This demand-
forecasting helps guarantee an adequate supply of vaccines. We 
hope that over the long term it will also reduce unit prices. 
Demand Forecasting 
2.8 
GAVI did not pay enough attention to developing-country priorities. 
Driven in large part by the foundation’s eagerness (even 
impatience) for results, GAVI often moved at a pace that made it 
impossible to get full buy-in from developing countries. 
Consult community for their 
priorities 
3.3 
The IMAGE project (Intervention with Micro finance for AIDS & 
Gender Equity) is a partnership between SEF and the Rural AIDS 
and Development Action Research (RADAR) Programme. IMAGE 
combines poverty-focused, group-based micro finance with 
structured training and discussion about social norms, gender-
based violence and HIV/AIDS. Combining two specialist projects 
created synergies resulting in impacts beyond those that have been 
achieved by either organisation independently. 
Complementing partners 
created synergy 
3.6 A recurring theme throughout the study was the fundamental role of 
solidarity and trust in shaping the project’s success. Solidarity and Trust 
8.7 
These communications materials used multiple languages and 
multiple methods and pre-tested by focus groups to ensure 
relevance. 
Pre-test solution to ensure 
relevance 
11.10 
Rio Tinto invests heavily in education and training of youth and local 
health care workers to ensure the skills needed to maintain the 
program remain in the local community. 
Invest in educating and training 
of youth and local health care 
workers to ensure skills remain 
in local community 
12.3 
Tied up with local NGO's having strong community linkages and 
experience in community development activities especially in areas 
of HIV/AIDS and education. 
Partner with NGO's with strong 
social links 
12.4 Create HIV/AIDS “Champions”, using the train-the-trainer principle. Create HIV champions to train 
others 
12.7 
Opinion makers like key family members, teachers, panchayat 
members and health workers were involved in the workshops which 
were followed by discussions. 
Build relationships and trust with 
opinion makers 
13.2 
Standard Charterer's HIV Champions develop relationships and 
work closely with NGO's operating in their country or with target 
groups to develop and deliver education activities. 
Build relationships 
14.7 
This collaboration also reduces duplication, identifies gaps and 
achieves efficiencies, such as improvements in the supply chain for 
ARV and TB pharmaceuticals for both public and private clinics. 
Collaboration with Government 
forms synergy 
14.8 
Having earned the respect of employees and the communities in 
which it operates, XCSA is now able to venture into new 
partnerships and facilitate further sustainable local development 
and social developments. 
Earned respect of employees 
and communities 
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Vector 5: Creating your own luck 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
15.2 
The program is managed through close collaboration between the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Health, led by Minister of Health Anna 
Abdallah; the Abbott Fund; and Axios, an organization specializing 
in health management in developing countries. 
Support winner (minister of 
health) 
17.2 By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically scale up the scope of its intervention. 
Partnering with Government - 
able to increase scope of 
intervention dramatically 
19.2 
In preparation for launching the program, each area of intervention 
was discussed with local authorities and large players on the 
ground—such as the World Bank and UNAIDS. The final program 
draft was submitted for approval to the President of Malawi and the 
local ministries involved. 
Partner with key international 
organisations 
19.3 
By building a multifunctional centre that hosts the activities of 
Project Malawi’s four partners, the company was able to improve 
synergies between the multiple services provided by each 
association. 
Look for synergy 
21.3 One unique feature of this initiative is the partnership forged between Cisneros and the Ministry of Education. Relationship with government 
25.1 Effective planning of the program from the outset. Effective planning of the program from the outset 
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Vector 6: Business Prospects on Offer 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.8 
Be Realistic: But the fact that the spending has been slower than 
we anticipated is an indicator that we underestimated just how hard 
it is to build up the systems necessary to confront HIV/AIDS across 
an entire country. 
Set Realistic Targets (bigger 
projects takes longer) 
2.3 
GAVI invites the 75 poorest countries in the world to develop plans 
and submit proposals for increasing vaccine coverage and use of 
newer vaccines. 
Community based proposals 
3.1 SEF integrates simple social performance indicators into its 
management systems. 
Integrates simple social 
performance indicators into 
management system 
5.1 Baseline Studies were conducted prior to intervention by experts. Baseline Study conducted by 
experts 
5.5 Ongoing surveillance, monitoring and progress reporting during the project. 
Progress monitoring and 
reporting 
5.8 Beyond a clearly evident business case, and based on AGA's 
values and business principles. Clear business case 
6.6 Personally affected, many of its global locations are in high risk 
communities. Personal gain 
7.1 Request for intervention came from workforce to extend current 
employee program into the local community. Community based proposal 
8.1 
Effort was to reduce the health care and economic burden of 
malaria on the local population and also help protect the local 
workforce. 
Clear business case and 
personal gain 
8.10 Conduct baseline surveys prior to intervention. Baseline study 
8.11 Continuous (monthly and annual) surveillance, evaluation and progress monitoring. 
Monthly and annual 
surveillance, evaluation and 
progress monitoring 
Clear success indicators 
10.2 Conducted a baseline study prior to involvement. Baseline study PRIOR to intervention 
10.8 Monthly progress reviews. Monthly progress monitoring 
12.1 Conducted baseline survey prior to intervention. Baseline study prior to intervention 
12.2 Identified SPECIFIC sites where training was needed. Identify specific sites where intervention was needed 
12.9 They view the process as a continuous one. Continuous Process 
15.6 
The country was politically stable and demonstrated leadership to 
fight HIV/AIDS and openness to partnerships with the private 
sector, such as those supported by the Abbott Fund. 
Government open to 
partnerships 
15.15 A large investment in monitoring and evaluation of its programs with its primary implementation partner Axios. Monitor to ensure success 
19.3 
By building a multifunctional centre that hosts the activities of 
Project Malawi’s four partners, the company was able to improve 
synergies between the multiple services provided by each 
association. 
Synergy in projects 
20.2 
By contributing its funding to a local NGO on the ground in Angola, 
Total increased the ability of its investment to reach the target 
group.  
Increase effect of intervention 
through partners 
22.2 
Star School partnered with the University of Zululand to perform a 
baseline evaluation of 24 schools, surveying knowledge, attitudes 
and behaviours relating to HIV/AIDS at the outset of the program. 
Star School contracted Health and Development Africa (an 
independent consultancy based in Johannesburg) to evaluate 
progress against that baseline across the 40 current schools, 
helping the program to evaluate rates of information uptake and 
behaviour change. 
Baseline study 
Quality and performance 
Indicators (rates of information 
uptake and behavioural change) 
25.6 
We have also learnt that this is a process not to be rushed. The 
results are important, but so is how we go about obtaining those 
results. 
We have also learnt that this is 
a process not to be rushed. The 
results are important, but so is 
how we go about obtaining 
those results 
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Vector 7: Country Attractiveness 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.2 Botswana also had a stable democracy and significant resources of its own to commit. 
Stable Democracy 
Own Resources to Commit 
1.3 
Bold political leadership is essential: The person most responsible 
for leading Botswana’s response to AIDS is President Festus 
Mogae. 
Political Leadership Support 
1.4 
By July 2000, Merck and the Gates Foundation created the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships and formally joined forces 
with President Mogae to support the country’s already ambitious 
efforts to combat the epidemic. 
Existing Efforts 
2.7 
“Five years only” does not work. GAVI is now requiring countries to 
“co-pay” from the start—that is, to assume a small percentage of 
the cost of the program right away, with the percentage increasing 
every year.(Only back winners not beggars, and co-ownership of 
the problems). 
Government must co-pay from 
the start 
5.4 Program was aligned with Government and International policies/efforts. Existing national program 
6.2 
Social Responsibility is not a competition - aligning with and 
complementing community outreach efforts where they exist 
already. 
Existing efforts 
9.1 
The foundation is supporting local NGO's in organizing mass 
awareness campaigns as well as awareness sessions on HIV/AIDS 
for community men, women and adolescents. 
Existing efforts and competent 
partners 
10.4 Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s. Existing Efforts 
11.8 Maximise local content. Maximise Local Content 
13.2 
Standard Charterer's HIV Champions develop relationships and 
work closely with NGO's operating in their country or with target 
groups to develop and deliver education activities. 
Existing efforts 
14.7 
This collaboration also reduces duplication, identifies gaps and 
achieves efficiencies, such as improvements in the supply chain for 
ARV and TB pharmaceuticals for both public and private clinics. 
Leadership support 
15.1 
The Abbott Fund’s partnership with the Government of Tanzania 
was designed to adapt resource-limited health systems to meet the 
lifelong treatment needs of people with HIV/AIDS, including 
improving facilities, upgrading administration and systems, training 
staff, increasing access to VCT and HIV care and assisting OVC. 
Government support 
Country has limited resources 
15.6 
The country was politically stable and demonstrated leadership to 
fight HIV/AIDS and openness to partnerships with the private 
sector, such as those supported by the Abbott Fund. 
Political stable 
Leadership support 
Openness to partnerships 
17.2 By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically scale up the scope of its intervention. 
Partnering with Government - 
able to increase scope of 
intervention dramatically 
20.1 
Total’s partnership with a local NGO whose central focus is to 
develop programs for a vulnerable population—young people—in a 
social environment with limited services makes this program a true 
best practice in community philanthropy. 
Strong local NGO 
24.1 
Leveraging existing company infrastructure and personnel, 
Debswana developed a unique partnership with the Government of 
Botswana to scale-up access to Highly Active Anti-Retroviral 
Therapy (HAART) treatment to reach 100,000 non-Debswana 
employees. 
Government involvement 
24.4 
Debswana’s program is a model example of business filling critical 
health gaps in resource-limited settings. In the case of Masa, the 
Government of Botswana was capable of procuring medication, but 
lacked the necessary infrastructure and medical personnel to 
effectively administer it to the people. 
Government provided some of 
the resources 
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Vector 8: Company’s Ability to Deliver 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
2.1 
The blueprint for GAVI called not for a large new international 
bureaucracy but rather for a lean secretariat housed within 
UNICEF’s offices in Geneva, administered by widely respected 
Norwegian immunologist Tore Godal, and governed by a 12-
member board.  
Obtain experts 
2.4 
An independent committee made up largely of developing-country 
public health experts then reviews and makes recommendations on 
the proposals. GAVI’s board then meets to review the 
recommendations. Once the board approves a proposal, it requests 
that the GAVI Fund release payment. 
Committee of experts 
3.3 
The IMAGE project (Intervention with Micro finance for AIDS & 
Gender Equity) is a partnership between SEF and the Rural AIDS 
and Development Action Research (RADAR) Programme. IMAGE 
combines poverty-focused, group-based micro finance with 
structured training and discussion about social norms, gender-
based violence and HIV/AIDS. Combining two specialist projects 
created synergies resulting in impacts beyond those that have been 
achieved by either organisation independently. 
Get complimenting partners to 
create synergy 
5.1 Baseline Studies were conducted prior to intervention by experts. Baseline Study conducted by 
experts 
5.6 Appointed a FULL TIME control manager, with support staff. Appointed full time staff 
6.3 Align all efforts INTERNALLY (Corporate Responsibility, Communication, Marketing, and Healthcare Initiatives). 
Large Organisation: Align efforts 
internally to attain maximum 
impact 
6.4 Leverage GM’s talent and resources to solve the problem. Leverage internal talents and 
resources 
8.3 Formed Implementation team with partners, government and world 
class experts in the field malaria and social development. 
Formulate implementation team 
of government and world class 
experts 
8.4 Team was led by medical experts, not Marathon itself. Team was led by medical 
experts, not the funders 
8.9 
All new visitors to the project site on Bioko are provided an in-
country orientation that focuses on malaria prevention and 
treatment. 
Staff receives in-country 
orientation 
9.2 The Foundation also networks with corporate houses and other NGO's for care and support services. Network with ground workers 
10.4 Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s. 
Not core competence - use 
NGO and community support 
structures 
11.3 Created a dedicated task force for each zone. Dedicated teams 
11.5 Received technical assistance from international leaders in the industry. 
Receive technical assistance 
form industry leaders 
11.6 Outsourced certain programs to specialist NGO’s. Outsource certain aspects to 
specialist NGO's 
11.7 Training of staff and health officials. Train staff 
11.10 
Rio Tinto invests heavily in education and training of youth and local 
health care workers to ensure the skills needed to maintain the 
program remain in the local community. 
Invest in educating and training 
of youth and local health care 
workers to ensure skills remain 
in local community 
11.12 
Fifty-four volunteers run support groups across the 16 municipal 
wards in the region including 20 local farms, ensuring convenient 
access for all members of the community. 
High staff count ensure 
convenient access for all 
members of the community 
12.3 
Tied up with local NGO's having strong community linkages and 
experience in community development activities especially in areas 
of HIV/AIDS and education. 
Partner with experts and NGO's 
with strong social links 
12.4 Create HIV/AIDS “Champions”, using the train-the-trainer principle. Create champions, using train the trainer principle 
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Vector 8: Company’s Ability to Deliver 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
12.8 
Periodic evaluations and feedback tools have proved that the 
awareness levels of the targeted groups have gone up post 
intervention. 
Evaluation and feedback tools 
13.1 
Standard Charterer's HIV Champions, who have driven the program 
forwards across the business. In 2006 the Bank had 300 HIV 
Champions across its geographic footprint. They are responsible for 
preparing programs that reflect the priorities of their own country 
and delivering awareness raising activities for employees. 
Assigned champions to lead in 
the area 
13.3 
Resources are made widely available both through central 
mechanisms such as the Bank's website (e.g. the HIV e-learning 
resource) as well as through individual activities led by HIV 
Champions. 
Resources made available 
13.5 
The Bank is keen to build on the success of the program; using the 
skills and capacity developed to benefit a broader network of 
people. The new Vision is to reach one million people in three 
years. The mission is to achieve this by strengthening its 
commitment to existing partnerships, including those with 
customers, suppliers and NGO's. 
Skills and capacity developed 
13.7 
Commitment: The Bank has also formalized an approach for 
employee volunteering; providing two days paid leave for 
employees to contribute to community projects. 
Employees get 2 days paid 
leave to volunteer to community 
projects 
14.3 
Xstrata has incrementally and systematically carried the momentum 
and learning from its workforce responses to the households and 
communities by means of the door to door approach by working 
with its implementing Partner, Re-Action! 
Expert Partnership 
Willingness to learn 
systematically 
14.4 
Work and community based Wellness Champions, Community 
Outreach Workers, Treatment Counsellors, and program 
coordinators who are trained and supported to mobilize the 
community at the grass roots level implement various tools to help 
the community. 
Train staff 
Champions approach 
14.11 
Monitoring and evaluation systems will now have to be harmonized 
so that achievements in the community (by the NGO’s) and 
workplace (internal champions) can be captured accurately and 
consistently. 
Integrated monitoring system 
15.3 The staff frequently visits Tanzania to coordinate the program and 
monitor progress. Expert group (partnership) 
15.4 
Additionally, highly skilled Abbott employee volunteers spend 
significant time on-site in laboratories and construction sites in 
Tanzania to work together with their Tanzanian counterparts. 
Leverage internal skills 
(volunteers) 
15.7 Effective partnerships require clear goals and effective use of each partner’s strengths. Know your strengths 
15.11 Be flexible and be prepared to learn and revise. Be flexible and be prepared to learn as you go 
15.15 A large investment in monitoring and evaluation of its programs with its primary implementation partner Axios. 
Invest in monitoring and 
reporting tools 
17.1 
Through its vast distribution networks—including transportation and 
communication infrastructure—the company is able to successfully 
deliver health information and VCT services to its contractors in the 
field, in addition to its broader supplier and distributor network. 
Own vast transportation and 
communication network 
Leverage Internal strengths 
17.3 A number of other partners help with program implementation and 
support on the ground. Partnered with ground workers 
18.1 
While Bralirwa is a small company based in a highly-endemic 
region, it has leveraged the experience and resources of its parent 
company, Heineken International, to improve VCT services and 
overall healthcare delivery. 
Leverage internal skills 
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Vector 8: Company’s Ability to Deliver 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
18.2 
Patient health is tracked through an electronic database which can 
easily monitor the progression of their condition and treatment 
regimens 
Monitoring system - electronic 
database 
18.3 
Bralirwa frequently partners with other players to continually 
educate its doctors, nurses and human resources personnel on the 
latest ideas and practices in workplace HIV/AIDS programming. 
Use experts to train their 
employees 
20.1 
Total’s partnership with a local NGO whose central focus is to 
develop programs for a vulnerable population—young people—in a 
social environment with limited services makes this program a true 
best practice in community philanthropy. 
Non-core business, outsource to 
experts 
21.1 
Through its partnership with the Universidad Peruana Cayetano 
Heredia, a private university in Lima, Peru specializing in medicine 
and education, Cisneros was able to create a relevant and impact 
course. The company contributed its multimedia platform to create 
the virtual classroom and e-learning tools, while materials were 
developed by professors from the university (Leverage strengths). 
Synergy between partners 
strengths 
21.2 
Professors also assist with teaching the course, evaluating 
classroom activities and monitoring the progress of teachers 
through the virtual classroom. 
Monitor system 
22.2 
Star School partnered with the University of Zululand to perform a 
baseline evaluation of 24 schools, surveying knowledge, attitudes 
and behaviours relating to HIV/AIDS at the outset of the program. 
Star School contracted Health and Development Africa (an 
independent consultancy based in Johannesburg) to evaluate 
progress against that baseline across the 40 current schools, 
helping the program to evaluate rates of information uptake and 
behaviour change. 
Outsourced progress monitoring 
to independent consulting firm 
23.3 
MBSA’s program also features a robust monitoring and evaluation 
component which provides data for reporting to company 
stakeholders. 
Robust monitoring and 
evaluation component which 
provides data for reporting to 
company stakeholders. 
24.1 
Leveraging existing company infrastructure and personnel, 
Debswana developed a unique partnership with the Government of 
Botswana to scale-up access to Highly Active Anti-Retroviral 
Therapy (HAART) treatment to reach 100,000 non-Debswana 
employees. 
Leverage company 
infrastructure 
24.2 
When the government program was launched, Debswana realigned 
its efforts such that it was able to efficiently contribute its 
competencies and resources. 
Efficiently contribute 
competencies and resources 
24.3 
The program has a rigorous monitoring and evaluation component, 
which includes audits by hospital administrators and monthly 
reports to the government on the status of Masa patients. 
Monitoring system 
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Vector 9: Strategic Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.6 
Create a national HIV/AIDS strategy—that is, to turn a serious but 
fragmented response into a comprehensive and coordinated 
national campaign. 
Selected entry mode led to a co-
ordinated national strategy 
2.2 
These 12 members represented all the major partners in the 
alliance, including developing-world governments, the World Health 
Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, pharmaceutical companies, 
NGO's, research institutes, and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation. 
Define international strategy 
5.4 Program was aligned with Government and International policies/efforts. 
Strategy is aligned with 
international efforts 
5.8 Beyond a clearly evident business case, and based on AGA's 
values and business principles. 
Based on business values and 
principles 
6.7 
Efforts are in line to the company's historic commitment to health, 
dignity, and human rights both in  GM communities and the world at 
large. 
Efforts are in line with corporate 
values 
8.2 
Engaged with the Equatorial Guinea Government and the EG 
Ministry of Health and Social Well-being during the problem 
definition phase. 
Define national efforts by 
involving government 
8.13 Intervention protocol became national policy for malaria treatment. Led to national strategy 
9.3 
Clear STRATEGY to SUPPORT community needs: Modicare has 
been working with a single minded mission of giving back to the 
society that has made it capable of giving, whatever it needs for its 
sustenance and development. 
Efforts support company 
strategy and values 
10.6 Leveraged governmental funds to pay for home based workers. Strategy in line with national 
efforts 
11.1 Strategic commitment to sustainable development. Sustainable development is a Business Value 
13.7 
Commitment: The Bank has also formalized an approach for 
employee volunteering; providing two days paid leave for 
employees to contribute to community projects. 
Supported by company policy 
14.2 
The community program is driven by Xstrata's strong commitment 
to innovation and the vision of supporting sustainable local social 
and economic development as the means of building community 
resilience to the vulnerabilities that perpetuate HIV/AIDS and TB. 
Strategy based on own 
business values and principles 
14.6 
Working together with the government is the most sustainable way 
of achieving its development goals so Xstrata has entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Provincial Department of 
Health to implement a Public-Private Mix model that will extend its 
forerunner project in the Breyten community to other sub-districts.  
Aligned with national efforts 
15.1 
The Abbott Fund’s partnership with the Government of Tanzania 
was designed to adapt resource-limited health systems to meet the 
lifelong treatment needs of people with HIV/AIDS, including 
improving facilities, upgrading administration and systems, training 
staff, increasing access to VCT and HIV care and assisting OVC. 
Define national strategy 
15.9 Program strategies need to support national AIDS plans and work 
with nationals of the country. 
Program strategies need to be 
aligned with national efforts 
15.14 
Continue to work with the Tanzanian government to identify and 
evaluate how best to address new challenges in the national scale 
up of HIV testing and treatment. 
Define national strategies 
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Vector 9: Strategic Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
19.2 
In preparation for launching the program, each area of intervention 
was discussed with local authorities and large players on the 
ground—such as the World Bank and UNAIDS. The final program 
draft was submitted for approval to the President of Malawi and the 
local ministries involved. 
Partner with international 
standard setters to align with 
international trends 
21.4 
The course was developed in partnership with Aid for AIDS, one of 
the region’s largest HIV/AIDS advocacy organizations. Through the 
collaboration, people living with HIV/AIDS were given a say in the 
creation of the courses and ensured that all materials were 
presented factually and were indicative of the realities of life with 
HIV/AIDS. 
In line with national efforts 
23.4 
Further, the company’s program is closely aligned with national and 
provincial HIV/AIDS and TB strategies. Through an agreement with 
the provincial government, MBSA is supplied medication for its 
expanded programs with SME's. 
Aligned with national and 
provisional strategy 
24.2 
When the government program was launched, Debswana realigned 
its efforts such that it was able to efficiently contribute its 
competencies and resources. 
Aligned strategy with national 
efforts 
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Vector 10: Location Specific Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.1 
However, the model we have helped to build in Botswana requires 
significant medical infrastructure, which could make it difficult to 
adopt in countries with fewer resources. 
Own resources 
1.3 
Bold political leadership is essential: The person most responsible 
for leading Botswana’s response to AIDS is President Festus 
Mogae. 
Government Involvement 
2.10 
GAVI was too narrowly focused. From the start, GAVI has 
recognized that funding vaccine purchases alone would not allow 
the 75 poorest countries in the world to overcome their 
infrastructure challenges, so it has provided “immunization system 
support” to help countries improve their ability to deliver vaccines to 
a large portion of their children. GAVI has learned that in many 
cases the ability of the country to reach more children is not related 
simply to its immunization program. Broader health-system failures 
are often to blame. So GAVI has now expanded its funding criteria 
and set aside about half of its resources to help meet broader 
health-system needs. 
Infrastructure and systems 
changed entry mode 
2.11 
Creating an alliance of existing entities was a better strategy than 
building a new entity But as the old African proverb says, “If you 
want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.” Each of 
GAVI’s partners has a unique role, and brings essential 
relationships and insights to the table. 
Support Existing Efforts 
6.2 
Social Responsibility is not a competition - aligning with and 
complementing community outreach efforts where they exist 
already. 
Compliment existing efforts 
8.5 Formulated clear and simple control strategy. Company operations affected 
9.1 
The foundation is supporting local NGO's in organizing mass 
awareness campaigns as well as awareness sessions on HIV/AIDS 
for community men, women and adolescents. 
Utilise existing efforts 
10.4 Used existing community support structures along with volunteers from NGO’s. 
Support existing efforts and 
leverage strong Community 
structures 
11.4 Crafted, along with local committees of each zone, strategies 
unique to each zone. 
Localised strategy unique to 
each zone 
11.10 
Rio Tinto invests heavily in education and training of youth and local 
health care workers to ensure the skills needed to maintain the 
program remain in the local community. 
Invest in educating and training 
of youth and local health care 
workers to ensure skills remain 
in local community 
12.2 Identified SPECIFIC sites where training was needed. Identify specific sites where intervention was needed 
13.2 
Standard Charterer's HIV Champions develop relationships and 
work closely with NGO's operating in their country or with target 
groups to develop and deliver education activities. 
Champion build relationship with 
NGO's operating on ground 
level 
14.7 
This collaboration also reduces duplication, identifies gaps and 
achieves efficiencies, such as improvements in the supply chain for 
ARV and TB pharmaceuticals for both public and private clinics. 
Know existing efforts to find 
gaps and prevent duplication 
15.1 
The Abbott Fund’s partnership with the Government of Tanzania 
was designed to adapt resource-limited health systems to meet the 
lifelong treatment needs of people with HIV/AIDS, including 
improving facilities, upgrading administration and systems, training 
staff, increasing access to VCT and HIV care and assisting OVC. 
Government involvement 
depicted entry mode 
Location in need of systems and 
infrastructure 
16.1 By adopting action plans for each country in which it operates, Accor has effectively localized its HIV/AIDS program. Adopt program for each country 
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Vector 10: Location Specific Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
17.2 By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically scale up the scope of its intervention. 
Partnering with Government - 
able to increase scope of 
intervention dramatically 
17.3 A number of other partners help with program implementation and 
support on the ground. 
Partnered with local ground 
workers 
18.1 
While Bralirwa is a small company based in a highly-endemic 
region, it has leveraged the experience and resources of its parent 
company, Heineken International, to improve VCT services and 
overall healthcare delivery. 
Highly-endemic region 
21.5 
By targeting its educational programs at students living in peri-urban 
centres and rural areas, Cisneros ensured that the messages 
presented were reaching those most at risk. 
Reaching the people in the 
areas that are most at risk 
24.4 
Debswana’s program is a model example of business filling critical 
health gaps in resource-limited settings. In the case of Masa, the 
Government of Botswana was capable of procuring medication, but 
lacked the necessary infrastructure and medical personnel to 
effectively administer it to the people. 
Government Lacked 
infrastructure, personnel and 
administrative systems, which 
was provided by social partner 
to provide synergy 
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Vector 11: Transaction Specific Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
2.1 
The blueprint for GAVI called not for a large new international 
bureaucracy but rather for a lean secretariat housed within 
UNICEF’s offices in Geneva, administered by widely respected 
Norwegian immunologist Tore Godal, and governed by a 12-
member board.  
Minimise bureaucracy through a 
small focussed body 
2.9 
Funding operating expenses is essential. But we’ve learned that 
funding operating expenses is vital for getting new entities up and 
running, for attracting donors that have greater funding restraints, 
and for giving grantees the ability to innovate. 
Fund operational expenses 
2.10 
GAVI was too narrowly focused. From the start, GAVI has 
recognized that funding vaccine purchases alone would not allow 
the 75 poorest countries in the world to overcome their 
infrastructure challenges, so it has provided “immunization system 
support” to help countries improve their ability to deliver vaccines to 
a large portion of their children. GAVI has learned that in many 
cases the ability of the country to reach more children is not related 
simply to its immunization program. Broader health-system failures 
are often to blame. So GAVI has now expanded its funding criteria 
and set aside about half of its resources to help meet broader 
health-system needs. 
Strategy was too narrowly 
focussed 
5.3 Defined a clear strategy/policy to solve the problem. Clear defined strategy to solve the problem 
6.1 Stay focused - have a clearly defined strategy and stay the course. Clear defined strategy to solve the problem 
8.5 Formulated clear and simple control strategy. Clear defined strategy 
10.6 Leveraged governmental funds to pay for home based workers. Leverage Government funding 
12.9 They view the process as a continuous one. Continuous Process 
13.5 
The Bank is keen to build on the success of the program; using the 
skills and capacity developed to benefit a broader network of 
people. The new Vision is to reach one million people in three 
years. The mission is to achieve this by strengthening its 
commitment to existing partnerships, including those with 
customers, suppliers and NGO's. 
Long-term vision and mission 
for Project 
15.6 
The country was politically stable and demonstrated leadership to 
fight HIV/AIDS and openness to partnerships with the private 
sector, such as those supported by the Abbott Fund. 
Government open for 
partnerships 
15.7 Effective partnerships require clear goals and effective use of each partner’s strengths. 
Clear goals effective use of 
partner's strengths 
15.8 Direct engagement of the leadership of each partner and 
communications is essential to success. 
Direct engagement of the 
leadership of each partner and 
communications is essential to 
success 
17.2 By partnering with the U.S. government, Dunavant was able to dramatically scale up the scope of its intervention. 
Partnering with Government - 
able to increase scope of 
intervention dramatically 
19.1 
By partnering with three additional local NGO's—Scout 
Associations, Save the Children and CISP—the scope of the 
intervention was broadened. 
Broaden scope through diverse 
partners 
19.3 
By building a multifunctional centre that hosts the activities of 
Project Malawi’s four partners, the company was able to improve 
synergies between the multiple services provided by each 
association. 
Design for synergy 
20.1 
Total’s partnership with a local NGO whose central focus is to 
develop programs for a vulnerable population—young people—in a 
social environment with limited services makes this program a true 
best practice in community philanthropy. 
Specific strategy & limited 
services 
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Vector 11: Transaction Specific Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
21.1 
Through its partnership with the Universidad Peruana Cayetano 
Heredia, a private university in Lima, Peru specializing in medicine 
and education, Cisneros was able to create a relevant and impact 
course. The company contributed its multimedia platform to create 
the virtual classroom and e-learning tools, while materials were 
developed by professors from the university (Leverage strengths). 
Get complimenting partners to 
create synergy 
22.1 
Star School uses a holistic approach to education about HIV/AIDS; 
rather than focusing exclusively on HIV/AIDS prevention 
information, the program’s curriculum aims to empower students to 
make better choices. 
Holistic approach rather than 
focussing on HIV only 
25.4 Effective disease management to ensure support to those who 
require it. 
Clear focussed strategy along 
with effective management 
 
 
Vector 12: Firm Specific Variables 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.5 
The Merck Company Foundation and the Gates Foundation each 
committed $50 million over five years to help Botswana strengthen 
its health infrastructure, such as training new health workers and 
managers, and establishing new laboratories and mobile clinics. 
Available Resources 
6.4 Leverage GM’s talent and resources to solve the problem. Leverage internal talent and 
resources to support entry mode 
8.3 Formed Implementation team with partners, government and world 
class experts in the field malaria and social development. 
Not core business - get world 
class experts 
9.1 
The foundation is supporting local NGO's in organizing mass 
awareness campaigns as well as awareness sessions on HIV/AIDS 
for community men, women and adolescents. 
Not core business 
15.11 Be flexible and be prepared to learn and revise. Be flexible and be prepared to learn as you go 
18.1 
While Bralirwa is a small company based in a highly-endemic 
region, it has leveraged the experience and resources of its parent 
company, Heineken International, to improve VCT services and 
overall healthcare delivery. 
Leverage internal skills of parent 
company 
20.2 
By contributing its funding to a local NGO on the ground in Angola, 
Total increased the ability of its investment to reach the target 
group.  
Ability to fund partners 
24.2 
When the government program was launched, Debswana realigned 
its efforts such that it was able to efficiently contribute its 
competencies and resources. 
Efficiently contribute 
competencies and resources 
Flexible 
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Vector 13: Experience 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.1 
However, the model we have helped to build in Botswana requires 
significant medical infrastructure, which could make it difficult to 
adopt in countries with fewer resources. 
With success on one mode, use 
same entry mode in other 
countries 
2.2 
These 12 members represented all the major partners in the 
alliance, including developing-world governments, the World Health 
Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, pharmaceutical companies, 
NGO's, research institutes, and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation. 
Partnership brings together 
enormous amount of experience 
2.3 
GAVI invites the 75 poorest countries in the world to develop plans 
and submit proposals for increasing vaccine coverage and use of 
newer vaccines. 
Consult with Stakeholders 
5.7 Similar process to be rolled out by Ashanti in other countries. (Gained experience). 
Similar Model rolled out in other 
countries 
7.4 Small beginnings: Success in one community caused management to roll the SAME program out to other communities. 
Similar Model In Other 
Countries 
Pilot Project in local community 
8.3 Formed Implementation team with partners, government and world 
class experts in the field malaria and social development. 
Get world class experts to run 
with the project 
Ask stakeholders for insight 
8.15 Ensure sustainability by continuing and improving existing efforts. Continue to improve your own 
existing efforts 
9.1 
The foundation is supporting local NGO's in organizing mass 
awareness campaigns as well as awareness sessions on HIV/AIDS 
for community men, women and adolescents. 
Low level of experience, use 
NGO's as partners 
10.1 Worked in collaboration with local government and other NGO’s. Gain experience through partnering with experts 
10.7 Run pilot projects. Small Pilot Project First 
11.4 Crafted, along with local committees of each zone, strategies 
unique to each zone. Stakeholder involvement 
11.5 Received technical assistance from international leaders in the industry. 
Receive technical assistance 
from industry leaders 
12.3 
Tied up with local NGO's having strong community linkages and 
experience in community development activities especially in areas 
of HIV/AIDS and education. 
Partner with experienced NGO's 
12.5 
Forged understanding with educational institutions including schools 
and private blue-chip companies to take the C`hampion' model 
forward as best practice in generating awareness on HIV/AIDS. 
Share experience with others 
12.7 
Opinion makers like key family members, teachers, panchayat 
members and health workers were involved in the workshops which 
were followed by discussions. 
Consult with opinion makers 
13.4 Use of pilot projects before rolling out on major scale. Gain experience through pilot 
13.5 
The Bank is keen to build on the success of the program; using the 
skills and capacity developed to benefit a broader network of 
people. The new Vision is to reach one million people in three 
years. The mission is to achieve this by strengthening its 
commitment to existing partnerships, including those with 
customers, suppliers and NGO's. 
Build on success of existing 
model 
Skills and Capacity developed 
14.3 
Xstrata has incrementally and systematically carried the momentum 
and learning from its workforce responses to the households and 
communities by means of the door to door approach by working 
with its implementing Partner, Re-Action! 
Gain experience systematically 
and incrementally 
Gain experience through 
stakeholder input 
Gain experience through expert 
partner 
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Vector 13: Experience 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
14.6 
Working together with the government is the most sustainable way 
of achieving its development goals so Xstrata has entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Provincial Department of 
Health to implement a Public-Private Mix model that will extend its 
forerunner project in the Breyten community to other sub-districts.  
Use same model in other 
districts 
14.8 
Having earned the respect of employees and the communities in 
which it operates, XCSA is now able to venture into new 
partnerships and facilitate further sustainable local development 
and social developments. 
Respect earned in community 
makes it easier to venture into 
new partnerships/projects 
14.10 
Sustainability and continuous innovation is imperative. Xstrata's 
next steps will be to continue to augment and develop its 
relationship with its partners and to explore opportunities for future 
collaborations. 
Gain experience with 
continuous development and 
partnership building 
15.2 
The program is managed through close collaboration between the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Health, led by Minister of Health Anna 
Abdallah; the Abbott Fund; and Axios, an organization specializing 
in health management in developing countries. 
Diverse partners bring vast 
portfolio of experience 
15.12 
Listen to local partners and understand local needs: working with 
community based organizations ensures local viability and sets the 
groundwork for a sustainable program. 
Listen to local people 
17.3 A number of other partners help with program implementation and 
support on the ground. 
Partnered with local ground 
workers 
19.1 
By partnering with three additional local NGO's—Scout 
Associations, Save the Children and CISP—the scope of the 
intervention was broadened. 
Maximise experience through 
diverse partners 
19.2 
In preparation for launching the program, each area of intervention 
was discussed with local authorities and large players on the 
ground—such as the World Bank and UNAIDS. The final program 
draft was submitted for approval to the President of Malawi and the 
local ministries involved. 
Listen to local people and large 
players on the ground 
Partner with industry players 
21.4 
The course was developed in partnership with Aid for AIDS, one of 
the region’s largest HIV/AIDS advocacy organizations. Through the 
collaboration, people living with HIV/AIDS were given a say in the 
creation of the courses and ensured that all materials were 
presented factually and were indicative of the realities of life with 
HIV/AIDS. 
Ask stakeholders 
23.1 
By taking on a mentoring role to these smaller businesses, MBSA 
was able to expand its prevention, voluntary counselling and testing 
(VCT) and treatment services to reach a large number of vulnerable 
community members. 
Mentoring role requires little 
experience, only compliment 
existing efforts 
23.2 Seventeen companies participated in the program’s pilot phase. Pilot Project 
25.5 Involvement of all relevant stakeholders in planning and implementation. Stakeholder involvement 
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Vector 14: Risk 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.5 
The Merck Company Foundation and the Gates Foundation each 
committed $50 million over five years to help Botswana strengthen 
its health infrastructure, such as training new health workers and 
managers, and establishing new laboratories and mobile clinics. 
Multiple Financial Partners 
2.4 
An independent committee made up largely of developing-country 
public health experts then reviews and makes recommendations on 
the proposals. GAVI’s board then meets to review the 
recommendations. Once the board approves a proposal, it requests 
that the GAVI Fund release payment. 
Experts assist with 
recommendation 
Approval done by board 
2.6 
Sometimes you have to be the first dollar in. GAVI Fund in 1999, we 
were its only funder, and we did not require that the grantee match 
our commitment (as we often do today). It was a risky bet. 
First Mover 
7.2 School principle was sceptic but they took the RISK and taking the first step. First mover against the odds 
7.4 Small beginnings: Success in one community caused management to roll the SAME program out to other communities. 
Minimise Risk though small pilot 
project 
8.3 Formed Implementation team with partners, government and world 
class experts in the field malaria and social development. 
Minimise risk through the use of 
a focus group of world class 
experts and stakeholder 
involvement 
8.12 Marathon and partners committed to provide finances for pre-defined services/medication. 
Multiple financial partners 
reduce risk 
10.6 Leveraged governmental funds to pay for home based workers. Reduce financial risk by leveraging Government funds 
10.7 Run pilot projects. Minimise risk through the use of pilot projects 
11.11 Multi-sector partnerships with the government, NGO's and the private sector ensure a broad and sustainable funding base. 
Multi-sector partnerships 
broaden and sustain funding 
base 
13.4 Use of pilot projects before rolling out on major scale. Minimise risk through pilot 
13.6 In 2006, Standard Charterer's HIV Champions partnered with Chi Heng Foundation to raise funds. Fund partner 
14.8 
Having earned the respect of employees and the communities in 
which it operates, XCSA is now able to venture into new 
partnerships and facilitate further sustainable local development 
and social developments. 
Positive reputation in community 
reduce risk of community 
resistance 
14.9 
Its methodology states that deep democracy and collective counsel 
creates a platform to retain and maintain the unity and value of 
individual response which in turn addresses behaviour change. 
Democracy and collective 
counselling brings unity 
15.2 
The program is managed through close collaboration between the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Health, led by Minister of Health Anna 
Abdallah; the Abbott Fund; and Axios, an organization specializing 
in health management in developing countries. 
Minimise risk through diverse 
set of partners and experts 
15.5 
When the Abbott Fund’s program was started in 2002, there were 
very few donors in the country and a significant need for 
improvement in its health care management, infrastructure and 
services. 
Start-up with high investment 
risk  
15.13 Be willing to invest in powerful ideas. Be willing to invest in powerful ideas 
16.2 Used a DVD production as central theme through all country efforts. Minimised through a standard theme 
19.1 
By partnering with three additional local NGO's—Scout 
Associations, Save the Children and CISP—the scope of the 
intervention was broadened. 
Minimise risk through diverse 
partners 
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Vector 14: Risk 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
23.1 
By taking on a mentoring role to these smaller businesses, MBSA 
was able to expand its prevention, voluntary counselling and testing 
(VCT) and treatment services to reach a large number of vulnerable 
community members. 
Mentoring role is low risk (co-
inside with model) 
23.2 Seventeen companies participated in the program’s pilot phase. Minimise risk through portfolio of partners 
25.1 Effective planning of the program from the outset. Risk was minimised through Effective Planning from the start 
25.5 Involvement of all relevant stakeholders in planning and implementation. Stakeholder involvement 
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Vector 15: Control 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.6 
Create a national HIV/AIDS strategy—that is, to turn a serious but 
fragmented response into a comprehensive and coordinated 
national campaign. 
Co-ordinate camping 
2.4 
An independent committee made up largely of developing-country 
public health experts then reviews and makes recommendations on 
the proposals. GAVI’s board then meets to review the 
recommendations. Once the board approves a proposal, it requests 
that the GAVI Fund release payment. 
Strict Approval Process 
5.5 Ongoing surveillance, monitoring and progress reporting during the project. 
Monthly and annual progress 
monitoring and reporting 
8.5 Formulated clear and simple control strategy. Simple control strategy 
8.11 Continuous (monthly and annual) surveillance, evaluation and progress monitoring 
Monthly and annual progress 
monitoring and reporting 
10.8 Monthly progress reviews. Monthly progress reviews 
12.8 
Periodic evaluations and feedback tools have proved that the 
awareness levels of the targeted groups have gone up post 
intervention. 
Periodic evaluations 
13.3 
Resources are made widely available both through central 
mechanisms such as the Bank's website (e.g. the HIV e-learning 
resource) as well as through individual activities led by HIV 
Champions. 
Centralised and -decentralised  
14.1 Excluded no person and driven by "100% Targets". Target Driven 
14.4 
Work and community based Wellness Champions, Community 
Outreach Workers, Treatment Counsellors, and program 
coordinators who are trained and supported to mobilize the 
community at the grass roots level implement various tools to help 
the community. 
Use program co-ordinators 
14.11 
Monitoring and evaluation systems will now have to be harmonized 
so that achievements in the community (by the NGO’s) and 
workplace (internal champions) can be captured accurately and 
consistently. 
Harmonised monitoring and 
evaluation system to measure 
achievements of own and 
partner's efforts 
15.2 
The program is managed through close collaboration between the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Health, led by Minister of Health Anna 
Abdallah; the Abbott Fund; and Axios, an organization specializing 
in health management in developing countries. 
Close collaboration 
15.3 The staff frequently visits Tanzania to coordinate the program and 
monitor progress. 
Co-ordinate all efforts though 
frequent visits 
15.11 Be flexible and be prepared to learn and revise. Be flexible and be prepared to learn as you go 
15.15 A large investment in monitoring and evaluation of its programs with its primary implementation partner Axios. Monitor System 
16.2 Used a DVD production as central theme through all country efforts. Centralised main theme 
18.2 
Patient health is tracked through an electronic database which can 
easily monitor the progression of their condition and treatment 
regimens 
Monitor system - electronic 
database 
19.3 
By building a multifunctional centre that hosts the activities of 
Project Malawi’s four partners, the company was able to improve 
synergies between the multiple services provided by each 
association. 
Co-ordinate efforts to ensure 
synergy 
20.3 
CAJ brought to the table a deep understanding of local cultural 
issues and knowledge of the barriers to reaching local youths that 
the different initiatives would need to overcome. 
Partner brought deep 
understanding of cultural issues, 
and barriers of reaching people 
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Vector 15: Control 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
21.2 
Professors also assist with teaching the course, evaluating 
classroom activities and monitoring the progress of teachers 
through the virtual classroom. 
Monitor progress 
23.1 
By taking on a mentoring role to these smaller businesses, MBSA 
was able to expand its prevention, voluntary counselling and testing 
(VCT) and treatment services to reach a large number of vulnerable 
community members. 
Mentoring role requires little 
control (co-inside with model) 
23.3 
MBSA’s program also features a robust monitoring and evaluation 
component which provides data for reporting to company 
stakeholders. 
Robust monitoring and 
evaluation component which 
provides data for reporting to 
company stakeholders 
24.3 
The program has a rigorous monitoring and evaluation component, 
which includes audits by hospital administrators and monthly 
reports to the government on the status of Masa patients. 
Rigorous monitoring evaluation 
component, including audits 
25.3 Assurance of confidentiality, as HIV is still a highly sensitive issue. 
Assurance of confidentiality, as 
HIV is still a highly sensitive 
issue 
25.4 Effective disease management to ensure support to those who 
require it. 
Effective management to ensure 
that only those in need were 
treated 
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Vector 16: Commitment 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
1.5 
The Merck Company Foundation and the Gates Foundation each 
committed $50 million over five years to help Botswana strengthen 
its health infrastructure, such as training new health workers and 
managers, and establishing new laboratories and mobile clinics. 
5 Year Financial Commitment 
2.6 
Sometimes you have to be the first dollar in. GAVI Fund in 1999, we 
were its only funder, and we did not require that the grantee match 
our commitment (as we often do today). It was a risky bet. 
Grantee must match 
commitment 
2.7 
“Five years only” does not work. GAVI is now requiring countries to 
“co-pay” from the start—that is, to assume a small percentage of 
the cost of the program right away, with the percentage increasing 
every year.(Only back winners not beggars, and co-ownership of 
the problems). 
Five years is too short 
5.6 Appointed a FULL TIME control manager, with support staff. Full time staff 
6.1 Stay focused - have a clearly defined strategy and stay the course. Stay focussed 
6.7 
Efforts are in line to the company's historic commitment to health, 
dignity, and human rights both in  GM communities and the world at 
large. 
Company has historic 
commitment to health, dignity 
and human rights 
8.12 Marathon and partners committed to provide finances for pre-defined services/medication. 
Financial commitment from 
company and partners 
8.15 Ensure sustainability by continuing and improving existing efforts. Commit to sustainability through 
continuous improvement 
11.1 Strategic commitment to sustainable development. Commitment is on strategic level 
11.3 Created a dedicated task force for each zone. Dedicated team for each zone 
12.7 
Opinion makers like key family members, teachers, panchayat 
members and health workers were involved in the workshops which 
were followed by discussions. 
Get commitment of opinion 
makers in the community 
12.9 They view the process as a continuous one. Continuous process/improvement 
13.5 
The Bank is keen to build on the success of the program; using the 
skills and capacity developed to benefit a broader network of 
people. The new Vision is to reach one million people in three 
years. The mission is to achieve this by strengthening its 
commitment to existing partnerships, including those with 
customers, suppliers and NGO's. 
Committed to reach 1 million 
over three years 
13.7 
Commitment: The Bank has also formalized an approach for 
employee volunteering; providing two days paid leave for 
employees to contribute to community projects. 
Strategic Commitment 
14.2 
The community program is driven by Xstrata's strong commitment 
to innovation and the vision of supporting sustainable local social 
and economic development as the means of building community 
resilience to the vulnerabilities that perpetuate HIV/AIDS and TB. 
Strategic commitment 
14.6 
Working together with the government is the most sustainable way 
of achieving its development goals so Xstrata has entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Provincial Department of 
Health to implement a Public-Private Mix model that will extend its 
forerunner project in the Breyten community to other sub-districts.  
Memorandum of understanding 
with Provincial Dept. of Health 
14.9 
Its methodology states that deep democracy and collective counsel 
creates a platform to retain and maintain the unity and value of 
individual response which in turn addresses behaviour change. 
Democracy and collective 
counselling brings unity 
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Vector 16: Commitment 
Case Key Success Factor Keyword (s) 
4.10 
Sustainability and continuous innovation is imperative. Xstrata's 
next steps will be to continue to augment and develop its 
relationship with its partners and to explore opportunities for future 
collaborations. 
Be committed to continuous 
development and improvement 
14.12 Committed to ensure that the last 5 year’s sustained investment in their workplace program remains effective. 
Committed for the last 5 years 
(on keep on) 
15.1 
The Abbott Fund’s partnership with the Government of Tanzania 
was designed to adapt resource-limited health systems to meet the 
lifelong treatment needs of people with HIV/AIDS, including 
improving facilities, upgrading administration and systems, training 
staff, increasing access to VCT and HIV care and assisting OVC. 
Meet lifelong treatment needs of 
people with HIV 
15.3 The staff frequently visits Tanzania to coordinate the program and 
monitor progress. Permanent staff 
18.3 
Bralirwa frequently partners with other players to continually 
educate its doctors, nurses and human resources personnel on the 
latest ideas and practices in workplace HIV/AIDS programming. 
Use partners to continually 
educate workforce 
19.5 Sustainable Funding Improves Adherence to ARV Therapy. Sustainable funding improves project success 
19.6 
By committing itself to a three-year investment, Intesa Sanpaolo 
was able to greatly enhance the impact its funding would have on 
people on the ground. Long-term investments allow for better 
planning and programs that can improve livelihoods in the long-run. 
Long-term investments (3yr) 
allow for better planning and 
programs that can improve 
livelihoods in the long-run 
20.2 
By contributing its funding to a local NGO on the ground in Angola, 
Total increased the ability of its investment to reach the target 
group.  
Funding 
22.3 
Star School was established by Dan Olofsson, a Swedish 
businessman who recently decided to invest in Thanda. His 
commitment to addressing HIV/AIDS in this vulnerable community 
and his continued leadership has helped secure consistent support 
and roll-out of the programs. 
Commitment of 
founder/visionary/leadership 
helped to secure consistent 
support 
25.2 Senior management commitment and support. Senior management 
commitment and support 
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(a) Use Intermediate Parties 
Intermediate parties can be utilised to reduce any/all of the four distances. 
Examples of successful applications include: 
 
Distance Intermediate Party 
Cultural Distance  Influential people within the community 
 Local community support structures 
 NGO’s with strong social links into the community. 
 Experts or someone with a deeper understanding of host and 
home culture/conditions. 
Political & 
Administrative 
Distance 
 Political “bargaining” agents. 
 Local organisations/suppliers 
Geographical 
Distance 
 Setting up local branches and/or regional hubs 
 Local organisations/suppliers 
Economic Distance Same intermediate parties as listed in “Cultural Distance” 
 
(b) Localise the Effort 
Localising the effort, especially through the “champion” approach, will 
minimise project distances by adapting the program in accordance to the local 
culture, economic conditions and political environment.  
 
Local centres will also reduce the geographical distance if they are 
strategically positioned to provide easy access for both parties. Special 
attention must be given to the location of community based centres as to 
ensure easy accessibility for all community members within that region. 
 
(c) Trustworthy Relationships 
Trustworthy relationships are essential for project success and have the 
capacity to reduce the following distances: 
 
APPENDIX  D APPLICATION NOTES ON OVERCOMING CAGE DISTANCES 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 222 
 
Distance Trustworthy Relationship With… 
Cultural Distance  Influential people within the community 
 Local community support structures 
 NGO’s with strong social links into the community. 
 Experts or someone with a deeper understanding of host and 
home culture/conditions. 
Political & 
Administrative 
Distance 
 Local community authorities and ruling parties 
 Local Government officials and departments 
 National Government officials and policy makers 
Geographical30 
Distance 
 Key stakeholders, ranging from ground level workers right up 
to the affluent donors. 
 
(d) Continuous Communication 
Continuous communication with the community can reduce the distance 
created by cultural differences. One must keep them well informed of the 
project’s intentions and outcomes prior and during each stage of the project. 
This can be done at community meetings or via influential community 
members. 
  
The same holds for political distance by obtaining the necessary 
rights/permissions from Government as required. It is also good practice to 
keep the relevant authorities/departments up to date with your project’s 
intentions, activities and progress during the various stages if one needs their 
buy-in at a later stage.  
 
Geographical distance can isolate project partners, regional offices as well as 
ground-level base stations from the social entrepreneurial organisation’s head 
office. Lack of current and correct information on ground between any of 
these entities can lead to unsynchronised efforts and even project failure. It is 
therefore essential to establish a strong communication link between all 
                                            
30
 A high level of trust between the social entrepreneur and any key stakeholder results in a lower intervention rate 
which probably negates some of the effects of geographic distance. 
APPENDIX  D APPLICATION NOTES ON OVERCOMING CAGE DISTANCES 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP  PAGE 223 
parties, utilising suitable information and communication technologies that 
enables one to frequently share relevant information in all directions. 
 
(e) Consultation and Involvement 
Democracy and collective counselling, especially during the problem definition 
phase, brings unity between all parties, unveils the actual problems at hand 
as well as creative ways of solving them. Early partner involvement creates 
buy-in, provides additional resources which allows for an increased 
intervention scope.  
 
Community consultation and involvement enables one to lower the Cultural 
and Economic Distance barriers by:  
 Allowing them to voice their needs and their priorities.  
 Gaining insight on community specific norms, values and beliefs that might 
have an impact on the venture.  
 Maximising the use of local content (resources and labour) during the 
implementation phase. This would then provide the community with 
income generating activities and the social entrepreneurial firm with 
intermediate parties.  
 
Consulting and involving Government’s local authorities and national 
departments from early on, provides the following advantages: 
 Attain Government’s buy-in and support. 
 Provides one of the most sustainable ways of achieving the Development 
Goals and increase the intervention scope exponentially. 
 Enables one to align the intervention strategies with Government’s 
efforts/policies or assist them in formulating new ones. 
 Gain access to Government’s social program funding. 
 Utilise public infrastructure to deliver a private intervention 
 Assisting them to improve the accessibility of infrastructure and quality of 
service delivery where needed. 
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(f) Infrastructure, Services and Critical Resources 
Numerous social interventions start-off without the required services and 
infrastructure available in the country/community. These circumstances then 
result in an overshoot of the estimated project cost and completion dates, 
which are deemed as a project failure if not taken into consideration during 
the problem definition phase.  
 
It is therefore recommended to take cognisance of the implications posed by 
the lack infrastructure, social systems and critical resources within a particular 
area can have on the Political, Geographical and Economic Distances.  
 
Distance Strategy 
Political & 
Administrative 
Distance 
Lack of national infrastructure and public services requires one to 
CONSULT and INVOLVE Government to overcome the problem.  
Geographical 
Distance 
Use the following strategies to distribute social supplies through 
the country: 
 CONSULT and INVOLVE Government to improve the local 
infrastructure/services through a joint effort.  
 Leverage a private (or even own) supply-chain network 
available in the area. 
 Use your own resources to strengthen the local 
infrastructure/services needed for project success. 
Economic Distance The economic distance between host and home countries must 
be considered when benchmarking the effectiveness of the local 
infrastructure and services to that of the home country. 
On the other hand, the provision (or improvement) of local 
infrastructure, services and critical resources during a social 
intervention will reduce the economic burden on the poor, thus 
also impacting the Economic Distance in the long run. 
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(g) Education and Skills Development 
Distance Strategy 
Cultural Distance  Educate the community about the outcome during the 
different phases of the project and how it will influence their 
lives 
 Equip local people to be effective ground-staff and 
intermediate parties. 
 Educate staff members on cultural differences between host 
and home country. 
Political & 
Administrative 
Distance 
Assist Government in upskilling and training their service delivery 
staff in order to improve the quality of supply.  
Economic Distance  Transfer skills to the community/host country as to ensure 
sustainability. 
 Provide skills development opportunities that can lead to 
income generating activities in the community. 
 
 
(h) Historical and Political Associations 
“Historical and political associations between two countries greatly affect trade 
between them.” 
 
For instance in South Africa, negative historic differences of “Apartheid” 
tended manifest when white social entrepreneurs did not respect the local 
black culture or when they were insensitive to the protocols of approaching 
community groups, authorities and/or influential members within the 
community. 
 
(i) Serving Attitude 
A servant leader attitude towards the community can assist one on 
overcoming the cultural and economic barriers between host and home 
country. This includes a willingness to learn from the community while 
empowering them to solve their own problems.   
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Any dictorial behaviour, or actions that sprout from personal and selfish 
interest, might have the opposite effect and could also hamper the alliance 
process with Government. 
 
(j) Solutions must make sense 
The solution must make sense within the constraints posed by all four 
distances: 
 Cultural Distance: It should not discriminate against or infringe with any 
cultural values, norms or beliefs. 
 Political Distance: It must be legal and in line with Governments policies, 
strategies and efforts. 
 Geographical Distance: It must be realistic, given the specific 
geographical constraints. 
 Economic Distance: The community must be able to benefit from it and 
must have the necessary skills/resources to sustain it. 
 
It is also recommended to test multiple strategies through the use of pilot 
projects in confined communities before implementing a solution on a local or 
national level. 
  
  
 
 
